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Abstract
In this thesis, we study problems related to security in three different contexts: cloud
scheduling, access control, and logic locking to protect digital ICs.
The first set of problems relates to security in cloud computing. Prior work suggests that
scheduling, with security as a consideration, can be effective in minimizing information
leakage, via side-channels, that can exist when virtual machines (VMs) co-reside in clouds.
We analyze the overhead that is incurred by such an approach. We first pose and answer
a fundamental question: is the problem tractable? We show that the seemingly simpler
sub-cases of initial placement and migration across only two equal-capacity servers are both
intractable (NP-hard). However, a decision version of the general problem to which the
optimization version is related polynomially is in NP. With these results as the basis, we
make several other contributions. We revisit recent work that proposes a greedy algorithm for
this problem, called Nomad. We establish that if P 6= NP, then there exist infinitely many
classes of input, each with an infinite number of inputs, for which a decrease in information
leakage is possible, but Nomad provides none, let alone minimize it. We establish also that a
mapping to Integer Linear Programming (ILP) in prior work is deficient in that the mapping
can be inefficient (exponential-time), and therefore does not accurately convey the overhead
of such an approach that actually decreases information leakage. We present our efficient
reductions to ILP and boolean satisfiability in conjunctive normal form (CNF-SAT). We have
implemented these approaches and conducted an empirical assessment using the same ILP
solver as prior work, and a SAT solver. Our analytical and empirical results more accurately
convey the overhead that is incurred by an approach that actually provides security (decrease
in information leakage).
The second set of problems relates to access control. We pose and study forensic analysis in
the context of access control systems. Forensics seeks to answer questions about past states
of a system, and thereby provides important clues and evidence in the event of a security
incident. Access control deals with who may perform what action on a resource and is an
important security function. We argue that access control is an important context in which
to consider forensic analysis, and observe that it is a natural complement of safety analysis,
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which has been considered extensively in the literature. We pose the forensic analysis problem
for access control systems abstractly, and instantiate it for three schemes from the literature:
a well-known access matrix scheme, a role-based scheme, and a discretionary scheme. In
particular, we ask what the computational complexity of forensic analysis is, and compare it
to the computational complexity of safety analysis for each of these schemes. We observe
that in the worst-case, forensic analysis lies in the same complexity class as safety analysis.
We consider also the notion of logs, i.e., data that can be collected over time to aid forensic
analysis. We present results for sufficient and minimal logs that render forensic analysis for
the three schemes efficient. This motivates discussions on goal-directed logging, with the
explicit intent of aiding forensic analysis. We carry out a case-study in the realistic setting of a
serverless cloud application, and observe that goal-directed logging can be highly effective.
Our work makes contributions at the foundations of information security, and its practical
implications.
The third set of problems relates to logic locking to protect digital integrated circuits (ICs)
against untrusted semiconductor foundries. We make two sets of complementary contributions,
all rooted in foundations and bolstered by implementations and empirical results. Our first
set of contributions regards observations about prior schemes and attacks, and our second
is a new security notion. Towards the former, we make two contributions. (a) We revisit a
prior approach called XOR-locking that has been demonstrated to be susceptible, in practice,
to a particular attack called the SAT attack. We establish that (i) there exist circuits that are
invulnerable to the SAT attack when XOR-locked with even a 1-bit key, and, (ii) there is a
particular property that is inherent to benchmark circuits that explains why the SAT attack is
successful against XOR-locked versions of those. Both (i) and (ii) are rooted in computing
foundations: for (i), one-way functions; for (ii), average-case computational complexity,
specifically, the class distP. (b) We revisit a state-of-art logic locking approach called TTLock
whose generalization called SFLL-HD has been argued to be “provably secure” in prior work.
We devise a new, probabilistic attack against TTLock. We explain, from foundations, why
benchmark circuits that are locked using TTLock are susceptible to our new attack. Our
observations (a) and (b), and prior work on attacks, informs our second contribution, which is
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In this thesis we use computing foundations to study computational problems related to
information security in three different contexts.
Our first line of contribution is in the context of cloud computing. In particular, we consider the
vulnerability that arises when a cloud provider hosts the virtual machines (VMs) of multiple
clients on the same physical machine using virtualization. Although this multi-tenant setting
results in economies of scale for the provider, it gives rise to a security threat because cross-
VM side-channel attacks may occur — it is possible for a malicious client who is co-resident
with a victim client to extract information about the victim by exploiting the underlying
shared hardware. Prior work proposes models to quantify information leakage from cross-
VM side-channels and suggests that a possible defence is to use a placement algorithm for
virtual machines that minimizes information leakage under these models [5]. We study this
optimization problem in more depth.
Our second line of contribution is in the context of access control systems. In access control
systems, principals request for accesses to resources, and their requests are granted or denied
based on the current authorization state. The authorization state may change over time, with
changes possibly being effected by semi-trusted or untrusted users. We pose and study a new
problem in this context — that of asking queries about the system’s past authorization states.
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Answers to these forensic questions may expose or explain vulnerabilities in the access control
system.
Our third line of contribution is in the context of logic locking to protect digital integrated
circuits (ICs). Logic locking is a process used by a semiconductor designer to hide their
intellectual property in a circuit before sending the circuit to an untrusted foundry for
fabrication. While there have been several proposals for how to lock a circuit, to the best of
our knowledge, each of these has been shown to be vulnerable to some attack or the other (see
Section 5.5 in Chapter 5 for a discussion). We seek to gain further insight to comprehend this
discouraging state of affairs in the logic locking research space.
Although each of our three lines of contributions in this work lie in different contexts, our
approach to addressing them is common — we appeal to computing foundations. In particular,
we use computational complexity theory to gain meaningful insights about the problems.
Computational complexity theory is a subfield of theoretical computer science; its primary
goal is to classify and compare the practical difficulty of solving problems about finite
combinatorial objects. It is concerned with how much resources are required to solve a given
computational task [6].
Our thesis statement is the following:
There exist problems in information security for which an analysis based in
computational complexity can provide meaningful insights into trade-offs and
thereby guide us to appropriate solution approaches.
We prove the thesis statement by construction. That is, we study three problems in information
security and we demonstrate how computational complexity theory provides insights into
those problems that were not previously known.
This thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2 we introduce definitions and preliminary
material related to computational complexity. We study the cloud VM-scheduling problem in
Chapter 3, the forensic analysis problem for access control in Chapter 4, and logic locking to
protect digital ICs in Chapter 5. Each of Chapters 3, 4 and 5 provides background information
2






In this chapter we provide definitions and explain the concepts related to computational
complexity theory that are used in this thesis.
2.1 Definitions
A computational problem is a function that we seek to compute using a computational device
such as a Turing machine. Thus, such a problem can be characterized by specifying: (i) inputs,
and, (ii) outputs that correspond to those inputs. A particular specification of an input to a
computational problem is called an instance of the problem. For example, Prime Factorization
corresponds to the function whose domain is the set of positive integers ≥ 2, and codomain is
the powerset of prime numbers. The function maps an input integer to its set of prime factors.
An example of an instance of Prime Factorization is 9, and the output of the function for this
instance is {3, 3}.
A decision problem is one which corresponds to a function whose codomain is {false,true},
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i.e., a bit. An example of a decision version of the Prime Factorization problem is one in
which the input is a pair of positive integers 〈N, k〉, such that N, k ≥ 2, and the ouput is ‘true’
if N has a prime factor ≤ k, and ‘false’ otherwise.
Solving a problem means computing the function that corresponds to the problem. An
algorithm is a step-by-step procedure for solving a problem. An algorithm is said to solve
a problem if it can be applied to any instance of the problem and is guaranteed to produce
the correct output for that instance. A deterministic algorithm is an algorithm which given
a particular instance as input, always produces the same output. That is, its behaviour on an
input instance can be completely predicted from the instance. In contrast, a non-deterministic
algorithm is an algorithm with more than one allowed step at certain times and which always
takes the right or best step. Conceptually, a non-deterministic algorithm could run on a
deterministic computer with an unlimited number of parallel processors. Each time more than
one step is possible, new processes are instantly forked to try all of them. When one process
successfully finishes, its result is returned. Thus the computation is as fast as if it always
chooses the right step. In this thesis, when we use the term ‘algorithm’ without qualification,
we mean a deterministic algorithm.
The description of a problem instance that we provide as input to an algorithm can be viewed
as a finite string of symbols chosen from a finite input alphabet. Although there are many
ways to map instances to strings, for simplicity and without any loss of generality, we can
assume that each problem has a fixed encoding scheme which maps its instances into strings
describing them. The input length of an instance of a problem is used as a formal measure of
the size of the instance, and is defined to be the number of symbols, n, in the description of
the instance obtained from the problem’s encoding scheme.
There could be multiple algorithms which solve a problem but in general, we are interested in
the most efficient one. In its broadest sense, the notion of efficiency, refers to all the various
computing resources needed to execute an algorithm such as time and space. However, time
requirements are often the most dominant factor, and by the ‘most efficient algorithm’ one
normally means the fastest one. The time complexity function of an algorithm expresses its
time requirements by giving, for each possible input length n, the largest amount of time
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needed by the algorithm to solve a problem instance of that size.
The notations O(.),Ω(.),Θ(.), o(.) and ω(.) are used to compare functions. We use them to
analyze the asymptotic efficiency of an algorithm, that is, how a particular resource required
by an algorithm, such as its running time, increases with the input size n in the limit, as
n increases without bound. We deal only with functions of the form f : N → R+, that is
only those functions whose domain is positive integers, and co-domain is positive reals. The
reason is that an input size for us is always a positive integer, and time- and space-efficiency is
quantified as a positive real.
For a given function g(n) we denote by O(g(n)) the set of functions
O(g(n)) = {f(n) : ∃ positive constants n0 and c such that 0 ≤ f(n) ≤ cg(n) for all n ≥ n0}.
For a function f(n) ∈ O(g(n)) it is customary to write f(n) = O(g(n)). The mindset, when
we say f(n) = O(g(n)) is that g(n) is an asymptotic upper-bound for f(n).
For a given function g(n) we denote by Ω(g(n)) the set of functions
Ω(g(n)) = {f(n) : ∃ positive constants n0 and c such that 0 ≤ cg(n) ≤ f(n) for all n ≥ n0}.
When we say f(n) = Ω(g(n)), we mean that f(n) ∈ Ω(g(n)) and that g(n) is an asymptotic
lower-bound for f(n).
For a given function g(n), Θ(g(n)) is the set of functions that are in bothO(g(n)) and Ω(g(n)).
When we say f(n) = Θ(g(n)), we mean that f(n) ∈ Θ(g(n)) and that g(n) is an asymptotic
tight bound for f(n).
The upper-bound provided by O(.) notation may or may not be asymptotically tight. We use
o(.) to denote an upper-bound that is not asymptotically tight. Formally for a given fuction
g(n) we denote by o(g(n)) the set of functions
6
o(g(n)) = {f(n) : for any positive constant c > 0 there exists a constant
n0 > 0 such that 0 ≤ f(n) < cg(n) for all n ≥ n0}.
Similarly, the lower-bound provided by Ω(.) notation may or may not be asymptotically tight.
We use ω(.) to denote a lower-bound that is not asymptotically tight. Formally for a given
fuction g(n) we denote by ω(g(n)) the set of functions
ω(g(n)) = {f(n) : for any positive constant c > 0 there exists a constant
n0 > 0 such that 0 ≤ cg(n) < f(n) for all n ≥ n0}.
We say that an algorithm is polynomial-time if there exists a constant k such that the algorithm’s
time-efficiency can be meaningfully characterized as O(nk), where n is the size of the input.
We say that an algorithm is exponential-time if there exists a constant k > 1 such that the
algorithm’s time-efficiency can be meaningfully characterized as O(kn), where n is the size of
the input.
The computational complexity of a problem refers to the inherent difficulty of the problem. It
characterizes the resources required to solve the problem. Problems are classified based on
their inherent difficulty with certain relationships existing between classes.
We use the notion of a reduction to compare two problems from the standpoint of their
computational complexity.
A Cook reduction, also called a polynomial-time Turing reduction, is a particular kind of
reduction from problem A to problem B. We say problem A Cook-reduces to problem B
if there exists an algorithm that solves problem A using a polynomial number of calls to an
algorithm that solves problem B, and polynomial time outside of those calls.
A Karp reduction, also called a polynomial-time many-one reduction, is another kind of
reduction. We say that a decision problem A Karp-reduces to a decision problem B if there
7
exists a polynomial-time computable function f that transforms instances of A into instances
of B such that x is a ‘yes’ instance of A if and only if f(x) is a ‘yes’ instance of B.
In this thesis, unless otherwise specified, the term ‘reduction’ refers to a Karp reduction.
2.2 Computational Complexity Classes
We now define the computational complexity classes that are of interest to us.
The class of decidable problems comprises the decision problems for each of which there
exists an algorithm that terminates and is correct for every instance of the problem.
The class of undecidable problems comprises the decision problems for each of which it is
proven that there cannot exist an algorithm that terminates and is correct for every instance of
the problem.
The class P is the set of decision problems for each of which there exists a constant k and an
algorithm whose time-efficiency is O(nk). That is, P comprises decision problems that can be
solved by an algorithm in polynomial time in the input size.
The class NP is the set of decision problems for each of which there exists a constant k and a
non-deterministic algorithm whose time-efficiency O(nk). An equivalent definition is that a
decision problem is in the class NP if for its ‘yes’ instances there exists an efficiently sized
proof that can be verified in polynomial time.
The class PSPACE is the set of decision problems for each of which there exists a constant k
and an algorithm whose space-efficiency is O(nk).
The class NPSPACE is the set of decision problems for each of which there exists a constant
k and a non-deterministic algorithm whose space-efficiency is O(nk).
The class EXPTIME is the set of decision problems for each of which there exists a constant
k and an algorithm whose time-efficiency is O(2nk).
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The relationship between the above classes is:
P ⊆ NP ⊆ PSPACE ⊆ NPSPACE ⊆ EXPTIME ⊆ decidable.
It is known that PSPACE = NPSPACE [7], and also that P ⊂ EXPTIME. Whether
P = NP is a major open problem, although it is generally conjectured that P 6= NP. Whether
NP = PSPACE and whether PSPACE = EXPTIME are also open problems.
When we say that a decision problem belongs to a complexity class, that is an expression of
an upper-bound for the hardness of the problem. For example, if a decision problem is in NP,
that expresses that the problem is no harder than NP. However it doesn’t say anything about
the lower-bound hardness of the problem.
The notion of a reduction can be used to express the lower-bound hardness of a problem
relative to a complexity class. We say that a problem A is C-hard under a type of reduction,
where C is a complexity class, if every problem in C can be reduced to A using that type of
reduction. For example, we may say that a problem A is NP-hard under a Cook reduction.
When one says a problem A is C-hard without specifying under what kind of reduction, one
usually means under a Karp reduction.
The notion of completeness combines an upper- and lower-bound on hardness. We say a
problem A is C-complete for a complexity class C under a type of reduction if two conditions
hold: (1) A is in C, and (2) A is C-hard under that type of reduction.
2.3 Average-Case Complexity
The computational complexity classes defined in the previous section relate to worst-case
complexity. That is, a problem belongs to a particular class if it’s worst-case instance requires
the resources characterized by that class. For example, a problem is in the class P if its
worst-case input can be solved in polynomial time.
As previously mentioned, a customary assumption is that P 6= NP. Therefore if a problem
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is NP-hard, it is unlikely that an efficient algorithm exists that solves every instance of it.
Because if such an algorithm exists, it would imply that all problems in NP can be solved in
polynomial time and that NP = P. For many NP-hard problems however, the instances that
arise in practice do not elicit the worst-case. Hence algorithm designers may try to design
efficient algorithms that work for ‘many’ or ‘most’ instances. Similarly for problems in certain
fields like cryptography, it is often not sufficient to demonstrate that the problem faced by the
attacker is hard in the worst-case. Rather, what is needed is evidence that the average instance
that arises in practice is hard for the attacker. This motivates the theory of average-case
complexity.
Average-case complexity classes characterize the difficulty of distributional problems. A
distributional problem is a pair 〈L,D〉, where L is a decision problem and D is a distribution
on instances of L.
The class distP is the average-case analogue of the class P. Informally, the class distP
comprises the distributional problems that can be solved by an algorithm that is efficient on
average over the particular distribution. Formally the class distP is defined as follows [6]:
Let D be a distribution over {0, 1}∗; we denote sampling from a distribution using a left arrow,
←. If A is an algorithm, let timeA(x) denote the running-time of algorithm A on input x.
Let E [·] denote expectation, and |s| denote the size of the encoding of a string s.
Given a decision problem L and a distribution D we say that 〈L,D〉 ∈ distP if there exists an








The above formalization was chosen over naive formalizations, such as the one that requires
the expectation of timeA(x) to be bounded by a constant, because it does not suffer from
issues that are suffered by the naive formalizations. These issues include not being closed
under the functional composition of algorithms, being dependent on the computational model
adopted, and being dependent on the encoding used [6].
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Chapter 3
The Overhead from Combating
Side-channels in Cloud Systems by
VM-Scheduling1
3.1 Introduction
Cloud computing has become an important paradigm by offering flexibility and
cost-effectiveness to both providers of infrastructure and services, and their clients. An aspect
of cloud computing is virtualization, which enables providers to host virtual machines (VMs)
of multiple clients on the same physical infrastructure. Indeed, multiple VMs may be
co-resident, that is, reside on the same server. While co-residency has benefits, such as
economies of scale, it gives rise to a serious security threat. Information may leak from a
1Substantial portions of this chapter are from previously published work [1]. My contributions are the
computational complexity analysis for the scheduling problem (Section 3.3), the analysis of the three approaches
taken by prior work [5] (Section 3.4), and the reductions of the scheduling problem to ILP and CNF-SAT
(Sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.2). The empirical evaluation of methods based on these two reductions (Section 3.5.3)
was conducted by Jonathan Shahen and further details about the evaluation can be found in our paper [1] and in
Jonathan’s PhD dissertation [8].
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victim client’s VM to a malicious co-resident VM via a side-channel attack. In such an attack,
the attacker runs a VM on the same server as that of the victim’s VM and takes advantage of a
shared physical component in order to extract information about the victim. For example, the
attacker may retrieve the victim’s cryptographic key by observing the activity of the processor
cache. Prior work exposes several such co-residency side-channels in shared cloud
environments (see, for example, [9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17]).
A straightforward solution to this security issue is hard-isolation: preclude co-residency and
give each client dedicated hardware. This is unfavourable because it reduces efficient use of
resources. Several other defences that do not involve the complete elimination of co-residency
have been suggested by prior work (see, for example, [18, 19, 20]). Many of these defences
suffer from at least one of the following drawbacks. Firstly, they entail changes to existing
deployments and applications (see Section 3.6 and [5] for a discussion). Secondly, they are
catered specifically to known cross-VM side-channel attacks. Therefore, as new attacker
capabilities are unveiled, more changes may have to be made. It is desirable to have defences
that are general across a broad spectrum of side-channel attacks and immediately deployable
with no or only few modifications to existing cloud hardware and software.
With this objective in mind, scheduler-based defences have been proposed in prior work [5].
These can be thought of as a realization of the moving target defence philosophy to mitigate
side-channels [21]. The mindset is that security is a factor which should be considered when
deciding how VMs are placed on servers, rather than as an after-thought.
A scheduler has several mechanisms it can employ to maximize security. Two that have been
explored in work by Moon et al. are the following [5]. A scheduler can be careful with where
it places a newly arrived VM thereby limiting information leakage from or to it. Migration of
existing VMs is yet another mechanism, with the intent that a victim VM does not leak too
much information to a co-resident malicious VM. In Figure 3.1, we illustrate a scheduler-based
defence. In the figure, a scheduler places and migrates client VMs in a manner that minimizes
information leakage between them.
Scheduler-based defences appear to have promise as they offer several advantages. Firstly,










Figure 3.1. Scheduling actions that can mitigate information leakage. Time is discretized into periods
called epochs. A scheduler places VMs, such as the ones that arrive in Epoch 1 and are placed in Epoch
2. It also migrates VMs, which results in a new placement for Epoch 3. We use this example in several
sections of the paper. In particular, the placement in Epoch 2 may or may not be considered to suffer
from more information leakage than the one in Epoch 3, depending on the model for leakage that we
adopt. ©2020 IEEE.
side-channel attack used. This makes them robust against unforeseen side-channels that meet
certain conditions [5]. Secondly, they require no changes to the cloud provider’s hardware,
client applications, and hypervisors and can be deployed “out of the box” as they require only
changing the VM placement and/or scheduling algorithm deployed by the cloud provider.
While we acknowledge that there may be other defences, e.g. shielded execution [22], that
also offer these advantages to some extent, our focus is on scheduler-based defences.
An important contribution of Moon et al. [5] is four models that quantify information leakage
in co-resident settings. These allow for the security-sensitive scheduling problem to be posed
precisely as an optimization problem — given a migration budget, we seek a placement of
VMs on servers that minimizes information leakage. That work explores three approaches
to solve the problem, namely a mapping to ILP, an initial greedy algorithm called Baseline
Greedy and a final greedy algorithm whose associated software is called Nomad.
Our primary intent is to analyze the overhead of introducing such security-sensitive scheduling
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to cloud systems. We make three sets of contributions.
Computational Complexity We first pose and answer a fundamental question: is the
underlying problem tractable2? A reason that this question is interesting is that we know
that the cloud scheduling problem for other objectives, such as utilization, is intractable, i.e.,
NP-hard [23]. Is it the same for the objective of decreasing information leakage?
We first establish an upper-bound for the hardness of the problem. We show that a decision
version of the problem, to which the optimization version reduces polynomially, is in NP
(Section 3.3.1). We show also that the problem is indeed NP-hard and is therefore
NP-complete (Section 3.3.2). We do this by showing that even for the simpler sub-case in
which there are only two servers of equal capacity, deciding whether there exists a placement
that meets a certain threshold of information leakage is NP-hard. A lower-bound hardness for
that problem is a lower-bound for our more general problem for so-called open systems —
settings in which VMs may come and go over time. We then establish that even the special
case of the problem for closed systems, under the 〈R,C〉 model for information-leakage, is
NP-hard (Section 3.3.3). In closed systems, there already exists a placement of VMs, and
there are no arrivals or departures. This special case is of interest because it is the only case
supported by the implementation of Nomad that was made available to us.
Given the above results, and the customary assumption, that P 6= NP, no efficient (polynomial-
time) algorithm exists for minimizing information leakage. We explore ways to mitigate
this intractability (Section 3.3.4). In particular, we discuss our investigations into tractable
sub-cases of the problem, and whether the problem may demonstrate certain kinds of optimal
substructure.
Analysis of Prior Approaches Our second set of contributions is an analysis of the three
approaches taken by Moon et al. to address security-sensitive scheduling [5].
2Some prior work uses the terms “tractable” and “intractable” to refer to an approach rather than the
underlying problem for which the approach is proposed as a solution [5]. For clarity and in consistence with
customary usage, we use the terms “tractable” and “intractable” for a problem, and “efficient” and “inefficient”
for an approach.
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That work asserts that mapping the problem to ILP is not promising in practice — even for
modestly sized problem instances, the approach takes longer than a day for a commercial
ILP solver on a reasonable computer. We analyze their mapping and observe that while it
does appear to be a reduction, it can be inefficient3 (Section 3.4.1) — there exists an encoding
of placement for which the output of the mapping from that work is exponential in the size
of its input. The fact that an underlying decision problem is in NP means that an efficient
(polynomial-time computable) reduction to ILP exists. Because that work does not make use
of an efficient reduction, it does not meaningfully characterize the overhead incurred by an
ILP approach.
We then observe that their starting point in the design of a heuristic algorithm, Baseline Greedy,
is, in the worst-case, more inefficient than it needs to be (Section 3.4.2). Given that a decision
version of the underlying problem is in NP, we know that there exists an algorithm that can
find the optimal solution in Θ(cn), where n is the size of the input instance and c is a constant.
An example of such an algorithm is one that tries every possible placement. We observe that
baseline greedy runs in time Θ(n!) in the worst-case. And cn = o(n!), that is, the function n!
is an upper-bound for cn that is not tight.
Their final design, Nomad, runs in time polynomial (quadratic) in the size of the input. Then,
given that the underlying problem is NP-hard and the customary premise P 6= NP, we ask a
natural question: what does Nomad give up for efficiency?
We show that Nomad provides no security for a large number of input instances (Section 3.4.3).
Under the customary premise, P 6= NP, there are an infinite number of input instances for
which Nomad provides no reduction in information leakage, let alone minimize it. Indeed, in
the worst case, Nomad suffers the maximum information leakage possible, even when it is
unconstrained by a migration budget, and even though there exists a placement that results in
zero information leakage.
A natural consequent question one may ask is, can Nomad, or a similarly efficient algorithm,
be modified to identify such instances and use a different approach on them, and yet retain its
3We distinguish correctness from efficiency in this context. A reduction is a mapping that satisfies a particular
“if and only if” property. It may not be computable efficiently.
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efficiency? The answer is ‘no,’ unless P = NP (Section 3.4.3).
True Overhead In our third set of contributions, we address the question as to what the
overhead really is, for an approach that indeed minimizes information leakage. Our approach
to answering the question is to first recognize that, as the problem is NP-hard, we cannot hope
to have an algorithm which is efficient for all inputs. However, a related decision-version is in
NP. Consequently, we have designed two approaches to the problem.
In one of our approaches, we reduce the problem to boolean satisfiability in conjunctive normal
form (CNF-SAT) with the intent of adopting a SAT solver as an oracle. And in the other,
we reduce the problem to ILP with the intent of adopting an ILP solver as an oracle. Both
CNF-SAT and ILP are known to be NP-complete [24]. Our reduction to ILP differs from that
of prior work in that ours is computable in polynomial-time, and, as a consequence, the size of
its output is polynomial in the size of the input. Our reductions to SAT and ILP are discussed
in Section 3.5.
We have implemented both of our approaches, and we have conducted an empirical assessment
of our approaches, and Nomad. We have also validated some of our analytical observations on
Nomad against its implementation [1].
Layout We describe the problem we address in Section 3.2. This is the same problem that is
addressed by Moon et al. [5]. Our results on the computational complexity of the problem are
in Section 3.3. In Section 3.4, we describe and analyze the three approaches (i.e. a mapping
to ILP, Baseline Greedy and Nomad) taken by Moon et al. [5]. We discuss our approaches
that are based on reductions to CNF-SAT and ILP in Section 3.5. We address related work in
Section 3.6 and conclude with Section 3.7.
We provide only a summary of the results from the empirical evaluation of our approaches and
Nomad. For further details, the reader is referred to our paper [1], and other work [8].
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3.2 Minimizing Information Leakage
In this section, we describe the problem posed by Moon et al. [5]. The problem is: given (i)
a set of clients, each having a number of VMs, (ii) a set of servers, each having a capacity
expressed as a number of VMs, (iii) a migration budget, that limits the number of VM
migrations that can occur, and (iv) previous placements of VMs on servers, what is a new
placement that minimizes information leakage? Our exposition is similar to that of Moon et
al. [5], with changes for clarity only.
Setup Time is discretized into periods called epochs. A VM is a virtual machine — a unit
of execution, similar to a process in a conventional operating system. A VM, when run, may
last several epochs. A client is associated with a set of VMs; every VM belongs to a client.
A VM belongs to the same client for the duration of its lifetime. The set of VMs that belong
to a client can change over time. A server is a machine on which a VM runs; the VM is
said to be hosted by that server. A server is associated with a capacity — it is able to host a
certain number of VMs only, at any given time. VMs may be migrated — hosted by a different
server in a later epoch. A potential victim client has some secret information in her VMs. A
malicious client attempts to steal the secret of a victim client via information-leakage across
VMs that can occur when the VMs are co-resident, i.e., hosted by the same server. We do not
know beforehand which VMs are potential victims, and which are malicious. In the leakage
models we consider, clients do not share secrets, and a client’s secret may be present in more
than one of its VMs. Figure 3.1 shows three servers and clients, and six VMs across those
three clients, and hosting over three epochs.
We quantify information as a certain number of bits. We premise that merely owing to co-
residency of a victim and a malicious VM, information leaks from the former to the latter.
Information that leaks from a VM to another aggregates over the time that the two VMs are
co-resident. In order to aggregate information leakage as a function of co-residency over time,
we consider a sliding window of the most recent 4 epochs. This can model secrets, such
as cryptographic keys, that are refreshed periodically; information the adversary gathered in
previous sliding windows is no longer useful to her. We assume that during an epoch, a VM
leaks 1 bit to another that is co-resident. This can be generalized to the case that the amount of
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leakage is some constant, k bits. The value k can then be used to model the time-length of
an epoch. The amount of information leaked from a victim to an adversary is proportional
to the time their VMs are co-resident with one another. For example, if a VM of Client A is
co-resident with a VM of Client B for 2 epochs, then the total information leaked from Client
A’s VM to Client B’s VM over the 2 epochs is 2 bits.
Replication and Collusion Replication means that information is duplicated across a victim
client’s VMs. This is potentially advantageous for an attacker because when an attacker VM
is co-resident with multiple victim VMs, under the assumption that the attacker VM extracts
different bits of information from each victim VM, the rate of leakage to the attacker increases.
For example, in Figure 3.1, for the placement in Epoch 2, with replication, Client C (black),
on Server 1, gains twice as many bits of a secret from Client A (white) than it would without
replication.
Collusion means that a malicious client’s VMs can collaborate with one another. This is
potentially advantageous for the attacker because when multiple attacker VMs are co-resident
with a victim VM, under the assumption that each attacker VM extracts different bits from
the victim VM, the rate of leakage to the attacker, as a whole, increases. In Figure 3.1, for
the placement in Epoch 2, with collusion, Client A (white), on server 1, gains twice as many
bits of a secret from Client C (black) than it would without. As in prior work, we denote the
presence of replication and collusion by R and C respectively, and the absence by NR and
NC respectively. This leads to four possible leakage models: 〈NR,NC〉, 〈R,NC〉, 〈NR,C〉,
〈R,C〉.
Table 3.1 presents the symbols we use in our calculations of information-leakage. vc,i denotes
the ith VM of client c. The VM-to-VM information leakage between the VMs vc,i and vc′,i′
over the most recent4 epochs, denoted by Ic,i,c′,i′(e,4), is calculated as the number of epochs
out of the 4 epochs that the two VMs were co-resident with each other. The VM-to-VM
leakages between VMs of clients c and c′ are used to calculate the client-to-client leakage
between clients c and c′, denoted by Ic,c′(e,4). The manner in which this is done depends on
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Symbol Meaning
vc,i The ith VM of client c.
Yc,i,c′,i′(e
′) An indicator variable, i.e., it takes the value 0 or 1 only. It takes the
value of 1 if vc,i and vc′,i′ are co-resident on a server during an epoch e′.
Otherwise it takes the value 0.
Ic,i,c′,i′(e,4) The VM-to-VM information leakage from vc,i to vc′,i′ over the sliding




Ic,c′(e,4) The client-to-client information leakage from c to c′ over the sliding
window of epochs (e−4, e]. This quantity is dependent on the presence
or absence of replication and collusion.
Itotal(e,4) The total information leakage over the sliding window of epochs (e−
4, e], under one of the four leakage models, {R,NR}× {C,NC}. This
quantity is calculated by aggregating the client-to-client leakage across
all pairs of cients.
Table 3.1. The symbols used for calculating total information leakage. ©2020 IEEE.
the leakage model adopted.
Information Leakage Models We now describe how client-to-client leakage is calculated
under the four models, using the example in Figure 3.2.
Model 1: 〈NR,NC〉 In this model there is neither replication nor collusion. The
information leakage from client c to client c′ is the maximum per-VM-pair information
leakage across all pairs of VMs. This is the information which leaks to the adversary VM that






Example: In Figure 3.2, the maximum VM-to-VM leakage from the blue client (B) to the red






















Figure 3.2. Example used in the prose to show how client-to-client leakage is calculated under all four
models. The leakage from B1 to R1 is 1 bit over the three epochs because B1 is co-resident with R1 for
one out of the three epochs.
bits over the three epochs.
Model 2: 〈R,NC〉 In this model there is replication but no collusion. There is a cumulative
effect across victim VMs. The information leakage from client c to client c′ is determined by








Example: In Figure 3.2, R1 obtains the most information, a total of 1+2=3 bits, so the leakage
from the blue client to the red client under 〈R,NC〉 is 3 bits.
Model 3: 〈NR,C〉 In this model there is collusion but no replication. There is a cumulative
effect across adversary VMs. The information leakage from client c to client c′ is determined








Example: In Figure 3.2, B1 and B2 each leak a total of 1+2=3 bits, so the leakage from the
blue client to the red client under 〈NR,C〉 is 3 bits.
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Model 4: 〈R,C〉 In this model there is both replication and collusion. There are cumulative







Example: In Figure 3.2, the sum of all bits leaked from the blue VMs to red VMs is 6, so the
leakage from the blue client to the red client under 〈R,C〉 is 6 bits.
Total Information Leakage Given the client-to-client information leakage in any one of







Minimizing Itotal(e,4) is equivalent to minimizing the average leakage across client pairs.
We acknowledge that there may be other ways to represent the security of the system, for
example, by minimizing the inter-client leakage. We chose the above representation for ease
of comparison with prior work [5]. However the approaches we propose in Section 3.5 are
general and can be used for other representations of security by modifying the objective
function.
An observation is that the total information leakages computed under the 〈NR,C〉 and
〈R,NC〉 models are equal.
Problem Statement We now pose the scheduling problem that is solved at the beginning
of each epoch with the intent of minimizing information-leakage. We first choose and fix a
particular information leakage model from amongst {R,NR} × {C,NC}.
Inputs: The lists X,S,A, F , and an integer, m. X = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} is a set of integers
where xi denotes the number of VMs belonging to the ith client. The number of clients, n, is
expressed via the size of this set. S = {s1, s2, . . . , sk} is a set of integers where sj denotes
the number of VMs the j th server can host. The number of servers, k, is expressed via the
size of this set. A = {a1, a2, . . . , an} is a set of integers where ai denotes the number of
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Symbol Meaning
X, xi X = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} is a list of integers where xi denotes the number
of VMs that belong to the ith client.
S, sj S = {s1, s2, . . . , sk} is a list of integers where sj denotes the number of
VMs the j th server can host.
A, ai A = {a1, a2, . . . , an} is a list of integers where ai denotes the number
of VMs belonging to the ith client which have arrived in this epoch.
F, fl F = {ft−1, ft−2, . . . , ft−4+1}, where each fl encodes the placement of
VMs in servers in the lth epoch. Entries in F can be used to express VMs
that depart.
m An integer that is the migration budget. Each kind of migration (e.g.,
swap VMs on two servers) has a cost associated with it. A special
symbol,∞, for m, is used to indicate that we are to be unconstrained by
a migration budget.
Table 3.2. The inputs to the scheduling problem. ©2020 IEEE.
VMs belonging to the ith client which have arrived just before the current epoch. m is an
integer that is the migration budget. Each kind of migration has a cost associated with it. For
example, moving a VM from one server to another may cost 1 unit of migration. Swapping
a VM on one server with a VM on another costs double of this, i.e., 2 units of migration.
F = {ft−1, ft−2, . . . , ft−4+1} is the set of placements that were used in prior epochs, where
each fl encodes the assignment of VMs to servers in the lth epoch. Entries in F can be used to
express VMs that depart. Table 3.2 summarizes these inputs.
Output: A placement for the current epoch, ft, that corresponds to the minimum total
information leakage subject to the constraints specified as input.
As an example, suppose that the input is as shown for Epoch 2 in Figure 3.1. Assume the
leakage model is 〈R,C〉, and m = 2. Also assume that Client A corresponds to Client 1,
Client B to Client 2 and so on. Then, the inputs are: X = {3, 1, 2}, S = {4, 4}, A = {0, 0, 0}
and a function f2(i, j) which indicates the number of VMs of client i on server j during Epoch
2, e.g. f2(1, 1) = 2. The output is the placement shown for Epoch 3 in Figure 3.1. In this
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example, the total information leakage in Epoch 2 is 10 bits, and in Epoch 3 it is 14 bits (10+4).
That is, migrating some VMs causes the increase in information-leakage to be 4 only, rather
than 10, which would have been the case had we adopted the same placement for Epoch 3 as
we have for Epoch 2.
3.3 Computational Complexity
We ask: does there exist an efficient algorithm for the problem from the previous section? If the
problem is intractable (e.g., NP-hard), then the answer is, ‘no’, under customary assumptions
(e.g., P 6= NP). In this section, we identify the computational complexity of the problem. In
Section 3.3.1 we present an upper-bound on the complexity: a decision problem that is related
polynomially is in NP. In Section 3.3.2 we present a lower bound: the problem is NP-hard. In
Section 3.3.3, we establish that the special case that is implemented in the version of Nomad
we have been provided is NP-hard as well. In Section 3.3.4 we discuss ways in which the
hardness can be mitigated, and some interesting problems that remain open.
3.3.1 An Upper-Bound: NP
Consider the decision version of the secure scheduling problem in which we are given a
threshold information leakage q, and we ask if there exists a placement for the next epoch
such that all the input constraints are satisfied and the total information leakage incurred is at
most q. This problem is in NP. An efficient (polynomially sized) certificate is a placement for
the next epoch. We can verify the certificate against all the constraints in polynomial time.
Given a placement for the next epoch, we can use it together with the input F , which is a
set of placements used in the previous4− 1 epochs, to efficiently compute the information
leakage it incurs. 4 is the number of epochs in a sliding window. For every client pair, for
every VM pair of those clients, we compute the VM-to-VM leakage as the number of epochs
from the4 epochs that the VM-pair have been co-resident with each other. Then we compute
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client-to-client information leakage using the appropriate formula from Equations 3.1-3.4
depending on the model of information leakage adopted. Finally, we aggregate client-to-client
information leakage over all pairs of clients as in Equation 3.5. Hence we can efficiently check
whether the total information leakage incurred by the certificate placement is less than or equal
to the threshold information leakage q.
We can also efficiently check whether the placement respects server capacities and assigns
each VM to exactly one server. Finally, we can compare this output placement to the placement
of the immediately prior epoch to determine the number of migrations needed, and compare
this to the budget m.
The optimization problem posed in Section 3.2 can be reduced in polynomial time to the above
decision problem by doing a binary search on the threshold to find the minimum information
leakage. Hence given that the decision version is in NP, an approach to solve the optimization
problem is to use an oracle for the decision version. We discuss ILP and CNF-SAT solvers as
oracles in Section 3.5.
3.3.2 A Lower-Bound: NP-hard
To prove that the problem is NP-hard, we show that a problem which is known to be NP-hard
can be reduced to it. We pose a variant of the classical Set Partition problem, which is known to
be NP-hard [25]. We call this variant Equal Cardinality Partition and show that it is NP-hard
as well. For the 〈NR,NC〉 model, we show an efficient reduction from Equal Cardinality
Partition. For the other three models, we show an efficient reduction from Set Partition. For
all four leakage models, we reduce to a sub-case of the decision version of our problem, that
we call Initial Placement, thereby proving that the general problem is NP-hard.
We begin with defining the Set Partition problem. In Set Partition, we are given a multiset
S = {x1, x2, ..., xn} of positive integers, and we seek to partition S into two subsets S1 and
S2 such that the sum of the integers in S1 equals the sum of the integers in S2. If indeed this is
the case for a particular instance of the problem, we say that the instance is true and call the
sets S1, S2 a solution to the instance. Otherwise we say that the instance is false.
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In Equal Cardinality Partition, we impose the additional constraint that |S1| = |S2|. We also
require that in every input instance, both the number of integers, n, as well as the sum of the
integers,
∑
i xi, are even, since otherwise the instance has no solution. We can check these
two conditions efficiently and reject any input that does not meet them.
Lemma 3.3.1. Equal Cardinality Partition is NP-hard.
Proof. Our mapping from Set Partition to Equal Cardinality Partition is as follows. Given
an instance of Set Partition, S = {x1, x2, ..., xn}, increment each integer in S by 1, and then
add n 1’s to S. Output the resultant set, S ′ = {x1 + 1, x2 + 1, ..., xn + 1, 11, 12, ..., 1n}, as the
corresponding instance of Equal Cardinality Partition. This mapping is computable efficiently;
in linear time. It is a reduction if, given an instance of Set Partition, it is true if and only if
the instance of Equal Cardinality Partition output by the mapping is true. Assume that the
input Set Partition instance is true. Therefore, there exists a solution, two subsets S1, S2 whose
contents sum to the same. If we increment every element in S1 and S2 by 1, add |S1| 1’s to
S2 and |S2| 1’s to S1, we obtain a solution to the corresponding Equal Cardinality Partition
instance. That is, the instance of Equal Cardinality Partition produced by the mapping is true.
For the other direction, assume that the Equal Cardinality Partition instance output by the
mapping for some input instance of Set Partition is true. Then, it has a solution S1 and S2. We
make the following observation. There are 2n integers in S ′: n of them are 1, and n of them
are not 1, and hence |S1| = |S2| = n. If S1 has k 1’s, then S1 must have n− k integers that
are not 1’s, and it follows that S2 must have n− k 1’s and k integers that are not 1’s. If we
remove all the integers equal to 1 from S1 and S2, and decrement every remaining element
in each of the sets by 1, we obtain two sets that demonstrate that the input instance of Set
Partition is true.
Now consider the following sub-case of the problem we pose in Section 3.2. We are given a
list X = {x1, . . . , xn} of client VMs, where n > 1 and
∑
i xi is even, and a list S = {s1, s2}
of two servers only, with s1 = s2 = (
∑
i xi) /2. We can infer S from X; that is, S does not
have to be explicitly specified in the input for this sub-case of the general problem. The other
inputs are A = X , F = ∅, and m = ∞. That is, we are asked to place the VMs from X
across two equal-capacity servers in a way that minimizes information leakage. The capacity
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of each server is exactly half the total number of VMs that need to be placed. We show that
this sub-case which we call the Initial Placement problem, is NP-hard, thereby proving that
the general problem is as well.
The above version of the Initial Placement problem is an optimization problem. To show that
it is NP-hard, we consider the following decision version of it. It takes all the same inputs, i.e.,
X,A, F and m, and an additional input, q, an integer that is a threshold for the information
leakage. The instance is true if there exists a placement which results in an information leakage
of at most q bits, and false otherwise. The decision version can be reduced to the optimization
version. Given an oracle for the optimization version, we simply query it with the inputs
X,A, F and m, and compare its output to q. Thus, if this decision version is NP-hard, so is
the optimization version.
Before we show that Initial Placement is NP-hard, we state and prove Lemma 3.3.2 which is
used in the reductions.
Lemma 3.3.2. For any instance of Initial Placement, a lower-bound on the minimum
information leakage for the 〈NR,NC〉 model is the one that arises when all the VMs of
exactly half the clients are on one server, and all the VMs of the other half of the clients are on
the other server. And this is the only placement that achieves this lower-bound. For the other
three models, a lower-bound on the minimum information leakage is achieved when each
client has all of its VMs on the same server. And this is the only placement that achieves this
lower-bound.
Proof. We begin with the 〈NR,NC〉 model. The information leakage resulting from placing
the VMs of half the clients on the first server, and the VMs of the other half of the clients on










” term arises from having n/2 clients on each
server. It gives us the number of pairs of clients on each server. One of the terms “2” in
the expression arises from considering both pairs 〈c, c′〉 and 〈c′, c〉 of clients. We do this as
information leaks in both directions. The other “2” term arises from having two servers.
There are only two other possible kinds of placements. In the first, one of the two servers
hosts VMs belonging to more than n/2 clients, and the other server hosts VMs belonging to at
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In the second kind of placement, exactly one of the servers is hosting VMs belonging to less
than n/2 clients. In thise case, the proof follows because for 1 ≤ k1 ≤ n/2, 1 ≤ k2 ≤ n/2,





















For the 〈NR,C〉 model, observe that if each client has all of its VMs on the same server, then




Consider a placement in which not every client has all of its VMs on the same server. Let the
number of VMs of client i on server 1 and server 2 be ai and bi respectively. Let Mij be the
maximum number of client j’s VMs that are co-resident with the same VM of client i. Then











Mij ≥ T/2−max{ai, bi} (3.10)
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To see why Equation 3.10 is true, assume for the purpose of contradiction the opposite. Also




Mij < T/2− ai (3.11)




Mij < T/2− xi (3.12)
which is false, because
∑
j 6=i
Mij is the total leakage from client i, and if all of client i’s VMs are




Mij = T/2− xi (3.13)
Now consider the other case in which ai < xi and bi > 0. Then Mij for j 6= i, is the maximum
number of VMs that client j has on a server. Let Lj be the minimum number of VMs that
client j has on a server. Then for all j 6= i:
Lj ≤Mij (3.14)








Mij + xi = T (3.15)










This contradicts Equation 3.14 which implies Equation 3.11 is false. Having now established
that Equation 3.10 holds, we combine Equations 3.9 and 3.10 to get the total information
leakage, for a placement that does not place all the VMs of each client on the same server, to













For the 〈R,NC〉 model, we first observe that the model is symmetric to the 〈NR,C〉 model.
That is, the leakage from client c to client c′ under 〈R,NC〉 is equal to the leakage from c′
to c under 〈NR,C〉 (see Equations 3.2 and 3.3 in Section 3.2). Hence the total information
leakage under both models are equal and it follows that Lemma 3.3.2 holds for the 〈R,NC〉
model.
In the 〈R,C〉 model, a placement for an Initial Placement instance that places all the VMs of
each client on the same server results in total information leakage of∑
i∈[1,n]
xi × (T/2− xi) (3.18)
The total information leakage for a placement that does not have this property is given by the
expression below, in which ai + bi = xi:
∑
i∈[1,n]
ai × (T/2− ai) + bi × (T/2− bi) (3.19)
The expression in Equation 3.19 is greater than that in Equation 3.18. Thus Lemma 3.3.2
holds for the 〈R,C〉 model.
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Theorem 3.3.3. Initial Placement is NP-hard.
Proof. For the 〈NR,NC〉 model, the proof is a reduction from Equal Cardinality Partition.
Given an instance, S = {x1, x2, ..., xn}, of Equal Cardinality Partition, let
X = {x1, x2, ..., xn}, and s1 = s2 = (
∑
i xi) /2. We set q to be the lower-bound on the






This reduction is computable efficiently, in linear time. We assert that the instance of Equal
Cardinality Partition is true if and only if the corresponding instance of Initial Placement is
true.
Assume that the input Equal Cardinality Partition instance is true. Therefore, there exists a
solution, two equal sized subsets, S1 and S2, whose contents sum to the same. These two
subsets give us the placement across the two servers which results in an information leakage
of q for the resulting Initial Placement instance under the mapping. This follows directly from
Lemma 3.3.2. Hence, the instance of Initial Placement produced by the mapping is true. For
the other direction, assume that the instance of Initial Placement output by the mapping for
some input instance of Equal Cardinality Partition is true. By Lemma 3.3.2, we know that
this means there exists a placement such that all the VMs of exactly half of the clients are
on one server, and all the VMs of the other half of the clients are on the other server. Then a
solution to the Equal Cardinality instance is S1 = {xi ∈ X : client i is placed on server 1}
and S2 = {xi ∈ X : client i is placed on server 2}. By Lemma 3.3.2 the cardinalities of the
two sets are equal. Since each server has a capacity equalling half the total number of VMs,
the contents of S1 and S2 sum to the same.
For the other three models, the proof is a reduction from the version of Set Partition in which
the sum of all integers in S is even, to Initial Placement. This version of Set Partition is
NP-hard because any instance of Set Partition whose sum of integers is odd must be a false
instance. Given an instance, S = {x1, x2, ..., xn}, of Set Partition, let X = {x1, x2, ..., xn},
and s1 = s2 = (
∑
i xi) /2. We set q to be the lower bound on the minimum information




where T is the total number of VMs. The other two models are symmetric and the lower
bound for both is
∑
i
(T/2− xi). The reduction can be computed efficiently. We assert that the
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input Set Partition instance is true if and only if the resulting Initial Placement instance is true,
using reasoning similar to that used to demonstrate correctness for the reduction from Equal
Cardinality Partition to Initial Placement in the 〈NR,NC〉 model.
The Initial Placement problem is a sub-problem of the general problem that is posed in Section
3.2. From Theorem 3.3.3, it follows that the general problem, i.e., for any k ≥ 2 servers, is
also NP-hard.
3.3.3 Closed Migration under the 〈R,C〉Model
We have shown in the previous section that the problem is NP-hard in general. In this section,
we consider a particular special case of the problem: closed migration, under the 〈R,C〉model
for information-leakage. With closed-migration, there is a set of existing VMs, and no VMs
arrive or leave. A reason we consider this special case in particular is that the implementation
of Nomad we were provided supports this special case only. Consequently, for the approaches
based on reduction to ILP and CNF-SAT that we discuss in Section 3.5 and have implemented
to compare empirically with Nomad [1], this special case is of particular interest.
We observe that under the 〈R,C〉 model for information leakage, a placement, f , needs to
express the number of a client’s VMs that are placed on a server only, and not the particular
VMs that are placed on the server. That is, f can be perceived as a function, f: [1, n]×[1, k] −→
[0,max
i
{xi}], and can be encoded as a table of size n× k× log max
i
{xi} bits. This is possible
because the formula for inter-client information leakage does not contain any maximization
(i.e., “max”) terms (see Section 3.2).
It is easy to compute a placement that expresses which specific client-VMs are placed on a
server given such a more compact encoding for placement. Following is an algorithm. Let
the new placement be ft and the immediately prior placement be ft−1. Let xij = ft(i, j) −
ft−1(i, j). Place all newly arriving VMs in a pool. For all i ∈ [1, n] (i.e., the clients) and
j ∈ [1, k] (i.e., the servers), if xij < 0, remove |xij| VMs of client i from server j and place
them in the pool. Then, for all i ∈ [1, n] and j ∈ [1, k], if xij > 0, take xij VMs of client i
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from the pool and place them on server j. This algorithm guarantees the fewest migrations.
Computing such a placement after we have solved a problem-instance is more efficient: the
input to and output from an algorithm for the optimization problem, and a corresponding
decision problem, are more compact. We exploit this observation regarding encoding for the
〈R,C〉 model to assert the following theorem.
Theorem 3.3.4. Closed Migration under 〈R,C〉 is NP-hard.
Proof. We show that a decision version of a sub-case of the problem is NP-hard. This
establishes that the more general problem is also NP-hard. The sub-case is as follows. We
are given as input X = {x1, x2, . . . , xn}, i.e., VMs that correspond to clients. We are given
S = {s1, s2} with s1 = s2 = (
∑
i xi) /2, i.e., two servers only each with capacity exactly half
of the total number of VMs. And we are given as input F = {f0}, where f0 is some placement
of the VMs across the two servers. Also, A = ∅ and m = ∞. Suppose every placement
f is encoded as a function that, given a client and server, maps it to the number of VMs of
that client that are resident on the server. That is, f: [1, n] × {1, 2} −→ [0,maxi{xi}]. The
decision version, in addition to these inputs X,S and F , takes an integer q′. We ask whether
there exists a new placement, f1, such that the total information leakage across the two epochs
is q′.
We reduce from the Initial Placement problem (see Section 3.3.2). Suppose, in the input
instance of the Initial Placement problem, we are given X and the information leakage
threshold, q. We infer S from X , and adopt the same X and S in our output instance of the
Closed Migration problem. Also, for the initial placement of the Closed Migration problem,
f0, we use some straightforward efficient algorithm to apportion VMs across the two servers.
For example, assign s1 VMs to the first server, where s1 is the capacity of the server, then
assign the remaining VMs to the second server. For q′, the information leakage threshold for
the output Closed Migration instance, we simply adopt the sum of the leakage caused by the
placement f0 (which we can efficiently compute), and the threshold, q, from the input Initial
Placement instance, as we show in the formula below. The double summation of products of
the f0 values arises from the fact that we are under the 〈R,C〉 model for information leakage.
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f0(c, j)× f0(c′, j)
We assert that the Initial Placement instance is true if and only if the corresponding Closed
Migration instance is true.
3.3.4 Mitigating NP-hardness and Open Problems
We now discuss possible ways in which the NP-hardness of the scheduling problem we
consider can be mitigated, and open problems that remain in this context.
Our intractability results and the customary assumption that P 6= NP imply that no efficient
algorithm exists that can find an optimal placement for every input instance. Possible ways
to deal with the intractibility are: (1) Identify sub-cases that are tractable. (2) Check if the
problem exhibits optimal substructure in order to determine if dynamic programming or a
greedy approach can be used. (3) Seek efficient approximability. We discuss our investigations
into (1) and (2). (3) is topic for future work.
Nomad [5] falls under (1), in that it achieves optimality for some sub-cases via an efficient
algorithm. However, in that work, exactly which sub-cases are tractable, i.e., can be solved
efficiently, is not identified. In Theorem 3.4.3 in Section 3.4.3 we show that Nomad is
ineffective for infinitely many classes of input, each with infinitely many inputs, unless
P = NP.
Tractable Sub-cases We have identified two tractable sub-cases. Consider the sub-case
in which every client i has only one VM, vi. An efficient algorithm to compute the optimal
placement for this sub-case is to spread the VMs evenly across servers. When a server is full,
it is eliminated from consideration. Once the optimal placement has been determined, the
migration budget over the following epochs can be used to get from the current placement to
the optimal.
Another tractable sub-case is one in which the minimum information leakage that can be
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achieved is zero. This is possible if and only if for every client i there exists a designated
server j such that the server’s capacity is at least the number of VMs client i has, i.e., sj ≥ xi.
There exists an efficient algorithm to check for this condition.
Optimal Substructure A problem is said to exhibit optimal substructure if, given an optimal
solution for an instance, removal of some components from both the problem instance and the
solution, yields an optimal solution for the smaller problem instance. Examples of approaches
that exploit optimal substructure are greedy algorithms and dynamic programming. Note that
we do not expect a problem that is strongly NP-hard to exhibit optimal substructure, as this
would imply that P = NP. However, if a problem is weakly NP-hard, then it may. A problem
is said to be weakly NP-hard only, if there exists an encoding of its inputs (e.g., in unary)
for which it is tractable. Some versions of the well-known Knapsack problem, for example,
are only weakly NP-hard. As we do not know whether some versions of our problem are
weakly NP-hard, our investigations into whether the problem exhibits optimal substructure
have implications to whether the problem is only weakly NP-hard.
Consider the general problem. Let π be an optimal placement for some input instance. Pick
a VM v that belongs to some client i. Suppose that in π, v is placed on server s. Remove
v, decrement the capacity of s by 1 and decrement xi by 1. The question is: Is the resulting
placement an optimal assignment for the modified problem? Unfortunately, the answer is “not
necessarily.” Consider the case in which we have two servers, each of capacity 2 VMs, and
three clients each having a single VM. A possible π in this case is for the VMs of clients 1 and
2 to co-reside on server 1 and for the VM of client 3 to be on server 2. If we now remove the
VM of client 3 from the problem and decrement the capacity of server 2 by 1, we observe that
the resulting placement is not optimal. The optimal placement places client 1’s VM and client
2’s VM on different servers.
We then asked if some special sub-cases of the problem exhibit optimal substructure. For
example, consider the case in which the total number of VMs across clients is equal to the total






sj . In such a sub-case, a placement fills all servers to
capacity. This sub-case does not exhibit optimal substructure either. A counterexample for the
〈NR,NC〉 case is shown in Figure 3.3.
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Figure 3.3. An example to show that a sub-case of the problem lacks optimal substructure. Consider the
top figure in the 〈NR,NC〉 model. Each of the three servers has a capacity of 3 VMs. The placement
shown is optimal resulting in the least total information leakage. If we remove one of the VMs of
client 2 from server 3, and decrement the capacity of server 3 by 1 VM we end up with the sub-optimal
placement shown in the middle figure. The optimal placement is shown in the bottom figure.
Open Problems As we suggest in the immediately preceding discussions, while we have
resolved some questions, we leave a number of others open. We list some of these here.
1. Is the Closed Migration problem tractable under models other than 〈R,C〉? We know
that it lies in NP, but does it lie in P? We emphasize (see Theorem 3.3.3 in Section 3.3.2)
that the general problem, comprising both open and closed systems, is indeed NP-hard
under all four models.
2. Is the problem we consider strongly NP-hard, or only weakly? Note that in Section 3.3.2,
the problem from which we carry out a reduction, Set Partition, is weakly NP-hard only.
3. Is an instance of the optimization problem efficiently approximable? A corresponding
question for cloud-scheduling that targets utilization, classical Bin-Packing, for example,
is known to be efficiently approximable within a constant factor [26].
35
3.4 Analysis of Prior Approaches
In this section we revisit and analyze the work of Moon et al. [5]. To our knowledge, that work
is the first to propose the models of information leakage that we adopt. That work considers
three approaches: a mapping to ILP, an initial design for a greedy algorithm called Baseline
Greedy, and a final greedy algorithm called Nomad. We describe and address each, in turn, in
Sections 3.4.1–3.4.3 below.
3.4.1 Mapping to ILP
The mapping to ILP of Moon et al. [5] comprises eight sets of constraints plus a constraint
that expresses the optimization objective. The objective for a solver is to decide the values of
several binary indicator variables that are used to encode placement. That is, there is a variable
which takes value 1 if and only if a particular VM of a client resides on a particular server
in the optimal placement. An example of a constraint on those variables is that the sum of 1
values for those variables for a server, across all clients, should not exceed the capacity of the
server. Similarly the sum of 1 values for those variables for a client, across all servers, should
equal the number of VMs the client has. The solver is asked to minimize an expression for
information leakage that uses the binary indicator variables.
In assessing the mapping to ILP, we distinguish two properties: correctness and efficiency.
We deem such a mapping to be correct if it is a reduction. That is, with the mindset that we
map a decision version of the problem to a decision version of ILP, does the mapping have the
property that the input instance is true if and only if the output instance is true? The mapping
of Moon et al. [5] does appear to be a reduction. We deem the mapping to be efficient if there
exists a polynomial-time algorithm that computes it. Unfortunately, the mapping is not.
Theorem 3.4.1. In the worst-case, Moon et al. [5]’s mapping to ILP results in an output
whose size is exponential in the size of the input, and an algorithm to compute the mapping
runs in exponential-time.
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Proof. We revisit our discussion on encoding placement in Section 3.3.3. As we discuss
there, under the 〈R,C〉 model, it suffices to record the number of VMs of each client on a
server, rather than their identities. Under such an encoding, the size of an input placement is
Θ(n.k. log max
i
{xi}) bits, where n is the number of clients, k is the number of servers and
xi is the number of VMs the ith client has. Moon et al.’s ILP approach involves constraints
over binary indicator variables that are used to encode a placement. For every VM and every
server, their approach uses a binary indicator variable that indicates if that particular VM is
placed on that particular server. Such a placement is of size Θ(n.k.max
i
{xi}) bits. A case
that elicits the worst case is when each of n and k are constant in xi. Such cases can certainly
arise in practice as the number of clients n and the number of servers k can be independent
from the number of VMs that a client has. If we use c to represent a constant and m = max
i
xi,
then in the worst-case, Moon’s reduction results in an output size of Θ(cm), while the input
placement under the compact encoding has a size in the worst-case of Θ(c logm). The former
is exponential in the latter, specifically, m = 2logm. Hence in the worst-case the choice of
using binary indicator variables results in an exponential explosion in the size of the input.
Our assessment of their mapping to ILP is motivated by the observation there that a commercial
ILP sover takes longer than a day for even modestly sized inputs. Our observations above,
and empirical results from our reduction to ILP (see Section 3.5 and [1]) suggest that this
inefficiency in the mapping may be the cause.
3.4.2 Initial Design: Baseline Greedy
Moon et al. [5] use the observation that their mapping to ILP performs poorly in practice as
motivation for the design of a greedy approach. In Baseline Greedy, in addition to all the
inputs specified in the general problem, there is an additional input that enumerates the types
of migration-moves allowed. A free-insert is when a single VM is moved from one server to
another. A k-way swap of VMs 〈va, vb, vc, ..., vk〉 means that VM va takes the place of vk, vb
takes the place of va, vc takes the place of vb, and so on. A k-way swap incurs k migrations.
Based on the types of moves allowed and the migration budget, Baseline Greedy generates a
37
list of possible moves and computes the reduction in leakage that results from each. The move
that yields the greatest decrease in leakage is chosen and the current placement is changed to
reflect this move. This happens iteratively until the migration budget runs out.




In the worst-case this is strictly worse than a brute force algorithm that tries every placement
to determine which is optimal.
Proof. We first observe that given i VMs, there are i! possible i-way swaps between them. The
worst-case run-time for Baseline Greedy is when the set of allowed moves includes all possible
i-way swaps, where i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, and m is the total number of VMs in the instance. Hence
the worst-case run-time of Baseline Greedy is Θ(m!). Next we observe that there are 2mk
possible placements because for each of the m VMs and each of the k servers, the VM is either
placed on that server or not. A brute force algorithm that tries all possible placements therefore
has a run-time of Θ(2mk). If m ≤ k, then an optimal placement that incurs zero leakage is
one that places each VM on a separate server. If m > k, then m cannot be a constant if k is
unbounded, but k can be a constant when m is unbounded. Hence in the worst-case, k is a
constant, and the brute-force algorithm takes time Θ(cm), where c = 2k. For any constant c,
cm = o(m!), that is, Θ(m!) is strictly worse than Θ(cm).
We acknowledge that Baseline Greedy is used only as a starting point, and its inefficiency
is recognized by Moon et al. [5], albeit not as precisely as we do. An identification of an
upper-bound for computational complexity helps with the identification of a more appropriate
starting point for the design.
3.4.3 Final Design: Nomad
Moon et al.’s final design is a greedy algorithm called Nomad [5]. Nomad is Baseline Greedy
with the following modifications. (1) Instead of recomputing the benefit for each move after a
move is selected, the benefit is only recomputed for the moves involving client pairs which
were affected by the selected move. For the leakage models that involve a maximization (i.e.,
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“max”) term in the computation of information leakage, this is made possible by approximating
the “max” operation with an exponential function. (2) Servers are grouped into clusters. Each
client is assigned to a cluster and can only migrate within it. A move therefore only affects
clients whose VMs reside in the same cluster in which the move was made. (3) The types of
allowed moves are restricted to free-inserts and 2-way swaps only. (4) The entire move table is
populated at the beginning of an epoch. Then, the move set is traversed starting from the move
that gives the most benefit. If the claimed benefit from the time that benefit was computed lies
within 95% of the current benefit and a move is feasible, then that move is made. If not, the
move is re-inserted with an updated benefit.
In summary, at the beginning of each epoch, Nomad does the following:
1. It enumerates all possible free-inserts and 2-way swaps in a move table M and for each
move, it computes its benefit as the further decrease in information leakage the move
provides as compared to retaining the placement from the previous epoch.
2. It chooses the move that provides the greatest benefit, updates the current placement
with this move, and decreases the input migration budget accordingly, i.e., by 1 if the
chosen move was a free-insert and by 2 if the chosen move was a 2-way swap.
3. Then it iteratively does the following until the migration budget for the epoch runs out:
• It finds the move z in M that gives the next greatest benefit.
• It computes the benefit provided by z under the updated placement.
• If the newly computed benefit is within 95% of the old benefit recorded in M
for z, it updates the current placement with z and decreases the migration budget
accordingly. Otherwise, it inserts the newly computed benefit for z in M .
In Nomad, as the moves are restricted to free-inserts and 2-way swaps, the running time
is Θ(n2) in the worst-case. Given that the problem is NP-hard (see Section 3.3.2), and the
premise that P 6= NP, no polynomial-time algorithm exists which can give us the optimal
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Figure 3.4. An example of an instance for which Nomad performs no migrations, even though a
placement incurring no leakage is possible. There are 3 servers, each having a capacity of at least 3
VMs, and 3 clients, each having 3 VMs. Under the 〈NR,NC〉, 〈R,NC〉 and 〈NR,C〉 models, no
free-insert or pair-wise swap gives us a reduction in leakage, hence Nomad makes no moves. The
optimal placement is shown at the bottom of the figure and incurs no leakage.
incurred by Nomad in exchange for its efficiency? We answer this question in Theorem 3.4.3
below. In the statement of the theorem, we refer to a class of inputs. We define it as follows.
We observe that the number of servers, call it, k, is an input to the problem. Each value of
k ≥ 2, corresponds to a class of inputs. We point out that within each such class of inputs,
there exist infinitely many inputs. This is because the capacity of each server is unbounded in
any input.
Theorem 3.4.3. P 6= NP implies that there exist infinitely many classes of inputs, each with
infinitely many inputs, for which a reduction in information leakage is possible, but for which
Nomad provides no decrease in information leakage whatsoever, even when unconstrained by
a migration budget.
We emphasize that the above theorem says that Nomad does not even provide a decrease in
information leakage, let alone minimize it. We emphasize also, that the theorem is true for all
four leakage models.
We prove Theorem 3.4.3 in four stages, which are Lemmas 3.4.4, 3.4.5, 3.4.6, and 3.4.7
below. In Lemma 3.4.4, we introduce a new, related problem, that we call the “Reduce
Information Leakage for Two Servers” problem. We show that it is intractable, i.e., NP-hard
under polynomial-time Turing reductions. With this result as the basis, we show, progressively,
that there exists at least one input with two servers only for which a reduction in information-
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leakage is possible, but Nomad provides none (Lemma 3.4.5), that there then must exist
infinitely many two-server inputs each for which a reduction in information leakage is possible,
but Nomad provides none (Lemma 3.4.6), and, that for every two-server input, there exists an
n-server input for every n ≥ 2, for which Nomad provides no reduction in information-leakage
(Lemma 3.4.7). We then tie everything together for the proof of Theorem 3.4.3.
We begin by defining the Reduce Information Leakage for Two Servers problem. Given a
current placement of VMs on two servers, output a different placement that results in strictly
less information leakage than the current placement if one exists, otherwise output the current
placement. In the following lemma, we establish that this Reduce Information Leakage for
Two Servers problem is NP-hard under polynomial-time Turing reductions [27].
A polynomial-time Turing reduction from a problem A to a problem B is an algorithm that
solves problem A using a polynomial number of calls to a subroutine, or oracle, for problem
B, and polynomial time outside of those subroutine calls [27]. Such a reduction is thought to
be weaker than the polynomial-time many-to-one reduction we customarily use to show that a
decision problem is NP-hard. However, the fact that a problem is NP-hard under polynomial-
time Turing reductions is also widely accepted as evidence that a problem is intractable [27].
We point out also that given the manner in which we have posed the Reduce Information
Leakage for Two Servers problem, it is not a decision problem, i.e., its output is not a bit that
corresponds to ‘true’ or ‘false.’ Therefore, the use of a polynomial-time Turing reduction
seems appropriate to show intractability.
Lemma 3.4.4. The Reduce Information Leakage for Two Servers problem is NP-hard under
polynomial-time Turing reductions.
Proof. We reduce from the optimization version of the Initial Placement problem (see
Section 3.3.2). Recall that in Initial Placement, we are given a list of client VMs,
{x1, x2, ..., xn} and two servers of equal capacity such that the total capacities of the two
servers is equal to the total number of VMs, i.e. s1 = s2 =
∑
i
xi/2. We are asked to find a
placement of VMs across the two servers that minimizes information leakage. Given a
subroutine for the Reduce Information Leakage for Two Servers problem, we devise the
following algorithm for Initial Placement.
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We take the Initial Placement instance, and place s1 VMs on Server 1 and place the remaining
on Server 2 using some (any) efficient algorithm. This gives us a current placement for the
Reduce Information Leakage for Two Servers instance. We invoke the subroutine for the
Reduce Information Leakage for Two Servers problem with this instance as input. If it outputs
a different placement than the current placement, we use this output from the subroutine as the
current placement for the next query to the subroutine. We stop when the output placement
is identical to the current placement. This placement is the optimal placement for the Initial
Placement instance. As there are potentially multiple possible placements that can reduce
information leakage, a question that arises is: how can we be certain that the intermediate
placements output by the subroutine will eventually converge to an optimal placement?
In an answer to this question, we observe that for the case of two full servers, for reducing
information leakage, the current placement is immaterial in that there always exists a sequence
of 2-way swaps from any current placement to an optimal placement. That is, for every VM
on Server 1 in the current placement that has to be on Server 2 in an optimal placement, there
exists a VM on Server 2 in the current placement that has to be on Server 1 in an optimal
placement.
Another question that arises is, how can we be certain that the reduction calls the Reduce
Information Leakage subroutine a polynomial number of times only? This follows because
the information leakage that results from the placement that is used in the first call to the
subroutine is polynomial in the size of the input. The output of each call to the oracle will in
the very least, reduce the leakage by 1. Hence the total number of calls to the oracle will be
polynomial in the size of the input.
Thus, the Reduce Information Leakage for Two Servers problem is NP-hard under polynomial-
time Turing reductions.
Lemma 3.4.5. There exists an input with only two servers, for which Nomad makes no moves,
but a reduction in information leakage is possible.
Proof. Our proof is by contradiction. We first list the facts we know, or have established, and
the assumption we make for the purpose of contradiction.
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1. P 6= NP,
2. The Reduce Information Leakage for Two Servers problem is NP-hard (Lemma 3.4.4),
3. Nomad is a polynomial-time algorithm, even when unconstrained by a migration budget,
4. Nomad can make free-inserts and two-way swaps,
5. If Nomad makes a move on some input placement, the resulting placement incurs strictly
less information leakage than the input placement, and,
6. If Nomad makes no moves on some input placement, then that input placement incurs
the minimum possible information leakage.
Item (1) is the customary assumption that the containment of P in NP is strict, Items (2)–
(5) are facts that we know or have established, and Item (6) we assume for the purpose of
contradiction.
The proof now is as follows. Items (4)–(6) imply that Nomad is an algorithm for the Reduce
Information Leakage for Two Servers problem. But this, together with Item (3) implies that
there exists a polynomial-time algorithm for the Reduce Information Leakage for Two Servers
problem. This contradicts the conjunction of Items (1) and (2). Thus, Item (6) is false. That
is, there exists at least one input for which a reduction in information leakage is possible, but
Nomad makes no moves and therefore provides no reduction in information leakage.
Lemma 3.4.6. There exist infinitely many inputs, each with only two servers, for which a
reduction in information leakage is possible, but Nomad makes no moves.
Proof. We establish this lemma by contradiction as well. In Lemma 3.4.5, we establish
that there exists such an input. Assume that only finitely many such inputs exist. Pick the
largest-sized such input, and let this input’s size be n0. This implies that for all inputs of
size n > n0, Nomad satisfies Item (6) from the proof for Lemma 3.4.5. But this in turn
implies that there exists an improved version of Nomad, call it NomadPrime, which works as
follows. It first checks whether the size of the input is ≤ n0. If yes, it invokes an algorithm to
correctly identify a placement that minimizes information leakage. This algorithm, for inputs
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of size ≤ n0, is not necessarily efficient; e.g., it may, by brute-force, simply try every possible
placement. If the input size > n0, it invokes Nomad.
Then, NomadPrime is a polynomial-time algorithm, because n0 is a constant, and for all
n > n0, it runs in time polynomial in the size of the input. And NomadPrime is then a
polynomial-time algorithm for Reduce Information Leakage for Two Servers. This contradicts
the conjunction of Items (1) and (2) in the proof of Theorem 3.4.5.
Lemma 3.4.7. There exists a one-to-one mapping, ψ, between the set of inputs with only
two servers for which a reduction in information leakage is possible, and the set of inputs
with some k ≥ 2 servers for which a reduction in information leakage is possible, with the
following property. If Nomad makes no moves on the two-server input, i, then Nomad makes
no moves on the k-server input ψ(i).
Proof. By construction — we present such a mapping, ψ. If k = 2, we simply pick the identity
mapping as ψ. Otherwise, k > 3, We are given as input i, which comprises two servers. We
map that to, ψ(i), an input with k servers. Two servers in ψ(i) are identical to the two servers
in the input i. For each of the remaining k − 2 servers, we pick some capacity. And we
introduce a new client, call it y. By “new client,” we mean that there are no VMs of the client
y in the two servers in the two-server input i. We fill each of the k − 2 servers with VMs of
that new client, y. We now claim that if Nomad makes no moves on input i, then it makes no
moves on input ψ(i).
We prove this as follows. Given the input ψ(i) constructed as above, we know that a decrease
in leakage is possible for it - a candidate placement is to make no changes to the new servers,
and for the original two servers, use the placement that decreases leakage. For ψ(i), we show
that under each of the four leakage models, Nomad will not decrease leakage as there is no
free-insert or 2-way swap that results in a decrease in leakage.
First we observe that under all four models, the information leakage arising from the newly
added servers is zero, since all of them contain VMs belonging to the same client, y. Therefore
Nomad will not make any 2-way swaps between VMs of these new servers as this would
result in no change in information leakage. Nomad will also not make any free-inserts or
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2-way swaps between VMs of the two original servers as otherwise it would contradict the
fact that the placement on the original two servers is one for which a decrease in leakage is
possible, but for which Nomad makes no moves. Nomad will also not make any free-insert
of a VM from a newly added server to one of the two original servers, as this would increase
co-residency and hence information leakage. The only other kind of move to consider is a
2-way swap between a VM on a new server and a VM on one of the two original servers. Let
the new and old server involved in the swap be denoted by σnew and σold respectively. Let
σnew be filled with VMs of the new client y. Let one such VM be denoted by VMy. Let x be
one of the clients having at least one VM on σold. Let one such VM be denoted by VMx. Now
assume Nomad swaps the placement of VMx and VMy.
We will show that under all four models, the leakage incurred by the new placement (after the
swap) is greater than or equal to the leakage incurred by the original placement, and hence
Nomad will not make the move. It suffices for us to show that this is the case when the capacity
of σnew is 1. Because if this is true, then even if the capacity of σnew is more than 1, the new
co-residency between clients x and y on σnew in the new placement can only further increase
information leakage from the case in which the capacity of σnew is 1.
We show that for all four leakage models, the maximum decrease in leakage from removing
VMx from σold is less than or equal to the minimum increase in leakage incurred from placing
VMy on σold.
Consider the 〈NR,NC〉 model. If in the original placement the number of clients other than
client x on σold is w, then the maximum decrease in leakage that results from moving VMx
out of σold is when these w clients are not co-resident with any other VM of x besides VMx,
and it is 2w bits; w bits from client x and w bits to client x. The minimum increase in leakage
that results from placing VMy on σold is 2w bits because now client y is co-resident with at
least w other clients. It is more than 2w bits if client x has VMs other than VMx on σold in the
original placement, because then client y is co-resident with client x also. Hence Nomad will
not make the swap under the 〈NR,NC〉 model.
Consider the 〈R,C〉 model. If in the original placement the number of VMs on σold belonging
to clients other than client x is z, then the decrease in leakage that results from moving VMx
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out of σold is 2z bits; z bits from client x, and z bits to client x. The minimum increase in
leakage that results from placing VMy on σold is 2z bit; z bits from client y and z bits to client
y. It is more than 2z bits if client x has VMs other than VMx on σold in the original placement.
Hence Nomad will not make the swap under the 〈R,C〉 model.
Consider the 〈NR,C〉 model. If in the original placement the number of clients other than
client x on σold is w, and the number of VMs on σold belonging to clients other than client
x is z, then the maximum decrease in leakage that results from moving VMx out of σold is
when these w clients are not co-resident with any other VM of x besides VMx and it is w + z
bits; w bits to client x and z bits from client x. The minimum increase in leakage that results
from placing VMy on σold is w + z bits; w bits to client y and z bits from client y. It is more
than w + z bits if client x has VMs other than VMx on σold in the original placement. Hence
Nomad will not make the swap under the 〈NR,C〉 model.
As the 〈R,NC〉 model is symmetric to the 〈NR,C〉 model, the result for it follows from the
result for the 〈NR,C〉 model.
Proof. (for Theorem 3.4.3)
Lemma 3.4.6 establishes that there exist infinitely many inputs in the class of inputs, k = 2, for
which a reduction in information leakage is possible, but Nomad provides none. By Lemma
3.4.7, each such input can be mapped uniquely to an input in every other class of inputs. The
proof follows from the fact that the number of classes of inputs, which corresponds to the
number of servers, k, is unbounded, in any particular input.
Examples As a concrete example of a class of inputs for which Nomad provides no benefit,
consider the following for the 〈NR,NC〉, 〈R,NC〉 and 〈NR,C〉 models. We have n servers,
each of capacity of at least n, and n clients each with n VMs, where n ≥ 3. In the initial
placement, each server has a VM that belongs to each client. Figure 3.4 shows the current
placement when n = 3. The optimal leakage is 0, obtained from the placement in which all




















Figure 3.5. An example to show the sub-optimality of Nomad for the 〈R,C〉 model. The capacity
of each server is at least 3 VMs. Clients 1,2 and 3 have two VMs each, and Client 4 has three VMs.
The placement at the top of the figure is the current placement. There is no free-insert or 2-way swap
that results in a reduction in leakage. Hence Nomad makes no moves even when unconstrained by a
migration budget. The optimal placement is shown in the bottom of the figure.
unbounded migration budget, we find that no free-insert or 2-way swap yields a reduction in
leakage. So, Nomad does not change the current placement, which is sub-optimal. Indeed, for
the 〈NR,NC〉 model, the current placement incurs the worst possible information leakage.
As another example, for the 〈R,C〉 model, consider the following class of inputs. There
are n servers, each with capacity of at least n, and n + 1 clients. Clients 1, 2, . . . , n have
n − 1 VMs each, and client n + 1 has n VMs. In the current placement, server i has the
VMs: 〈i, 1〉 , 〈i, 2〉 , . . . , 〈i, n− 1〉 , 〈n+ 1, i〉, where 〈x, y〉 corresponds to VM y of client x.
There is no free-insert or 2-way swap which yields a reduction in leakage for this placement.
Hence Nomad makes no changes to the current placement. The current placement and optimal
placement for n = 3 are shown in Figure 3.5. We have tried this input against the Nomad
software which we have been provided, and confirmed the above observation.
3.5 Reductions to ILP and CNF-SAT
Given that Nomad provides no decrease in information leakage for infinitely many inputs,
we revert to the two approaches that we discuss in this section. One is an efficient reduction
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to ILP and the other is an efficient reduction to CNF-SAT. Our primary intent is to identify
whether we can indeed realize software that is efficient in practice, and provides the security
guarantee of minimizing information leakage, notwithstanding the NP-hard worst-case for
computational complexity. Both approaches are efficient algorithms given access to oracles
for ILP and CNF-SAT, respectively. We chose to invest in both approaches because there
can be differences in the performance of individual solvers for different classes of problem
instances. Similar to prior work, we also focus on the 〈R,C〉 leakage model because it is the
most conservative of the four models — replication and collusion are both advantageous to
the attacker.
Input: An instance of the scheduling problem, 〈X,S,A,m, F 〉







|ft(i, j)− ft−1(i, j)| ≤ 2×m
2 foreach sj ∈ S, j ← 1 to k do
3 C ← C ∪
∑
i∈[1,n]
|ft(i, j)| ≤ sj
4 foreach i← 1 to n do
5 C ← C ∪
∑
j∈[1,k]










ft′(c, j)× ft′(c′, j)
7 return 〈C,Ob〉
Algorithm 1: Reduction to ILP for the 〈R,C〉 model for information leakage. C,Ob
are the outputs, | · | is absolute value, and the other symbols are explained in Table
3.2 in Section 3.2. Line (1) ensures that the migration budget, m, is respected. Lines
(2)–(3) ensure that the capacity of a server, si, is not exceeded. Lines (4)–(5) ensure
that every VM of each client is placed on exactly one server. The objective function on
Line (6) minimizes the total information leakage.
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3.5.1 Reduction to ILP
Algorithm 1 is our reduction to ILP for the 〈R,C〉 case. The other cases require minor
modifications only, as we discuss in the following. The input to the reduction is an instance
of the problem posed in Section 3.2, and the output is the corresponding ILP instance. The
unknown in the constraints and the optimization objective, is a new placement — values for
the n × k variables ft(i, j), for each i ∈ [1, n], j ∈ [1, k], for a given t, for the 〈R,C〉 case.
These values are the number of VMs of client i on server j in the upcoming epoch, t. For
the other three models of information leakage, the unknowns are ft(v, i, j), where v ∈ [1, xi],
which indicates whether VM v of client i is placed on server j in epoch t.
In Algorithm 1, Line (1) initializes the output set of constraints C, with a constraint that
ensures that the migration budget, m, is not exceeded by whatever moves are needed to reach
the new placement, ft. If m is specified as∞ in the input, we initialize C ← ∅ instead. Lines
(2)–(3) add constraints to ensure that the capacity of each server, sj , is not exceeded in the
new placement. Lines (4)–(5) add constraints to ensure that every VM of each client is placed
on exactly one server. The objective function, Ob, that is instantiated in Line (6), ensures that
we minimize the total information leakage with the new placement. The only nuance here
is that the objective function, Ob, for the 〈R,C〉 case, is not a set of linear constraints, but
rather quadratic constraints. However, Quadratic Constraint Programming is known to be in
NP as well [28] — we have designed and implemented a reduction from quadratic to linear
constraints via bit-wise multiplication. Our reduction is based on the standard algorithm used
for multiplication in which one multiplies the multiplicand by each digit of the multiplier and
then adds up all the properly shifted results. This algorithm and hence our reduction runs in
quadratic time.





· 4 · k · log22 maxi xi
)
, where
n is the number of clients,4 is the number of epochs in the sliding-window, k is the number
of servers, and log2 maxi xi is the maximum number of bits we need to express the number of
VMs per client. The reason is that the running time is dominated by Line (6) — the above
expression for the running-time comes directly from the three summations and the product.
This bound is not tight; more efficient reductions can exist from, for example, more compact
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encodings for placement.
3.5.2 Reduction to CNF-SAT
We reduce the decision version of the scheduling problem to CNF-SAT. That is, in addition to
the inputs X,S,A,m and F , we take as input an integer, q. This input q represents a threshold
for the information leakage we want to meet. That is, we ask if there exists a new placement
whose information leakage is at most q. To obtain a solution to the optimization version, we
perform a binary-search on q. In other words, if adopting the current placement for the next
epoch results in a total information leakage of at most q, we set the threshold to q/2, perform
a reduction to CNF-SAT and query the solver again. If the solver returns with ‘yes’, then we
set the threshold to q/4 and so on. Our reduction of the problem considered in this thesis to
CNF-SAT is via CIRCUIT-SAT, the satisfiability problem for boolean circuits [29]. Once we
reduce to CIRCUIT-SAT, we adopt a well-known linear-time reduction from CIRCUIT-SAT
to CNF-SAT [29]. Algorithm 2 is our reduction to CIRCUIT-SAT.
Our reduction is based on the work of Sinz [30] and Mousavi [31]. Those pieces of work
articulate how constraints of the form we need to address can be encoded as boolean circuits.
We refer the reader to those pieces of work for more comprehensive discussions, and focus on
our scheduling problem here.
The reduction to CIRCUIT-SAT, as Algorithm 2 indicates, is similar to the reduction to ILP.
In lieu of constraints that we express in ILP, we express constraints using boolean circuits,
whose basic elements are AND, OR and NOT gates. The output of the reduction in Algorithm
2 is a boolean circuit with input wires for a solver to set in a manner that the single output
wire evaluates to 1, i.e., the circuit is satisfied. As in the reduction to ILP in Section 3.5, the
unknown which the solver determines is a new placement. Thus, the input wires correspond
to, or encode, a placement. The input wires, wi,j , as Lines (1)–(3) in the algorithm indicate,
represent a placement that satisfies all the constraints encoded by the circuit. The manner in
which they represent a placement is that a placement for us is a set of n× k integers, ft(i, j),
for each i ∈ [1, n], j ∈ [1, k], given n clients, and k servers. That is, ft(i, j) is the number of
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Input: An instance of the decision version of the scheduling problem
〈X,S,A,m, F, q〉
Output: A CIRCUIT-SAT instance, i.e., a boolean circuit with a set of input wires
and a single output wire
1 foreach i← 1 to n do
2 foreach j ← 1 to k do
3 Form a set, wi,j , of log2(xi) wires
4 foreach sj ∈ S, j ← 1 to k do
5 foreach i← 1 to n do
6 The wi,j wires as input to an adder circuit, Aj
7 A comparison circuit: Aj ≤ sj
8 foreach i← 1 to n do
9 foreach j ← 1 to k do
10 The wi,j wires as input to an adder circuit, Ai
11 A comparison circuit: Ai = xi
12 foreach i← 1 to n do
13 foreach j ← 1 to k do
14 A circuit to determine di,j = |ft(i, j)− ft−1(i, j)|





di,j ≤ 2 ·m








ft′(c, j)× ft′(c′, j) ≤ q
17 Single-output AND of all the above
Algorithm 2: Reduction to CIRCUIT-SAT from a decision version of the scheduling
problem, for the 〈R,C〉 model. The inputs X,S,A,m, F are explained in Table 3.2 in
Section 3.2. The input q is an information-leakage threshold.
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VMs of client i that are to reside on server j.
This integer value, ft(i, j) can be represented using at most log2(xi) bits, where xi is the total
number of VMs of client i. This is the reason that in Line (3) of Algorithm 2, we have a
log2(xi)-sized set of wires corresponding to each i, j. Of course, some leading bits amongst
this set of bits may be all 0, when VMs of a client are spread across several servers. But we
need to account for the possibility that every VM of a client may end up resident on the same
server.
Once we decide on these inputs wires, we can go ahead and express boolean-circuit constraints
on them. The constraints are the same as for the reduction to ILP that we discuss in Section
3.5. Specifically, in Lines (4)–(7), we first, in the inner for loop in Lines (5)–(6), build adder
circuits to add the number of VMs of each client that is resident on each server. Then, in the
outer for loop of Lines (4) and (7), we use a comparison circuit to specify the constraint that
the output of the adder circuits should be at most the capacity of each server, sj . Note that the
integer sj is itself encoded as a circuit. It is easy to build a circuit of such a constant bit-string.
E.g., a “1” can be encoded as “x ∨ ¬x”, and a “0” as “x ∧ ¬x.” While we have specified those
using propositional logic, it is easy to translate them to circuits that use OR,AND and NOT
gates in lieu of ∨,∧ and ¬, respectively.
Lines (8)–(11) similarly encode the constraint that each client resides on exactly one server,
and Lines (12)–(15) esure that the migration budget is not exceeded. Finally, Line (16) ensures
that the threshold for information-leakage is met. In Line (17), we AND all the above circuits;
the output of this AND is the output of the circuit. The question to a solver, now, is whether
the input wires can be set to bit-values in a manner that the output wire evaluates to 1. This is
possible if and only if all the constraints are satisfiable.
This is exactly the question we seek to answer. The running-time of the reduction to CIRCUIT-
SAT is the same as the running-time of the reduction to ILP, i.e., polynomial in the size of




A limited empirical assessment of our two approaches and Nomad can be found in our
paper [1], and in other work [8]. The intent of the empirical assessment was: (a) to validate
empirically our analytical insights on the shortcomings of Nomad, and, (b) to understand the
overhead of actually providing a security guarantee of minimizing leakage in practice. For
the ILP approach, we used the CPLEX [32] solver as it was used in prior work [5]. For the
CNF-SAT approach, we used Lingeling [33] as the solver. Below we summarize the results
and takeaways from the assessment.
On (a), we found that our empirical observations concurred with our analytical insights on
Nomad’s lack of security. Figure 3.5 in Section 3.4 shows an example of an input for which
we expect Nomad not to make any moves even though a decrease in leakage is possible.
Figure 3.6 shows the results from running this particular example in practice. We observe
from the figure that for this input, the approaches based on ILP and CNF-SAT converged
to the optimal leakage of 8 bits per epoch within a single epoch, but Nomad provided no
decrease in information-leakage even when unconstrained by a migration budget. As another
example, Figure 3.7 shows how each of the three approaches performed after 1 epoch when
they were given random inputs that have a known non-zero optimal leakage. We observe
from the figure that ILP and CNF-SAT consistently converged to the optimal information
leakage, but Nomad’s performance was inconsistent — for 4 out of the 10 cases, it was unable
to converge to the optimal leakage.
On (b), our results suggest that while both the ILP and SAT approaches converge to the optimal
placement, the ILP approach is often faster. An ILP solver solves an optimization problem
and therefore the ILP approach, given an instance of the scheduling optimization problem,
comprises a single reduction to ILP along with a single call to an ILP solver. A SAT solver, on
the other hand, solves a decision problem, and therefore the CNF-SAT approach comprises
a binary search for the optimal leakage value. Each iteration of the binary search entails a
reduction to CNF-SAT and a call to a SAT solver. The ILP approach’s faster performance than
that of the CNF-SAT approach can be observed in Figure 3.8 which shows the results from a
test that was conducted to assess the scalability of the three approaches.
53
Figure 3.6. This figure shows how information leakage varies when all three approaches are allowed to
run 10 epochs on the placement map shown in Figure 3.5. The CNF-SAT and ILP solvers were both
able to obtain the optimal placement in which a leakage of 8 bits is incurred per epoch. Nomad was
unable to make any move. ©2020 IEEE.
Figure 3.7. Increase in information leakage in 1 epoch for 10 random initial placements for input
instances of 5 servers with 4 VM slots each, and 6 clients with 3 VMs each. Each of the 10 tests
were run over a duration of 1 epoch with an infinite migration budget. The optimal placement is the
one resulting in leakage of 18 bits. ILP and CNF-SAT always converged to the optimal. Nomad’s
performance was inconsistent. ©2020 IEEE.
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Figure 3.8. Scalability of Nomad, ILP, and CNF-SAT using the testing parameters presented in Moon
et. al [5]. Cluster size of x means: x servers with capacity 4, and x clients with 2 VMs each. Total VMs
in the cluster:
∑
VM = 2 · x. ©2020 IEEE.
Our approaches that provide security incur a higher overhead than Nomad (see Figure 3.8).
However, this overhead, in practice, is not as high as suggested by prior work. We find that if
an efficient reduction to ILP is devised and adopted, then the run-time is significantly lower
than previously thought. For example, while prior work reports that their ILP approach takes
longer than a day for cluster sizes of 40 and 50 [5], ours took only 4 and 8 minutes, respectively.
This difference can be attributed to the result established in Theorem 3.4.1, i.e., the reduction
to ILP in prior work can be exponential time in the size of the input for the 〈R,C〉 model. In
contrast, our reduction to ILP and CNF-SAT are polynomial-time. Whereas we are able to
guarantee minimum information-leakage, it is unclear what security benefit more efficient
approaches, particularly Nomad, actually provide.
The main takeaway from our empirical assessment is that security comes at a cost. This
cost can be lowered by prudently leveraging tools such as constraint-solvers. But devising
efficient reductions so they can be leveraged prudently can be a technical challenge. If we are
to propose VM-migration as a viable technique to reduce information-leakage at scale, then
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more research-investment is needed, e.g., into more efficient reductions, and solvers, before it
can be deemed to be practical. Our results suggest that such a technique can be practical for
relatively small clouds only — ones with 10’s, but not 100’s or 1000’s, of servers. Approaches
such as Nomad suggest that this technical challenge can be bypassed easily. But this is simply
not true. The reasons for this lie at the very foundations of computing.
3.6 Related Work
We discuss work on cross-VM side-channels and defences against them.
Cross-VM side-channel attacks Ristenpart et al. [13] were among the first to show how an
attacker can map the internal cloud infrastructure using network probing in order to achieve
co-residency with a victim VM, and how the co-residency can be exploited to extract coarse-
grained information such as keystroke patterns.
This was followed up by the work of Zhang et al. [16] who showed how a Prime+Probe
side-channel attack on upper level cache can be used to extract more fine-grained information
such as an ElGamal decryption key. In the prime stage, the attacker fills a portion of cache
and then waits to allow the victim to access cache. In the probe stage, the attacker reloads the
primed data and uses the probe time to decide whether the victim accessed that portion of
cache. Prime+Probe attacks on last level caches that make use of huge page-sizes have also
been studied [11, 9, 34]. More recent work shows a cross-core Prime+Probe attack on sliced
non-inclusive caches [35].
Research has also shown how fine-grain information can be extracted using Flush+Reload
techniques [17, 10, 15, 36]. In the flush stage, the attacker flushes out certain lines in memory
and waits to allow the victim to access them. In the reload stage, the attacker accesses the
flushed lines. If any such line does not take long to load, the attacker knows the line was
accessed by the victim.
Other works have shown that sharing of same-content memory pages among co-resident clients
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poses the threat of a memory disclosure attack [12, 14]. The attacker can identify which pages
it shares with a victim and take advantage of differences in write times to gain information
about the victim’s applications and OS.
Other work has shown side-channel attacks based on page faults against SGX-based shielded
execution [37, 38]. In such an attack, a compromised OS allocates a minimum number of
physical pages to the victim process, such that memory accesses spill out of the allocated set
as much as possible, leaving a trace of page faults that leaks sensitive information.
Of course, other kinds of side-channels may exist. For example, the work of Xu et al. [37]
considers the issue of excluding the operating system from the trusted computing base, and
side-channels that can result as a consequence. As another example, the work of Shinde et
al. [38] considers side-channels based on page-faults. Such attacks can certainly underlie cross-
VM side-channel attacks. For example, if a benign VM runs a particular kind of application
that allows a malicious VM that is co-resident to cause a page-fault, it may be vulnerable to
the latter kind of attack.
Defences To counter such attacks, several defence strategies have been proposed. At a
hypervisor level, Vattikonda et al. [18] proposed hiding a program’s execution time by
eliminating fine grained timers. Kim et al. [39] used statistical multiplexing to protect against
cache-based side-channel attacks in the cloud. They proposed a set of locked cache lines per
core that are efficiently multiplexed amongst co-resident VMs and never evicted from the
cache. Raj et al. [19] identified last level cache (LLC) sharing as one of the impediments to
finer grain isolation, and proposed two resource management approaches to provide
performance and security isolation - cache hierarchy aware core assignment and page
colouring based cache partitioning. Shi et al. [40] proposed an approach that leverages
dynamic cache colouring: when an application is doing security-sensitive operations, the
VMM is notified to swap the associated data to a safe and isolated cache line. Varadarajan et
al. [41] introduced a minimum run time (MRT) guarantee into the Xen scheduler, to limit the
frequency of preemptions.
At a guest OS level, Zhang et al. [42] proposed a method by which a tenant can construct their
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VMs to automatically inject additional noise into the timings that an attacker might observe
from caches. Pattuk et al. [20] suggested partitioning cryptographic keys into random shares
and storing each share in a different VM. Zhou et al. [43] presented a software approach which
dynamically manages physical memory pages shared between security domains to disable
sharing of LLC lines.
At a hardware level, some works have proposed modifying the cache architecture to obtain
access randomization [44, 45] while others have explored the partitioning of cache [46]. In
recent work, Liu et al. [47] demonstrated how to combat LLC side-channel attacks by using the
Intel Cache Allocation Technology (CAT) to partition the LLC into a hybrid hardware-software
managed cache.
As many side-channel attacks are based on the observances of memory access, a promising
defence strategy is to use oblivious RAM (ORAM) to randomize data access patterns [48, 49].
When an adversary observes the physical storage locations accessed, the ORAM algorithm
ensures that they have negligible probability of learning the true access pattern.
An approach that focuses on isolation is that of shielded execution, for example, by using Intel
SGX enclaves [22]. Chen et al. [50] presented a software framework that enables a shielded
execution to detect page-fault side-channel attacks.
Various scheduler-based defences have also been explored. Y. Zhang et al. [51] proposed
periodically migrating VMs using methods based on game theory. Azar et al. [52] focused on
mitigating co-location attacks, on the premise that they are a necessary first step to performing
cross-VM attacks. Their approach assigns VMs to servers such that attack VMs are rarely
co-located with target VMs. Their model is based on co-location rather than on information
leakage. Han et al. [53] also studied how to minimize the attacker’s possibility of co-locating
their VMs with targets. They introduced a security game model to compare different VM
allocation policies and advocated selecting an allocation policy statistically from a pool instead
of having a fixed one. Bijon et al. [54] proposed an attribute-based constraints specification
framework that enables clients to express essential properties of their resources as attributes. A
constraints enforcement engine then schedules the VMs while respecting the conflicts specified
by these attributes. Han et al. [55] proposed metrics which can be used to assess the security
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of a VM allocation policy.
The work that is most closely related to ours is by Moon et al. [5]. They characterized
information leakage models which can be used to pose the security-sensitive scheduling
problem precisely and explore various approaches to address the problem. Our work differs
from theirs in the following ways: (1) We analyze the problem’s computational complexity,
(2) Our reduction to ILP is polynomial time, while theirs can be exponential time for a
certain encoding of input, (3) We also investigate the approach of reducing to CNF-SAT
and employing a SAT solver, and (4) Our approaches guarantee security whereas their final
approach, Nomad, does not.
3.7 Conclusions
Our conclusions are discussed in Chapter 6, Section 6.1.
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Chapter 4
Forensic Analysis for Access Control4
4.1 Introduction
In this work we unify two important topics in information security. Forensic analysis (or
simply, forensics) seeks to answer questions about past states of a system. It is the process
of identifying, preserving, analysing and presenting evidence in a manner that is legally
acceptable [57]. In the context of computer and information security, it closely parallels the
challenges faced by investigators at the scene of a possible crime. For example, given a chunk
of bytes on a hard disk, we may ask whether those bytes are, or were, part of an image. We
may ask also whether there was an attempt to delete that image from the disk. While there has
been no prior work on forensic analysis specifically in the context of access control, there has
been work on forensics in broader contexts such as intrusion detection and event reconstruction
systems (see, for example, [58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63] and Section 4.6).
4This chapter is based on work that is undergoing review [3]. My contributions are the following: posing the
forensic analysis problem for access control (Section 4.1), formulating the problem (Section 4.2), the theorems
and proofs demonstrating hardness results for HRU (Section 4.3.1) and ARBAC (Section 4.3.2), the algorithm for
forensic analysis for Graham-Denning (Section 4.3.3), and the notion and theorems pertaining to goal-directed
logging (Section 4.4). The case study in Section 4.5 was conducted by Huang Xiaowei and further details about

















Figure 4.1. Forensic vs. safety analysis. In safety analysis, we ask whether a future “goal” state with a
certain property is reachable from the current state. In forensic analysis we ask if we could have reached,
or did reach, the current state from a past “goal” state with a certain property, possibly delimiting our
search with a known past state.
Access control deals with actions that a principal may exercise on a resource. It is recognized
as an important aspect of the security of a system; indeed, its “centre of gravity” [64]. When a
principal, such as a process of an operating system, seeks to exercise an action, such as read or
write, on a resource, such as a digital file, the access control system ensures that the attempt is
mediated. An authorization policy is used by the mediator to determine whether the attempt
should be allowed. In realistic systems, this authorization policy may change over time. For
example, Alice may now be disallowed from writing to a file that she used to be able to write
to. As another example, a user or a file may be deleted from the system entirely.
Forensics vs. safety An authorization policy at any given moment can be perceived as an
instance of a state in a state-change system. This is exactly the mindset that underlies safety
analysis, a well-researched problem in access control (see Figure 4.1). As we discuss further
in Section 4.6, there has been considerable work on safety analysis for access control (see, for
example, [65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76]). The intent behind safety analysis
is to determine whether an undesirable access may be authorized in some future state of the
system by some sequence of actions, each of which changes the authorization policy.
Safety analysis is motivated by delegation [77]: the power that users, who are not fully trusted,
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possess to change authorizations. Delegation, in turn, is motivated by the need to scale access
control systems – relying on only a few fully trusted users to change authorizations does not
scale to large numbers of users and resources. If indeed an instance of such safety analysis
reveals that an undesirable state may be reachable in future, we may want to change the
current authorization policy, or the nature of changes that users who are not fully trusted are
allowed to make to authorizations, so that the possibility of reaching such an undesirable state
is precluded.
Safety analysis is part of security through prevention; that is, ensuring that our system can
never be insecure. Unfortunately, while prevention is certainly part of an overall approach to
securing systems, it is widely acknowledged that it is often insufficient [78]. There are two
reasons for this. One is that it is not always possible to characterize the set of undesirable
states that we want to preclude a system from reaching. Another is that even if we are
able to characterize such a set, the underlying analysis problem may be intractable, or even
undecidable [65].
A complementary approach to security via prevention, is security via detection – detecting,
after the fact, that a breach has occurred. Action can then be taken, such as finding the
perpetrator, and holding them accountable. Also, this may give us insight into preventive
mechanisms to preclude similar breaches in the future. Forensics is part of security via
detection. Questions we pose in the context of forensic analysis relate to whether past states of
a system indicate a violation, relative to our current mindset, i.e., after the fact. Thus, from
the standpoint of access control, forensic analysis is a natural complement of safety analysis:
safety asks about the future, forensics asks about the past (see Figure 4.1).
Forensics in Access Control We argue that access control is an important and useful
context in which to pose and consider forensic analysis. The reason is, as we mention
above, access control is a critical part of the security of a system. Therefore, an ability to
answer questions about past authorizations can provide important clues and evidence regarding
breaches. Alternately, and equally as importantly, it may provide evidence for exoneration –
reasonable doubt as to one’s guilt. These themes recur in the next section, in which we pose












   if own ∈ M[x,z] then
      remove read from M[y,z]
invertRemoveRead(x, y, z)
      add read to M[y,z]
   only if own ∈ M[x,z]      
invert
Figure 4.2. A natural way to ask whether a past state may have existed is to first “invert” the state-
change rule. The figure shows an example for an access control system based on the HRU scheme [24].
In “inverting” a state-change, a pre-condition becomes a post-condition. In the example, we would
specify the arguments x =sam, y =joe, z =file to go from one state to the other.
As we discuss further there, we can think of three kinds of basic questions one may ask about
past authorization states.
One is whether a user, say, Alice, may have possessed a particular privilege. For example,
whether she may have been able to write to a file. Another is whether she indeed possessed
such a privilege. A third is whether she exercised a privilege. Of course, the third implies the
second, which in turn implies the first: if indeed she exercised a privilege, then we know that
she possessed it, and if she possessed it, then we know that she may have possessed it.
One may ask why we care about the first two kinds of questions at all. The answer to this
lies in our intent. A natural way to motivate the weakest of the above questions, i.e., whether
Alice may have held a privilege, is to consider its complement — whether it is impossible that
Alice held a privilege. An answer of ‘true,’ to this complementary question, can be used to
exonerate Alice of a crime. A weaker query may also suffice if an investigator seeks clues,
and not definitive evidence.
Differences from safety Notwithstanding the apparent correspondence between safety and
forensic analysis, there are some important differences. A difference is that a natural way to
intuit an algorithm for forensic analysis in a particular setting is to first “invert” state-change
rules and then check whether a past state with a certain property may have existed. It is
customary in access control, and indeed, more broadly in computing, to describe a system by
specifying a current state, and the manner in which a state can change to a new state. This is
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exactly what we do in the specification of a Turing machine, for example [6].
An example from access control is shown in Figure 4.2. The state in the example is encoded
as an access matrix – the rows are subjects and columns are objects; in the example, we have
one object only, file, and two subjects, sam and joe. A manner in which a state can change is
specified as a command in the Harrison-Ruzzo-Ullman (HRU) scheme [65]. In the example,
the command allows a subject who has own access to file to remove read access from a subject.
Thus, this command contains a precondition – the check for whether the former subject indeed
has own access. If we were to think of the past from the new state then, we presumably would
consider the “inverse” of the command. A natural way to specify such an “inverse” is using
a post-condition as shown in the figure. We leverage this mindset in devising an algorithm
for forensic analysis in a Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) scheme called Administrative
RBAC (ARBAC) [79] (see the proof for Theorem 4.3.5 in Section 4.3.2).
Another difference between forensic and safety analysis is that in an instance of safety analysis,
we typically specify two states: a current state, and a future “goal” state. The latter may be
specified partially only, for example, whether a particular subject possesses a particular right
over a particular object. We ask whether such a “goal” state is reachable from the current state.
In forensic analysis, apart from the current state and a past “goal” state, it seems meaningful
to specify also a known state from the past that delimits how far back we look for the “goal”
state. Such a state is shown to the far left as a double circle in Figure 4.1. The reason for
this is that as we are looking in to the past, a superuser who runs the forensic analysis may
already know of such a state, and by explicitly specifying it, is able to tailor the analysis so
they are able to zero-in on the answer to their forensic question. For example, we may be
aware that the security incident we are investigating happened within the past two weeks, and
so it is meaningful to specify a known past state from two weeks ago to delimit our search.
Furthermore, it is typical for a superuser to first configure a system to first be in some state,
and only then delegate the ability to change the authorization state to potentially untrustworthy
users. The superuser, in their forensic analysis, may want to delimit forensic analysis with
such a state. In our specification of forensic analysis in access control in Section 4.2, we allow
the explicit specification of such a state. We point out, however, that such a state can be an







  create object file, 
  enter own into M[owner,file] 
grantRead(owner, friend, file)
  if own in M[owner,file], 
    enter read into M[friend,file] 
grantWrite(owner, friend, file)
  if own in M[owner,file], 
    enter write into M[friend,file] 
removeRead(owner, exfriend, file)
  if own in M[owner,file], 
    delete read from M[ex-friend,file] 
removeWrite(owner, exfriend, file)
  if own in M[owner,file], 









Figure 4.3. An example of an access control system in the HRU scheme [65].
completely relax this additional constraint, if needed.
A third difference between forensic and safety analysis is that as forensics considers past
events, at least some of those events may have been recorded in logs. These logs, in turn, can
be an additional input to forensic analysis.
Logs Logs are data we record and store about past states of a system. They are useful for
security based on after-the-fact detection. In Section 4.4 we identify that indeed, incorporation
of prudently recorded logs can make the forensic analysis problem computationally easier.
This may not seem surprising, but the associated challenge here is that indiscriminate logging
can result in inordinately large logs that we need to store, perhaps over long periods of time,
before we pose a forensic analysis instance. A hypothesis of this work, which we investigate
further in Section 4.4, is that depending on our intent, we can do goal-directed logging; that is,
log only those things that are potentially useful for forensic analysis in future. Our goal can
significantly reduce the amount of logs we collect and have to store over a possibly long period
of time before we pose a forensic analysis instance in response to, for example, a suspicion
that a breach occurred at some time in the past. Thus, goal-directed logging can be seen as a
kind of semantic, lossy, compression technique for logs. We also address the issue of sufficient
and minimal logs in Section 4.4.
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The issue of sufficient logs is tied closely to the kind of forensic question we seek to ask.
Also, it relates to a fundamental technical challenge with both safety and forensic analysis:
the possibility of several, even infinitely many, reachable states. We illustrate this using the
example in Figure 4.3 which is a system in the Harrison-Ruzzo-Ullman (HRU) scheme [65].
As the figure shows, the scheme uses an access matrix to encode a state, and a set of commands
as the state-change rule (see Section 4.3.1 for more details). Suppose our current state is the
left state in the figure in which joe does not have write to code, and the known past state which
delimits our search is the same state. Now suppose we seek to know: did joe ever possess
write to code? Without logs, it would be impossible to know the answer. A sufficient log
would be a bit attached to joe that is set if and only if joe gets write to code. Also sufficient
are logs on every action by the owner sam. Now suppose we relax the question to: could joe
have possessed write to code? The answer to this question may be true or false, again based
on the logs we maintain. Suppose, we maintain no logs whatsoever. Then the answer is ‘true.’
Suppose, instead, we maintain as logs all actions by the owner sam. Then the answer is ‘true’
or ‘false’ based on whether sam did indeed grant write to joe.
Foundations We formulate the problem in Section 4.2; to our knowledge, we are the first
to pose the forensic analysis problem in access control as such. We then make two sets of
contributions at the foundations. In Section 4.3, we consider three access control schemes
from the literature: (i) the HRU scheme [65], (ii) the Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
scheme, Administrative RBAC (ARBAC) [79], and (iii) the Graham-Denning scheme [80].
We identify the computational complexity of forensic analysis for each of those schemes. Our
reason for considering these schemes is that they are qualitatively different from one another:
HRU is based on the access-matrix and commands that fire, ARBAC is based on RBAC, and
Graham-Denning is a discretionary scheme. Also, the computational complexity of safety
analysis is known for each of these schemes, and they belong to different classes: for HRU, it
is undecidable [65], for ARBAC, it is PSPACE-complete [81], and for Graham-Denning, it
is in P [71]. We identify that for each of these schemes, forensic analysis, in the worst-case,
lies in the same class as safety analysis, thereby establishing a tight correspondence between
safety and forensics in this regard as well. Our other set of contributions at the foundations is
with sufficient and minimal logs. In Section 4.4 we study goal-directed logging to reduce the
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size of logs needed to maintain precision and improve efficiency of forensic analysis for these
schemes.
Practice We have conducted a case-study on forensic analysis in the access control system of
a practical application called Hello, Retail! [82]. Hello, Retail! is a serverless cloud application
[83], intended to be run in the Amazon Web Services (AWS) public cloud [84]. We chose
Hello, Retail! as it is open-source, has won a serverless architecture award [85], serverless
cloud applications are considered to be at the cutting-edge of application development and
deployment and a security policy configuration has been published with Hello, Retail!’s code.
We simulated a security incident and used logging that AWS supports to carry out forensic
analysis. Our study and results are in Section 4.5.
Other sections In addition, we discuss related work in Section 4.6, and conclude with
Section 4.7.
4.2 Problem
As we mention in Section 4.1, an access control system can be perceived as a state-change
system. This perspective is consistent with prior work, particularly as it relates to safety
analysis (see, for example, [65, 74, 70, 81, 75]). We first recall this characterization in Section
4.2.1, and then, in Section 4.2.2, pose the forensic analysis problem in a manner that is
meaningful for any access control scheme. In Section 4.2.3 we explain how the notion of
‘trusted’ users can be incorporated in the problem formulation.
4.2.1 Access Control Schemes and Systems
An access control scheme is a pair 〈Γ,Ψ〉, where Γ is a set of states and Ψ is a set of state-
change rules. In practice, Γ may be infinite, but Ψ is finite. A state, γ ∈ Γ, encodes the
rights or privileges that a subject has at a given time. That is, it contains all the information
necessary to make an access control decision at that point in time. Examples of subjects are
67
users and roles. An access control request can be seen as encoded by a query which is issued
on a state. The syntax of a query is custom to a particular scheme; in the next section in which
we instantiate concrete schemes, we adopt specific queries for each. For example, in Figure
4.3, we consider one resource only, and we can perceive a query as a pair, 〈subject, right〉,
which encodes the query as to whether subject possesses right over the resource. When a
query q is issued on a state γ ∈ Γ, it evaluates to either true, which we denote γ ` q, or false,
which we denote γ 0 q. For example, in Figure 4.3, the state to the left ` 〈joe, read〉, but
the state to the left 0 〈joe,write〉.
A state-change rule, ψ ∈ Ψ, specifies how a state may change to another. Each such ψ ∈ Ψ
is a function which maps a state, and possibly additional arguments, to another state. For
example, a particular ψ may specify that a state in which a subject a which possesses a right
own on a resource, and a subject b which does not possess a right to that resource can change
to a state in which a’s privileges remain unchanged, but b has the right to the resource. This is
exactly the state change from the state to the left of Figure 4.3 to the state on the right.
Given two states γ and γ′ and a state-change rule ψ, we write γ →ψ γ′ if the change from γ to
γ′ is allowed by ψ, and γ →∗ψ γ′ if a sequence of zero or more allowed state-changes leads
from γ to γ′. For example, in Figure 4.3, left state→∗ψ right state, and left state→∗ψ left state.
An access control system based on a scheme 〈Γ,Ψ〉 is an instance of that scheme, i.e., 〈γ, ψ〉,
where γ ∈ Γ, is the current state, and ψ ∈ Ψ, is the state-change rule for that system. Figure
4.3 illustrates an access control system based on the HRU scheme [65].
Three assumptions We make three assumptions regarding state-changes in an access
control system. One is that at any moment in time, at most one state-change can be in
execution. That is, we do not allow for state-changes in parallel. Another assumption is that
a state-change that is enabled either occurs successfully, or does not occur at all. We do not
have a notion of partial state-changes. The third assumption is that whenever we consider a
sequence of state-changes, γ →∗ψ γ′, it is finite. All these assumptions have been adopted in
prior work in the context of safety analysis, and articulated explicitly [72]. The motivation for
these assumptions is that they model practice.
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4.2.2 Forensic Analysis: Problem Formulation
Given an access control scheme 〈Γ,Ψ〉, a forensic instance is 〈γ, ψ, k, q, π, L〉, where (we
discuss each component in more detail farther below):
• 〈γ, ψ〉 is an access control system, i.e., γ ∈ Γ is the current state and ψ ∈ Ψ is the
state-change rule;
• k is a known past state that delimits which past states we consider;
• q is a query, which encodes the kind of state we seek to find;
• π ∈ {possible,actual} encodes whether we are asking if a state in which q is true
may have occurred, or did occur;
• L is a log.
Comparison to safety analysis Before we discuss each of the above components in more
detail, we compare the above formulation to the manner in which safety analysis has been
expressed in prior work (see, for example, [65, 70, 74, 75, 81]). An instance of safety analysis
is 〈γ, ψ, q〉 – given the system 〈γ, ψ〉, we ask whether there exists a future state in which q
is true. Thus, in forensic analysis, in addition to those components, we consider k, π and L.
These are discussed in Section 4.1; we discuss them below in more detail. Some work in
safety analysis, for example, that of Jha et al. [81], also incorporates a set of trusted users who
are assumed to not effect any state-changes. We can certainly incorporate such a set in our
formulation of forensic analysis. We address this in Section 4.2.3.
The system, 〈γ, ψ〉 As with safety analysis, we assume that we are given an access control
system, i.e., a current-state γ and the state-change rule ψ. We seek to explore past states going
backwards from γ under the assumption every “forward” state-change meets ψ.
A known past state, k The state k delimits the state-space in our search. That is, we explore
only those states that lie between the current state, γ, and k. There are two reasons we include
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such a component in our problem-formulation. One is that for many practical instances, the
initial state of the system may not be an “empty” one. Indeed, it is typical for a superuser to
create users and objects and assign certain rights to the users over the objects before initializing
the access control system. Secondly, the known past state also allows us to limit how far back
in time our analysis should go. We assume that γ is reachable from k, i.e. k →∗ψ γ.
The query, q The query characterizes the kind of state we seek in our state-space search.
While the exact syntax of a query is custom to the particular access control scheme, in this
work, just as in safety analysis, we adopt as query an access request. For example, in a scheme
based on an access matrix, a query is 〈subject, object, right〉. As another example, in an RBAC
scheme, a query may be 〈user, role〉. Safety analysis has been generalized to so-called security
analysis [69, 71] in which more general queries are considered. Certainly, we can generalize
forensic analysis to such queries as well; we leave that for future work.
Possible vs. actual, π In Section 4.1, we discuss three kinds of forensic questions that seem
meaningful in the context of access control: whether a user, say, Alice, (i) may have possessed
a privilege, (ii) did possess a privilege, and, (iii) exercised a privilege. From the perspective of
state-reachability, (i) and (ii) are both meaningful to pose. Analysis type (iii) pertains to access
enforcement, rather than authorization of an access, and is beyond the scope of the kind of
forensic analysis we consider. The component π is intended to capture whether we mean type
(i) possible, or type (ii) actual.
Log, L A log, L, is a record of past states and state-changes; it is a sequence of entries,
each of which is a portion of a state or state-change that has occurred. A log may not be
comprehensive: not only may an entry contain only a portion of a state or state-change, but
also, not all states and state-changes that have occurred may appear in a log. For example, only
some, and not all authorizations that are part of a state, may have been recorded as an entry.
We can think of the log as a ground truth. With this perspective, we can attempt to establish
properties of interest to us in forensics using logical entailment [86]. We may establish, for
example, given 〈ψ,L〉, where ψ is the state-change rule and L the log from a forensic analysis
instance, that a state-change sequence, γ1 →ψ γ2 →ψ . . .→ψ γn, for n ≥ 1, did indeed occur.
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We may establish, instead, that a given state-change sequence γ1 →ψ . . .→ψ γn did not occur.
It is possible, of course, that a statement we pose cannot be established, and neither can its
complement. For example, for a particular sequence γ1 →ψ . . . →ψ γn, we may be able to
neither establish that it occurred, nor that it did not occur.
Semantics of an instance Given a forensic analysis instance, it can be assigned a truth-
value of one of true, false or unknown. If π = possible, then the instance cannot be
unknown, and is either true or false. It is true if and only if there exists a state γ′ such that: (1)
γ′ ` q, and, (2) there exists a sequence k →∗ψ γ′ →∗ψ γ for which we are not able to establish
that it did not occur. It is false otherwise. We clarify that Condition (2) is that such a sequence
may indeed have occurred; we are unable to exclude that possibility.
If π = actual, the output may be true, unknown or false. It is true if and only if there
exists a state γ′ such that: (1) γ′ ` q, and, (2) we are able to establish that some sequence
k →∗ψ γ′ →∗ψ γ did indeed occur. It is false if and only if we are able to establish that in the
sequence k →∗ψ γ that occurred in the past, there is no state γ′ such that γ′ ` q. Otherwise, it
is unknown.
We are careful with the above characterizations so that they are logically consistent with one
another. For example, if a forensics instance with π = actual is true, then that instance is
guaranteed to be true if we change π to possible. It is the case also that if an instance with
π = possible is false, then that instance remains false if we change π to actual.
An investigator may set π to possible or actual depending on their intent. If their intent
is, for example, exoneration of a suspect, then possible may be the more appropriate of the
two, with the hope that the instance is false. If their intent is establishment of guilt, actual
may be more appropriate, with the hope that the instance is true.
In Section 4.3, we instantiate the above ideas for concrete access control schemes. We also
present examples of concrete systems and forensics instances for those schemes.
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4.2.3 Trusted Users
In the safety problem one asks if a state in which an undesirable access is authorized can be
reached in the future. Such a state is deemed to be unsafe. Prior work on safety analysis (e.g.
[65, 70, 81]) consider the notion of trusted users. These are users who are assumed to make
secure choices when they change the system’s authorization policy. Thus, a safety instance
that includes a set of trusted users, T , in its input, asks if an unsafe state can be reached in
future via state-changes that are effected by users not in T , i.e., untrusted users. To clarify, it
may be possible for users in T to effect state-changes that result in an unsafe state in future,
but these users are trusted not to do so.
Our formulation of forensic analysis in the previous subsection can be adapted to include a set
of trusted users, T . The way to do this, however, needs careful consideration. As discussed
in Section 4.2.2, in forensics, the path of interest, k →∗ψ γ′ →∗ψ γ, is specified by 3 states. k
and γ are the input known past and current states respectively. γ′ is the goal state that the
analysis seeks to find, i.e., γ′ ` q, where q is the input query. As in safety analysis, the goal
state in forensic analysis can be considered ‘unsafe’. Thus, it is reasonable for forensics to be
concerned only with sequences k →∗ψ γ′ in which the state-changes are effected by untrusted
users only. An observation is that if the goal state in a forensics instance is a safe state, there
is no reason to specify a set of trusted users in the input. As for the sequence γ′ →∗ψ γ, if
γ is unsafe, then the same rule applies, i.e., forensics is interested in sequences in which
state-changes are effected by untrusted users only. If γ is safe, then the state-changes can be
effected by any kind of user, trusted or untrusted.
Semantics of an instance We now explain the semantics of a forensic instance that includes
a set of trusted users, T . We assume γ is safe; our formulation requires minor modifications
only for the case in which it is not. Given a forensic instance 〈γ, ψ, k, q, π, L, T 〉, if π =
possible, the instance is either true or false. It is true if and only if there exists a state γ′
such that: (1) γ′ ` q, (2) there exists a sequence of state-changes k →∗ψ γ′ effected by users
not in T , (3) there exists a sequence of state-changes γ′ →∗ψ γ and, (4) we are not able to
establish that the sequences of (2) or (3) did not occur.
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If π = actual, the output may be true, unknown or false. It is true if and only if there
exists a state γ′ such that: (1) γ′ ` q, and, (2) we are able to establish that some sequence
k →∗ψ γ′ →∗ψ γ did indeed occur. It is false if and only if we are able to establish that in the
sequence k →∗ψ γ that occurred in the past, there is no state γ′ such that γ′ ` q. Otherwise, it is
unknown. Observe that for π = actual, we make no mention of state-changes being effected
by trusted vs. untrusted users. This is because if γ′ ` q and k →∗ψ γ′ actually happened, then
by the definition of trusted users, the state-changes must have been effected by untrusted users.
In the remainder of this chapter, we do not consider the notion of trusted users as it has no
consequence to our results.
4.3 Computational Complexity
In this section, we analyze the worst-case computational complexity of the forensic analysis
problem posed in the previous section for three access control schemes from the literature. An
intent is to determine whether efficient algorithms exist for forensic analysis in these access
control schemes, in the worst-case. Also of interest is whether forensic analysis has a different
worst-case computational complexity than safety analysis for these schemes.
Proof strategy We adopt customary approaches to establish both lower- and upper-bound
computational hardness. To establish lower-bound computational hardness, we reduce from
a problem that is known to have that lower-bound computational hardness. To establish an
upper-bound, we do so by construction: we propose an algorithm. In the proofs for Theorems
4.3.1 and 4.3.3 in Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 respectively, we choose to reduce from the safety
analysis problem for that particular scheme. This not only establishes the desired lower-bound,
but also establishes a correspondence between safety and forensics for these schemes.
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4.3.1 HRU
In this section, we analyze the worst-case computational complexity of forensic analysis for
the HRU scheme [65]. We first describe the scheme, present an example system and forensic
analysis instances for it, and then state and prove that forensic analysis for the scheme is
undecidable in the worst-case.
The HRU scheme We assume the existence of two sets, subjects S and objects O with
S ⊆ O. Every system is associated with a finite set of rights, R. A state, γ, is associated with
a subset of subjects and objects that exist in that state, and an access matrix that maps each
subject-object pair to a subset of the set of rights that that subject possesses over that object.
We write Mγ[s, o] for the entry, or cell, in the access matrix in the state γ, that is the set of
rights the subject s possesses over the object o. To refer to the access matrix in its entirety, we
write Mγ[].
A state-change rule ψ in the HRU scheme is a set of commands, Cψ. A state-change is the
firing of a command in Cψ. Each command takes arguments, each of which is a subject
or object, has an optional precondition, which is a conjuction of checks for the presence
of a right in a cell for a subject and object that are arguments, and a sequence of primitive
operations. The HRU scheme specifies six primitive operations: (i) the creation of a subject,
which creates a new row and column in the access matrix, (ii) the creation of an object which
is not a subject, which creates a new column, (iii) the deletion of a subject, which removes
the corresponding row and column, (iv) the deletion of an object that is not a subject, which
removes the corresponding column, (v) the addition of a right to a cell, if it is not already in
the cell, and, (vi) the removal of a right from a cell, if the cell contains that right.
Figure 4.3 shows an example of an HRU system in which the set of rights
R = {own, read,write} and Cψ comprises five commands. We refer the reader to prior work
[65, 72] for a more comprehensive description of the HRU scheme.
Forensic analysis in HRU In a forensic analysis instance 〈γ, ψ, k, q, π, L〉 for an HRU
system, γ and k are access matrices, and ψ is a set of commands such that k →∗ψ γ, and a
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corresponding sequence of state-changes did indeed occur. L, the log, comprises portions of
states and state-changes; it is empty if logging is not enabled. A query q corresponds to an
access request, which, for an access matrix, is a triple 〈s, o, r〉 where s is a subject, o is an
object and r is a right.
Example – possible access Consider Figure 4.3 and suppose we ask if it is possible that
sam had read access to code in a past state, and we have no information about the path taken
from the initial state (left state in Figure 4.3) to the current state (right state in Figure 4.3). The
query is true because the following is a possible sequence of commands: grantRead(sam, sam,
code), removeRead(sam, sam, code), grantWrite(sam, joe, code). Now suppose we happened
to have logged every state-change, and the log tells us that the only state-change that occurred
is grantWrite(sam, joe, code). Then the answer to the query is false.
Example – actual access Consider Figure 4.3 and suppose we ask if sam had read access
to code in a past state, and we have no information about the path taken from the initial state
to the current state. The instance is unknown because it may be true or false depending on the
path taken. If we know from our logs that the only command that fired is grantWrite(sam, joe,
code), then the instance is false.
Computational complexity We now state the worst-case computational complexity of
forensic analysis in the HRU scheme in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.3.1. Forensic analysis for the HRU scheme is undecidable in the worst-case.
Before we prove Theorem 4.3.1 that characterizes the worst-case computational complexity
of forensic analysis in the HRU scheme, we recall the particular kind of safety analysis from
prior work that we leverage in our proof of that theorem. The safety question is: given
that a particular subject s does not possess a particular right r over a particular object o in
the current state, does there exist a reachable state in which it does? Then, we identify the
computational complexity of this safety problem for a restricted version of the HRU scheme.
To our knowledge, this result is new to our work; however, the proof is directly from prior
work [72].
Definition 1 ((s, o, r)-simple safety [72]). Given an HRU-system, with the current state γ, a
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state-change rule ψ, a right r ∈ R, an object o ∈ O and a subject s ∈ S, the corresponding
(s, o, r)-simple-safety instance is true if and only if (1) either r 6∈Mγ[s, o], or at least one of
s, o does not exist in γ, and there exists a state γ′ such that: (2) γ →∗ψ γ′, and, (3) both s, o
exist in γ′, and r ∈Mγ′ [s, o].
Theorem 4.3.2. (s, o, r)-simple safety for an HRU system in which we disallow the primitive
operations: (i) destroy subject, and, (ii) destroy object, is undecidable.
Proof. Prior work [72] proves that (s, o, r)-simple-safety is undecidable for the HRU scheme
in general. We observe that that proof employs a reduction which outputs an HRU system,
none of whose commands contains a destroy subject or destroy object primitive operation.
Proof of Theorem 4.3.1. We adopt the class of forensic analysis instances 〈γ, ψ, k, q, π, L〉
in which π = possible, γ 0 q and L = ∅. We then reduce from the (s, o, r)-simple-
safety problem for an HRU system in which the primitive operations that destroy objects and
subjects are absent. Recall that such a safety instance takes as part of its input a triple 〈s, o, r〉.
Underlying our proof is the observation that the forensic instance with q set to the 〈s, o, r〉
from the safety instance is true if and only if both the following are true:
Condition 1: there exists a state γ1 such that s, o exist in γ1, r ∈Mγ1 [s, o] and k →∗ψ γ1, and,
Condition 2: there exists a state γ2 such that r 6∈Mγ2 [s, o], and γ1 →∗ψ γ2, and γ2 →∗ψ γ
The reduction uses the following intuition. The input safety instance is mapped onto Condition
1, and the current state of the forensic instance is chosen so that by defining appropriate HRU
commands, if Condition 1 is satisfied, then Condition 2 is satisfied.
The reduction is as follows. Let the safety instance be 〈αs, ψs, qs〉, where αs is the current
state, ψs is the state-change rule, and qs = 〈s∗, o∗, r∗〉 is the query. Let the forensic instance
we would like to map to be 〈γ, ψ, k, q, π = possible, L = ∅〉. Then the parameters of the
forensic instance are set as follows:
• q = qs
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• k is such that the subjects and objects that exist in k are the subjects and objects that
exist in αs plus a new subject, snew and a new object onew, and Mk[] is Mαs [] with a row
and column for snew, and a column for onew added.
• The set of rights is the same as from the safety instance, plus a new right, rnew.
• γ is such that the only subject that exists is snew, the only object that exists other
than snew is onew, and the access matrix is such that Mγ[snew, onew] = {rnew} and
Mγ[snew, snew] = ∅.
• ψ is ψs plus three new commands Remover∗ , Destroys and Destroyo which are
specified below.
Remover∗(s1, s2, o1, o2) checks if r∗ ∈M [s1, o1] and if yes, it removes it and enters rnew into
M [s2, o2]. Destroys(s1, s2, o1) checks if rnew ∈ M [s1, o1] and if yes, it destroys s2.
Destroyo(s1, o1, o2) checks if rnew ∈ M [s1, o1] and if yes, it destroys o2. These three
commands collectively ensure that once Condition 1 is satisfied (i.e. s∗ possesses r∗ over o∗),
then Condition 2 can be satisfied by calling Remover∗(s∗, snew, o∗, onew), and then the
commands Destroyo(snew, onew, o2) and Destroys(snew, s2, onew) as many times as
necessary, each time with the appropriate parameters for o2 and s2, to reach the current state γ.
Hence it suffices to show that the safety instance is true if and only if the forensic instance
satisfies Condition 1.
Assume the safety instance is true. This means there exists a state β that is reachable from
the current state, αs, of the instance, such that r∗ ∈ Mβ[s∗, o∗]. Since the known past state
of the forensic instance, k, is derived from αs, and the forensic instance includes all of the
commands of the safety instance, this implies that the forensic instance satisfies Condition 1.
For the other direction, assume Condition 1 can be satisfied for the resulting forensic instance.
We observe that the sequence of commands that can be used to get from k to γ1 need not
contain any of the commands Remover∗ , Destroys or Destroyo. This is because in HRU, the
condition of a command checks only for the presence of rights, and hence removing the right
r∗ from a cell, or destroying subjects or objects, is not beneficial in fulfilling the conditions of
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Figure 4.4. An ARBAC system with four roles, four can-assign rules in CAψ, and two can-revoke
rules in CRψ. In the state, γ, shown, UAγ = {student}.
commands from the safety instance check for rnew in their condition. Hence, if Condition 1
can be satisfied for the forensic instance, then it can also be satisfied using only the commands
that were part of the safety instance, which implies the safety analysis instance is true.
We observe also that even though we have adopted an empty log, L = ∅, in the above proof,
there exist classes of instances in which L 6= ∅ for which the problem remains undecidable.
An example of such a class is one in which the contents of L are irrelevant to the forensic
question.
4.3.2 ARBAC
We now consider an access control scheme, ARBAC [79], which is role-based. As in the
previous section, we first describe ARBAC, provide examples, and then identify the worst-case
computational complexity of forensic analysis in ARBAC.
The ARBAC scheme We adopt and describe a restricted version of the ARBAC scheme
that suffices for our lower-bound in Theorem 4.3.3. As with safety, our results carry over to
the general version [87]. In the ARBAC scheme, a state is based on RBAC. In our restricted
version, a state is the set of roles to which a particular user, whom we associate with the access
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control system as part of the input, is assigned. That is, each access control system in ARBAC
is associated with a set of roles R which does not change across states. There is a particular
user, u, who also is part of the specification of the system and does not change across states. A
state, γ, is UAγ where UAγ ⊆ R is the set of roles to which the user u is assigned in the state
γ. The different subsets of R are the different possible states.
A state-change rule, ψ, with which a system is associated comprises two sets of rules:
can-assign rules, CAψ, and can-revoke rules, CRψ. Each member of CAψ is a pair
〈precondition, target role〉. Each member of CRψ is a role. A precondition in a member of
CAψ is either the mnemonic ‘true,’ or a conjunction of roles or their negation. E.g., given the
set of roles R = {r1, . . . , r50}, a precondition in a rule in CAψ may be r1 ∧ ¬r2 ∧ ¬r23. The
target role in a member of CAψ is a role from R, e.g., r15. The meaning of a rule
〈precondition, target role〉 is that if the role-membership of the user u in our system satisfies
the precondition, then u may be assigned to the target role. In our example, if u is a member
of r1, and a member of neither r2 nor r23, then u may be assigned to r15.
The meaning of a member, which is a role, in CRψ is that the user u’s membership from that
role may be revoked. A state-change is the firing of a rule in CAψ or CRψ, i.e., either the
assignment of the user u to a role, or the revocation of u from a role. Thus, if we transition
from a state γ to γ′, then UAγ′ is either UAγ ∪{r}, if the state-change was the assignment of
u to r, or, UAγ \{r}, if the state-change was the revocation of u from r. In the former case,
we assume that r 6∈ UAγ , and in the latter, r ∈ UAγ . That is, a state-change must change u’s
role-membership.
Figure 4.4 shows an example of an ARBAC system. It has four roles and its state-change rule
ψ comprises the CAψ and CRψ that is shown in the figure. We show also a state, γ, in which
u is a member of one of the four roles.
Forensic analysis in ARBAC In a forensic analysis instance, 〈γ, ψ, k, q, π, L〉 in ARBAC,
the states γ and k are subsets of R and are the roles to which the user u in the system is
assigned to in those states. The state-change rule, ψ, comprises the two sets CAψ and CRψ.
The log, L, is portions of states and state-changes. As before, L may be empty. A query, q, is
a role, 〈r〉. The meaning of a query is: is the user u with which the system is associated, a
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member of r?
Example – possible access Suppose our system is the one shown in Figure 4.4, and we
have a forensic instance in which γ, the current state, and k, the known past state, are both
the state shown in the figure, i.e., u is assigned to the role student only. Suppose we adopt
π = possible, L = ∅ and the query q = 〈professor〉; that is, we are asking whether it is
possible that in a past state, u was a member of the role professor. This instance is true. We
can intuit this by going “backwards” starting at γ and ending at k. A possible such sequence
of state-changes is: assign-to(student), revoke-from(professor), assign-to(professor), revoke-
from(student). Now suppose L is every state that occurred, or, alternately, every state-change
that occurred, starting at k. And from L, we observe that u was never revoked from student.
Then the instance is false.
Example – actual access Consider the system in Figure 4.4, and let γ = k be the state
shown in the figure. Suppose π = actual, L = ∅ and q = 〈professor〉. Then the forensics
instance is unknown because it may or may not have been the case that u was a member of
professor. If, on the other hand, L records every state-change, or even every exercise of a rule
in CAψ, then the instance is true if there is an assignment to the role professor in L, and false
otherwise.
Computational complexity We state our lower-bound in Theorem 4.3.3 below. The proof
is similar to the proof for Theorem 4.3.1, and relies on the fact that safety analysis for the
version we consider is PSPACE-complete. PSPACE is the class of decision problems for
each of which there exists an algorithm that consumes space at worst polynomial in the size of
the input [6].
Theorem 4.3.3. Forensic analysis for ARBAC is PSPACE-hard in the worst-case.
Before we prove Theorem 4.3.3, we revisit safety analysis for the particular restricted version
of ARBAC that we adopt. Shahen et al. [88] observe that safety analysis for the same kind of
query as we adopt for forensic analysis is PSPACE-complete, which is the same class as to
which more general versions of ARBAC belong. As that observation is made somewhat in
passing in that work and we rely on it for our proof of Theorem 4.3.3, we call it out clearly in
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the following theorem.
Theorem 4.3.4. Safety analysis for the version of ARBAC we adopt, with a query = a role, as
we adopt, is PSPACE-complete.
Proof. As prior work [88] observes, the reduction of Jha et al. [81] for PSPACE-hardness
maps to only those instances that belong to our restricted version. The upper-bound of
PSPACE remains as our version is less general.
We now present the proof for Theorem 4.3.3.
Proof of Theorem 4.3.3. In our forensic analysis instance, 〈γ, ψ, k, q, π, L〉, we adopt π =
possible, L = ∅ and γ 0 q. We reduce from safety analysis for the version of ARBAC we
discuss above, in a manner similar to our proof for Theorem 4.3.1. Let the safety instance
be 〈Rs,UAs,CAs,CRs, qs = 〈r∗〉〉, where Rs is the set of roles in the instance, UAs ⊆ Rs
is the set of roles to which the user is assigned in the current state, CAs,CRs comprise the
state-change rule and qs = 〈r∗〉, where r∗ ∈ Rs, is the query. That is, whether there exists a
future state in which the user is a member of r∗. We map the safety instance to a forensics
analysis instance 〈γ, ψ, k, q, π = possible, L = ∅〉 as follows.
1. The set of roles in the system for our forensics instance is the same as in the safety
instance, Rs;
2. The set of roles to which the user is assigned in the known past state, UAk = UAs;
3. The query q = qs = 〈r∗〉;
4. The set of roles to which the user is assigned in the current state, UAγ = Rs \{r∗}; and,
5. The state-change rule, ψ comprises CAψ = CAs ∪ {〈r∗, r〉 : r ∈ Rs \{r∗}} and
CRψ = CRs ∪ 〈r∗〉.
We now claim that the safety instance is true if and only if the following two conditions hold
for the forensics instance:
81
Condition 1: there exists a state γ1, such that γ1 ` q, and k →∗ψ γ1.
Condition 2: there exists a state γ2, such that γ2 0 q, γ1 →∗ψ γ2, and γ2 →∗ψ γ.
As in the proof for Theorem 4.3.1, in our reduction, we map the input safety instance to
Condition 1, and the current state, γ, of the forensic instance is chosen so that by defining
appropriate CAψ and CRψ rules, if Condition 1 is satisfied, then Condition 2 is satisfied. We
first prove this: that Condition 1 implies Condition 2. Suppose the forensic instance meets
Condition 1. This means that there exists a state γ1 such that γ1 ` q. Now, to reach state γ2 as
above, we exercise each rule in CAψ that is not in CAs as specified in (5) above. This results
in the user being assigned to every role in Rs. We then exercise new rule in CRψ to revoke the
user from r∗. Thus, Condition 2 is satisfied.
It remains to be shown that the safety instance is true if and only if Condition 1 is met. For the
“only if” direction, assume the safety instance is true. Then, we observe that CAψ ⊇ CAs and
CRψ ⊇ CRs. Thus, every state-change in the safety instance can be effected in the forensic
instance to go from the state k to the state γ1. Thus, Condition 1 is true.
For the “if” direction, assume the forensic instance satisfies Condition 1. We claim via the
following reasoning that the members in the set CRψ that do not exist in CRs, and the members
in the set CAψ that do not exist in CAs do not affect whether Condition 1 holds. This in turn
implies that the safety instance is true.
Our reasoning is as follows. 〈r∗〉 ∈ CRψ allows for the revocation of the user from r∗.
The revocation cannot happen unless Condition 1 is already satisfied, i.e., unless the user is
already a member of r∗. And, 〈r∗, r〉 ∈ CAψ allows for the user to be assigned to any role
in Rs, provided that the user is a member of r∗, i.e., Condition 1 is already satisfied. Hence,
Condition 1 can be satisfied by the forensic instance as a result of members in CAψ ∩ CAs
and CRψ ∩ CRs which implies that the safety instance is true.
The above theorem gives us a worst-case lower-bound for forensic analysis in the ARBAC
scheme. The following theorem gives us an upper-bound. However, we restrict it in the
following ways. (i) We allow π = possible only. (ii) We set the log, L = ∅. (iii) We
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consider our restricted version of ARBAC only. The reason for (i) is that that is the only
version which is a decision problem, i.e., each instance is associated with true/false only.
The reason for (ii) is that without a more precise specification of what exactly L contains,
we cannot meaningfully analyze it. The reason for (iii) is that that is the version to which
we restrict ourselves in the proof for Theorem 4.3.3 above. For (ii), in the next section, we
discuss sufficient logs that render forensic analysis efficient. For (iii), we conjecture that our
upper-bound remains even if we adopt more general versions of ARBAC. Our basis for this
conjecture is the strong correspondence between safety and forensics, and the fact that the
computational complexity of safety analysis is not impacted by the generalizations to ARBAC
that have been considered in the literature. In Appendix A we describe a general version of
ARBAC considered in prior work on safety analysis [81] and show that forensic analysis for it
has the same upper-bound as the restricted version we consider here.
Theorem 4.3.5. Forensic analysis for the ARBAC scheme we adopt with π = possible and
L = ∅ is in PSPACE.
Proof. Our proof is by construction. We propose a non-deterministic algorithm that is correct
and is guaranteed to halt, and that consumes space at worst polynomial in the size of the
input, thereby proving that the problem is in NPSPACE, the class of decision problems
for which there exists a non-determinisic algorithm that consumes space only polynomial
in the size of the input. We then appeal to Savitch’s theorem, NPSPACE = PSPACE [7].
Given a forensics instance, 〈γ, ψ, k, q, π, L〉, our algorithm “inverts” state-changes, and goes
“backwards” starting at the current state, γ.
We maintain a “present state,” call it p. (We call it “present” to distinguish from “current state”
which is an input.) As p is a subset of the set of roles, it can be represented by |R| bits, which
is polynomial in the size of the input. We initialize p to γ. We then enumerate all possible
state-changes that could have resulted from an immediately prior state, p′ to p. This is our
“inversion” of state-changes. There can be at most linearly, and therefore, polynomially, many
such state-changes because the number is upper-bounded by the size of ψ, i.e., |CAψ|+ |CRψ|.
To enumerate these possible state-changes, we do the following. For each 〈c, r〉 ∈ CAψ, we
ask whether r ∈ UAp, i.e., the user in the system is a member of r in the state p. If yes, we ask
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whether the precondition c is satisfied by UAp \{r}. If yes, then that member of CAψ was
a possible state-change, with the prior state p′ = UAp \{r}. Otherwise, it is not a possible
state-change. Similarly, for each 〈r〉 ∈ CRψ, we ask whether r ∈ UAp. If yes, then we know
that that member 〈r〉 of CRψ was not a possible state-change. Otherwise, it was with the prior
state p′ = UAp ∪{r}.
Then, from amongst the possible state-changes, we non-deterministically pick one, and set p
to the corresponding prior state, p′. Apart from space for enumerating possible state-changes
and space for p, we allocate space also for: (i) the number of “backwards” state-changes we
have effected, and, (ii) a boolean for whether we have encountered a state p such that p ` q.
The size of (i) is |R| bits, where R is the set of all roles. This is because we have at most 2|R|
possible different states, and therefore a counter of log 2|R| = |R| bits suffices. The size of (ii)
is one bit.
Every time we effect a (non-deterministic) state-change backwards with a new present state p,
we do the following. We increment our counter (i) above. Then we check whether the bit (ii)
above is already set. If yes, we check whether p = k, the known past state. If yes, we halt and
output ‘true.’ If the bit (ii) is not set, we check whether the new state p ` q. If yes, we set the
bit (ii) and we clear the state counter to 0. If we do not return ‘true’ after this state-change,
then we check whether our counter has reached 2|R|. If yes, we immediately halt and output
‘false.’ Otherwise, we continue, i.e., enumerate possible state-changes with the new present
state p.
The algorithm above is correct because there exists a sequence of non-deterministic choices
that causes us to output ‘true’ if and only if the input instance is indeed true. Also, the
algorithm is guaranteed to halt because of the counter we maintain. The total space we need is
at worst linear, and therefore polynomial, in the size of the input.
Corollary 4.3.6. Forensic analysis for the ARBAC scheme we adopt with π = possible
and L = ∅ is PSPACE-complete.
Observations As with the HRU scheme, forensic analysis in ARBAC, at least for the
version we consider for possible instances with no logs, is in the same complexity class as
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safety analysis. Unlike the HRU scheme, however, it is decidable, and the proof for Theorem
4.3.5 can be seen as constructive: it provides an algorithm, albeit a non-deterministic one.
There is considerable prior work on tools, in practice, for safety analysis of ARBAC and its
variants (see, for example, [87, 89, 90, 91]). Underlying these tools is a reduction to variants
of model-checking, each complete for PSPACE. Given that forensic analysis for ARBAC is
in PSPACE, we expect that such tools can be effectively re-purposed for forensic analysis.
4.3.3 Graham-Denning
We now consider a third scheme from the literature, the Graham-Denning scheme [80]. We
consider it for two reasons. One is that it is qualitatively different from both the HRU and
ARBAC schemes: it is a discretionary scheme, i.e., there is a notion of ownership of objects
by subjects, and the granting of rights based on a subject’s discretion. The other reason
is that similar to HRU and ARBAC, safety analysis has been studied for Graham-Denning
[70]. We first reproduce the description of the scheme from prior work [70], provide some
examples, and then identify the worst-case computational complexity of forensic analysis in
Graham-Denning. The proof is constructive: it is an algorithm. It is similar to the algorithm
for safety analysis from prior work [70] in that it is a case-analysis.
The Graham-Denning Scheme The authorization state in Graham-Denning can be
encoded using an access matrix, exactly as in the HRU scheme, with one exception. And that
is that there is a special subject, call it a superuser, which exists in every state. The set of
rights can be partitioned into three sets: (i) an arbitrary set of rights associated with a system
like in the HRU scheme, call it R, (ii) a set of rights, denote it R∗, which are the transferrable
versions of every right in R, i.e., R∗ = {r∗ : r ∈ R}; the semantics of an r∗ are that a user
who possesses r∗ over an object may grant r or r∗ to another user over that object, and, (iii)
two distinguished rights own and control neither of which is in R nor R∗. The state-change
rule is fixed for every instance of the Graham-Denning scheme, and is a set of commands.
This set, reproduced from prior work [70] is shown in Figure 4.5.
A state must satisfy seven properties; the state-change rule, i.e., the commands, maintain these
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properties in the next state.
1. Every object must be owned by at least one subject.
2. Only subjects are controlled.
3. The special subject u exists in the state. It is not owned by any subject, and it is not
controlled by any other subject.
4. A subject other than u is owned by exactly one other subject (a subject cannot own
itself).
5. Every subject controls itself.
6. A subject other than u is controlled by at most one other subject.
7. There exists no set of subjects that form a cycle in terms of ownership of each other.
Figure 4.6 shows an example of a Graham-Denning system in which, besides the special
subject u, there are two subjects, alice and bob, and one object, file. The figure shows two
states, and examples of sequences of commands from Figure 4.5 that may have transpired in
going from one state to the other.
Forensic analysis in Graham-Denning In a forensic analysis instance 〈γ, ψ, k, q, π, L〉 for
a Graham-Denning system, ψ is the set of commands shown in Figure 4.5, and γ and k are
access matrices such that k →∗ψ γ, and a corresponding sequence of state-changes did indeed
occur. L, the log, comprises portions of states and state-changes; it is empty if logging is not
enabled. A query q corresponds to an access request which is a triple 〈s, o, x〉 where s is a
subject, o is an object and x is a right.
Example - possible access Suppose our system is the one shown in Figure 4.6, and we
have a forensic instance in which γ, the current state, and k, the known past state that delimits
our search, are both the left state in the figure, and we ask if it is possible that alice had write to
file in some state between k and γ. If the log, L, is empty, then the query is ‘true’ because the
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Figure 4.5. The set of commands that constitutes the state-change rule, ψ, for a system based on the
Graham-Denning scheme. The first parameter i is the initiator of the command. There is one transferr,
grantr, and deleter command for each r ∈ Rb, and one transferr∗ , grantr∗ and deleter∗ command
for each r∗ ∈ R∗b . Figure reproduced from [70].
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Figure 4.6. An example of an access control system in the Graham-Denning scheme [80].
following is a possible sequence of commands: grant write(bob, alice, file), delete write(bob,
alice, file).
Example - actual access Given the same current and past known states as the example
above, suppose we now ask if alice actually had write to file in the past. If the log, L, is
empty, then the query is ‘unknown’ because there exists a path between k and γ such that the
query is true (e.g. grant write(bob, alice, file), delete write(bob, alice, file)), and there also
exists a path between k and γ such that the query is false (e.g. transfer own(u,bob,alice),
transfer own(bob,u,alice)). If the log, L, is not empty and records all state-changes, then the
instance is true if there is a state-change in L that grants or transfers write over file to alice,
and it is false otherwise.
Computational Complexity We first recall the result for safety analysis from prior work
[70]. That work adopts queries of the same form as we adopt, i.e., q = 〈s, o, x〉, and proves
that safety analysis is in P for the Graham-Denning scheme. The proof is by construction:
that work devises an algorithm and proves that it is correct and runs in polynomial-time in the
worst-case. The algorithm is a case-analysis: as a simple example, if in the query q = 〈s, o, x〉,
the right x = control and the object o is not also a subject, then by Property (2) in the list of
properties above, we can immediately conclude that no reachable state exists that satisfies q.
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Not all cases are as straightforward.
In the below theorem, we establish that like safety, forensic analysis for Graham-Denning with
π = possible, L = ∅ and q of the form 〈s, o, x〉, is tractable.
Theorem 4.3.7. Forensic analysis in the Graham-Denning scheme with π = possible,
L = ∅ and q of the form 〈s, o, x〉, is in P.
Proof. We consider the computational complexity of only those forensic instances,
〈γ, ψ, k, q, π, L〉, where q = 〈s, o, x〉, that satisfy π = possible, L = ∅. We adopt the
same proof-strategy as prior work on safety [70], and propose an algorithm that carries out a
case-analysis. Thus, we prove by construction that the problem lies in P, which, as with the
HRU and ARBAC schemes, is the same class in which safety analysis lies. Algorithm 3 is our
algorithm.
Input: Forensic instance, {γ, ψ, k, q = (s, o, x),possible, ∅}
Output: true or false
1 if γ ` q ∨ k ` q then output true
2 if x = control then
3 if o 6∈ S then output false
4 if o ∈ Sγ ∧ s ∈ Sγ then output false
5 if o ∈ Sk ∧ ∃s′ ∈ Sk s.t. s′ 6= o ∧ control ∈Mk[s′, o] ∧ s′ ∈ Sγ then output false
6 if x = own then
7 if o ∈ Oγ \ Sγ ∧ s ∈ Sγ then output false
8 output true
Algorithm 3: Algorithm for forensic analysis for the Graham-Denning scheme when
π = possible and L = ∅. S denotes the set of subjects in the scheme.
Following is a line-by-line explanation of Algorithm 3.
[Line 1] If the query is true in the current state γ or the known past state k, the instance is true.
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[Line 2,3] If x = control, and o is not a subject, the instance is false because only subjects
are controlled.
[Line 2,4] If x = control, and o and s are subjects that exist in the current state γ, the instance
is false because γ 0 q (see Line 1) and the control right cannot be revoked or transferred (see
commands in Figure 4.5).
[Line 2,5] If x = control, and o is a subject that exists in the known state k, and o is controlled
by some subject s′ in k, besides itself, and s′ also exists in γ, then the instance is false. This is
because a subject can be controlled by at most one other subject besides itself, and the control
right cannot be revoked or transferred.
[Line 2,8] If x = control, and none of the checks in lines 3-5 output false, then the instance is
true because o’s owner can grant control over o to s in some state between the states k and γ.
[Line 6,7] If x = own, and if o is not a subject, and o and s both exist in γ, the instance is
false, because when a subject owns an object that is not a subject, this ownership is retained
until either the subject or the object are destroyed, and γ 0 q (see Line 1).
[Line 6,8] If x = own, and the check in line 7 does not output false, then the instance
is true, because if o is a subject, its owner can transfer ownership to s, and if o is not a
subject, its owner can grant ownership to s. Figure 4.6 shows examples for these two cases.
Suppose the past known state k and the current state γ are both identical to the state to
the left of the figure, it is possible that bob had own to alice in the past because a possible
sequence of commands that may have executed between k and γ is transfer own(u,bob,alice),
transfer own(bob,u,alice). Suppose that k and γ are the states to the left and right of the figure,
respectively, it is possible that alice had own to file in the past because a possible sequence of
commands is grant own(bob,alice,file), transfer own(u,bob,alice), destroy subject(bob,alice).
[Line 8] If x ∈ R ∪R∗, then the instance is true, because the owner of o can grant x to s and
then revoke x from s.
Algorithm 3 does not account for the possibility of trusted users. In Appendix B we present a
forensic analysis algorithm for Graham-Denning based systems that considers a set of trusted
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users.
Observations The class P can be seen as an upper-bound for the computational complexity
of forensic analysis in the Graham-Denning scheme. Thus, our proof strategy is akin to our
proof for Theorem 4.3.5 in the previous section: we propose an algorithm. Thus, for all three
schemes we consider, forensic analysis lies in the same class as safety analysis.
4.4 Goal-directed Logging
We now consider logging. Logs record information about past states, and can aid forensics.
In this work, we assume that the logs are trustworthy. For example, they may be recorded
on write-once media. If the logging mechanism is comprehensive, that is, it logs every
state-change that occurs such that all prior states between the initial and current state can be
reconstructed from the logs, then forensic analysis as it was posed in Section 4.2 becomes
tractable. One would just have to scan the log entries linearly beginning from the initial state
in order to decide if the given query was true in a past state. However, there are significant
drawbacks associated with this kind of comprehensive logging. Firstly, the size of the log may
explode. Secondly, it results in the quantity problem [92]— a large amount of data that needs
to be analyzed in a forensic investigation. This problem contributes significantly to the time
needed to complete the analysis. Thirdly, logging irrelevant data may obstruct the accuracy of
the forensic analysis by distracting the analyst from the relevant data [93].
Data reduction techniques can be used to control the size of logs that need to be analyzed.
For example, in the investigation of a computer hard disk, files that are known to be of no
interest to the investigation from an examiner’s viewpoint can be eliminated through the use
of file filters. In the context of access control, a way to reduce the amount of information
logged is to use goal-directed logging. That is, if we know in advance or restrict the types of
forensic analysis that can arise, then we need to log only the necessary information to answer
the analyses that are of interest.
We point out that what we mean by goal-directed logging is different than what has been
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proposed as goal-oriented logging [94, 93]. In prior work, the term goal-oriented logging
has been used to suggest that logging requirements can be extracted from analyzing the goals
of an attacker. This is done by considering the security policies in place and analyzing the
ways in which an attacker can violate these. In this work, we do not attempt to derive logging
requirements from security policies because there is no guarantee that such policies achieve
perfect security. Indeed there may be situations in which the deficiency of security policies
leads to a breach. In this case, if the logs are extracted solely from the policies, they would not
contain the information needed to expose or analyze such a breach.
Of course, the goals of a forensic analysis may not be known in advance. In this case, although
goal-directed logging cannot be used to reduce the size of the logs that are recorded, it can
be used to reduce the size of the logs that are input to the analysis. For an access control
scheme, a minimal log contains exactly the information required to answer the particular
type of forensic analysis with true or false, and no information more than that. If any part
of a minimal log is missing, then for possible analysis, there exists a query such that the
analysis is undecidable, and for actual analysis there exists a query such that the answer is
unknown. A sufficient log contains all the information that a minimal log provides, but may
also contain more information than that. The following theorem follows immediately from the
fact that a log that is sufficient for actual analysis is sufficient for possible analysis.
Theorem 4.4.1. For any access control scheme, the size of a minimal log for possible
analysis is less than or equal to the size of a minimal log for actual analysis.
HRU In the absence of logs, possible analysis in HRU is undecidable (see Section
4.3.1). Let the number of commands, objects and rights, in a given HRU access control system
be C, B and R, respectively. We first consider some candidate logs.
Suppose our log consists of a counter that increments every time a command is executed
successfully. Let the number of commands that have been executed successfully be denoted
by x. Then the size of the log is ≈ log2 x assuming binary encoding, because that is the size
we need for a counter. (In the sentence immediately prior, the first use of “log” refers to the
record, and the second refers to logarithm.) Let the maximum number of arguments in any
command of the system be j. Then given a forensic analysis instance 〈γ, ψ, k, q, π, L〉, we can
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explore all the paths from k to γ in O((C ·Bj)x) operations, which is super-exponential in the
size of the forensic instance.
As another candidate, suppose our log consists of a list of the commands executed successfully,
but without their arguments. Now, we cannot simply maintain a counter of size log2 x, but
rather, if x is the number of command executions, the log has x entries, and the size of the
log is x · log2C. In this case we can explore all the relevant paths from k to γ in O((Bj)x)
operations, which is an improvement, but still exponential in the size of the instance.
As a final candidate, suppose our log consists of a list of the commands executed successfully,
with their arguments. Without any loss of generality, assume that every command has j
parameters. The size of the log is now x · (log2C + j · log2B). This log allows us to
reconstruct the exact path taken from the initial state to the current state, in linear time in the
size of the instance.
Theorem 4.4.2. Given an access control system in the HRU scheme, a size of a sufficient log for
a polynomial-time algorithm for possible analysis instances is (x−y)·(log2C+j ·log2B),
where y = min(c, x) and c is a constant.
Proof. The log consists of a list of all but a constant number, y, of the commands that are
executed successfully with their arguments. Also assume that the commands not logged are
the ones that are executed first. That is, the logging mechanism only starts logging once the
number of commands, x, is at least y. The size of the log is (x − y) · (log2C + j · log2B).
Given such a log, we can explore all relevant paths from k to γ in O((C · Bj)y) operations
which is polynomial in the size of the input forensic instance.
Theorem 4.4.3. In the worst-case, for an access control system in the HRU scheme, the
lower-bound on the size of a minimal log for a polynomial-time algorithm to output either
‘true’ or ‘false’, and not ‘unknown’, to an actual analysis instance is x · (log2C+j · log2B).
Proof. For actual analysis, the log must allow for the reconstruction of the exact path taken
from initial to the current state. Therefore, in the worst-case, the log must consist of a list of all
the commands executed successfully, with their arguments. Figure 4.3 in Section 4.1 depicts
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an example showing how even when a single command is not logged, it can be uncertain
whether a query is true or false. Suppose that the known past state and the current state are
identical to the left state in the figure, and the log records only the second of two commands
that are fired and this is removeWrite(sam,joe,code). From the figure we see that it is not
possible to answer whether joe actually had write access to code without knowing what the
first command fired was. Even when a single parameter is not logged, it can be uncertain
whether a query is true or false. For an example that demonstrates this, consider Figure 4.3 and
suppose that the known past state and current state are identical to the left state in the figure
but in addition to own, M [sam, code] also contains write. Now suppose two commands have
fired and the log records grantWrite(sam,x,code),removeWrite(sam,joe,code) where x denotes
the missing parameter. In this case also, it is not possible to answer whether joe actually had
write access to code as it depends on whether the missing parameter is sam or joe.
ARBAC In the absence of logs, possible analysis for the ARBAC scheme is
PSPACE-complete (see Section 4.3.2). In the following, let the number of distinct
preconditions that appear in the CA state component of the access control system be C and let
the set of roles be R.
Theorem 4.4.4. Given an access control system in the ARBAC scheme, the size of a sufficient
log, for a polynomial-time algorithm for possible analysis instances is min(C, |R|).
Proof. If min(C, |R|) = C we maintain a bit for each precondition where the bit is set if
the precondition is ever satisfied by the role assignment of the user u to whom the system
is associated with. Then given a possible query, q = 〈r〉, we can answer it efficiently by
using the following algorithm. First check if u is assigned to r in the past known or current
states, and if yes, output true. Next, linearly scan CR to check if r can be revoked, and if not
output false. Otherwise linearly scan CA and output true if and only if there exists a member
〈c, r〉 ∈ CA such that the precondition bit for u associated with c is set. If min(C, |R|) = |R|,
we maintain a bit for each role in R, where the bit is set if u is ever assigned to the role. Then
given a possible query, q = 〈r〉, we output true if the bit associated with r is set, otherwise
we output false. This algorithm runs in time linear in the size of the forensic instance.
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Theorem 4.4.5. In the worst-case, for an access control system in the ARBAC scheme, the
lower-bound on the size of a minimal log for a polynomial-time algorithm that outputs either
‘true’ or ‘false’, and not ‘unknown’, for actual analysis instances is |R|.
Proof. In the proof of Theorem 4.4.4 above, we explain how logs of size |R| can be used to
answer a query efficiently. We now reason why in the worst-case such a sized log is minimal.
Assume that we reduce the log by one bit. That is, we do not log whether or not the user u in
the system and query was assigned to a particular role r∗. We can construct a forensic instance
for which the resulting log is insufficient. The instance has the following properties: (1) the
query is 〈r∗〉, (2) the query is not true in the initial and current states, (3) 〈r∗〉 ∈ CR, i.e., u
can be revoked from r∗, and, (4) there is only one 〈c, r〉 ∈ CA such that r = r∗, and for this
element, c = true . For such an instance, the log reduced by one bit is not sufficient to answer
if u was definitively assigned to r∗ in a past state because that is exactly the information we
excluded from the log, and there is no other way to get this information.
Graham-Denning In the absence of logs, forensic instances in the Graham-Denning scheme
in which π = possible is in P (see Section 4.3.3). Thus, we can state the following theorem
regarding logs for possible analysis instances.
Theorem 4.4.6. The size of a sufficient log for a polynomial-time algorithm for possible
forensics analysis instances for the Graham-Denning scheme is 0.
For actual analysis, we provide a lower-bound in the following theorem. C and B are the
number of commands and objects, respectively, in the system. As the proof states, it relies
directly on our result for the HRU scheme above. This, as it turns out, is a benefit of adopting
the syntax for the HRU scheme for encoding the Graham-Denning scheme.
Theorem 4.4.7. In the worst-case, for an access control system in the Graham-Denning
scheme, the lower-bound on the size of a minimal log for a polynomial-time algorithm that
outputs either ‘true’ or ‘false’, and not ‘unknown’, for actual analysis instances is at least
x · (log2C + 2 · log2B).
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Proof. For actual analysis, the log must allow for the reconstruction of the exact path taken
from initial to the current state. Therefore in the worst-case the log must consist of a list
of all the commands executed successfully, with their arguments. The minimum number of
arguments in a command is two, and the maximum is three (see Figure 4.5). The examples for
HRU in the proof for Theorem 4.4.3 can be adapted to be examples for Graham-Denning of
when if a single command or parameter is not logged, we are forced to output ‘unknown’.
Observations If we assume that in ARBAC, the number of distinct preconditions is smaller
than the number of roles in the system, then the log-size that suffices for possible analysis
is smaller than the minimal logs that are needed for actual analysis in the worst-case, for all
of the three schemes we consider. An interesting consequence of this relates to goal-directed
logging: if we know that our objective is possible analysis only, then we can make do with
smaller log-size. This observation, in turn, validates the goal-directed mindset whose intent is
one of reducing the log-size, or rendering analysis easier by more quickly trimming down the
logs to only what is needed.
4.5 Case Study
We now discuss a case-study we have conducted on a real software system to validate some
of our analytical insights from the previous sections. In our case study, we first deploy an
open source application called Hello, Retail! [82] on the AWS cloud platform [84]. We then
simulate a security incident. The scope of our study was to answer the following questions
about AWS: (1) What types of forensic queries does it support? (2) Can goal-directed logging
help to reduce the size of logs? In Section 4.5.1, we provide some background on the portion
of AWS’s access control model on which we focus, the logging service it provides on which
we focus, and the Hello, Retail! application. In Section 4.5.2 we describe the security incident
that we simulate and our observations.
Limitations Our case-study is not a comprehensive assessment of logging in AWS. Indeed,





[ "s3:PutObject", "s3:ListBucket" ],
"Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::myBucket" }] }
Figure 4.7. An example AWS policy. It has an ‘Allow’ or ‘Deny’ effect, and the actions and the
resource to which the policy applies. The policy may be attached to a user or role.
so-called management events [95]. AWS has other logging capabilities; for example, it is
possible to log so-called service and data events [95], and deploy not only CloudTrail, but also
CloudWatch [96].
4.5.1 Background
AWS is a public cloud provider: a customer can pay for and get computing resources at
various layers of the software stack. One of their services is serverless computing: a customer
writes call-back functions which are associated with events that may happen, and deploys
those functions using a service called AWS Lambda [97]. The customer does not need to
explicitly allocate computing resources. Hello, Retail! is such a serverless application. We
now overview AWS IAM, CloudTrail and Hello, Retail!
AWS IAM AWS IAM (Identity and Access Management) enables you to manage access
to AWS services and resources securely [98]. It implements a version of role-based access
control. Their version combines role-based and identity-based authorization. IAM users may
be assigned to IAM roles, and IAM roles assigned to IAM policies. An IAM user can be
assigned to multiple roles, and an IAM role can be associated with multiple policies. An IAM
user can assume a role and is then able to exercise the role’s access privileges. In addition, in
IAM, a user can be associated directly with a policy. Figure 4.7 shows an example of a policy.
A policy may also be attached directly to a resource such as an “S3 bucket”: S3 is AWS’s
storage service [99]. In IAM, there is also the notion of a service role. This is a special IAM
role that is associated with services that are managed by AWS such as Elastic Compute Cloud
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(EC2) [100] and AWS Lambda [97]. These managed services assume a service role in order to
obtain permissions to make API calls to other AWS services.
CloudTrail AWS CloudTrail allows us to log, continuously monitor, and retain account
activity related to actions across your AWS infrastructure [95]. The logs are in JSON format
and are delivered to an S3 storage bucket. CloudTrail characterizes events into data, service
and management events. Data events log read/write access to objects in S3 and databases in
DynamoDB. Service events are created by AWS services, and are not necessarily triggered by
the cloud application. Management events log all control plane operations associated with a
AWS account. For example, accessing a table in AWS DynamoDB would be logged as a data
event, while creating a new IAM role would be logged as a management event. All access
control changes made via IAM are logged by CloudTrail. We use these logs as the source of
evidence to perform forensic analysis. Figure 4.8 shows an example of a CloudTrail log.
Hello, Retail! There are three reasons that we have chosen Hello, Retail! [82] for our
case-study. One is that the serverless computing design pattern where applications are hosted
by a third-party service such as AWS Lambda [97] is considered to be at a cutting-edge, and
Hello, Retail! has won an award for its serverless architecture [85]. Another reason is that
Hello, Retail! has been written to run on AWS, which provides both a rich access control
scheme within AWS IAM [98], and logging capability within AWS CloudTrail [95]. A third
reason is that included with Hello, Retail! is a security policy configuration: users and roles,
and associated authorizations. This offers us the opportunity to deploy our analytical approach
from the prior sections.
Hello, Retail! is an event sourcing application that has been made available as open source.
The front-end interface of Hello Retail is a website hosted on AWS CloudFront, a content
delivery network. Its back-end consists of multiple AWS Lambda functions, each of which
is a call-back function each of which triggers on an event. The scenario for which Hello,
Retail! has been built is that of a merchant adding a product to their online store. When
this happens, two things must occur. Firstly a photographer needs to take a photo of the
product. Secondly, the customers should see the new product with the new photo in the
product catalog. The application comprises several components each of which runs as a
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1 {”Records”: [{
2 ”eventVersion”: ” 1.0”,
3 ” userIdentity ”: {
4 ”type”: ”IAMUser”,
5 ” principalId ”: ”EX PRINCIPAL ID”,
6 ”arn”: ”arn :aws:iam::123456789012:user/Alice ”,
7 ”accountId”: ”123456789012”,
8 ”accessKeyId”: ”EXAMPLE KEY ID”,
9 ”userName”: ”Alice”
10 },
11 ”eventTime”: ” 20140324 T21:11:59Z”,
12 ”eventSource”: ”iam.amazonaws.com”,
13 ”eventName”: ”CreateUser”,
14 ”awsRegion”: ”us east 2”,
15 ”sourceIPAddress”: ” 127.0.0.1”,
16 ”userAgent”: ”aws cli /1.3.2 Python /2.7.5 Windows/7”,
17 ” requestParameters ”: {”userName”: ”Bob”},
18 ”responseElements”: {”user”: {
19 ”createDate”: ”Mar 24, 2014 9:11:59 PM”,
20 ”userName”: ”Bob”,
21 ”arn”: ”arn :aws:iam::123456789012:user/Bob”,




Figure 4.8. An example CloudTrail log. The log records a management event in which Alice creates a
new user Bob in IAM.
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Figure 4.9. Portion of Hello, Retail!’s workflow.
Lambda function. Depending on their purpose, some Lambda functions may require access to
other AWS resources. For instance, the Lambda function whose purpose is to receive images
from photographers requires access to AWS S3 [99] in order to store the image files in the
relevant S3 photo bucket. A Lambda function obtains the required access it needs by assuming
an IAM service role that has a policy attached to it that grants access to the relevant AWS
resource.
Figure 4.9 illustrates the portion of Hello, Retail!’s workflow that pertains to us. An inventory
manager logs onto the website and registers a new product. This event triggers the
product-catalog-api function which in turn triggers the
product-catalog-builder function, where the product’s information is added into
the product database. Next the product-photo-assign function is called which finds
an available photographer from the photographer database and then calls the
product-photo-message function. This latter function sends the photographer a text
requesting for a picture of the product. Product-photo-receive waits to receive a text
containing an image and when it does, it stores it into an S3 data bucket. The final function
product-photo-success associates the image with the product in the product database
and displays the image on the website.
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4.5.2 Forensic Analysis
We now discuss an incident we effected in the Hello, Retail! application that is not expected,
and forensic analysis to track down its cause. An ‘incident,’ in this context, is some anomaly
that is observed, that is caused by a malicious act.
Incident For our incident, we did two things: (i) over-privileged a service role, and, (ii)
caused an incorrect photo to be associated with a product. We explain (ii) first. We added two
products, a MacBook and an iPhone, to the Hello, Retail! application. A photographer, Alice,
is assigned to take a picture of the MacBook, while another photographer, Bob, is assigned to
take a picture of the iPhone. Alice and Bob take the photos and send them back. However, on
the front-end website, an iPhone is shown on the page of both products, while the expected
behaviour is that a MacBook should be displayed on the MacBook’s product page and an
iPhone should be displayed on the iPhone’s product page.
We now explain (i). The intent of (i) is to be the cause of (ii). That is, the reason for this incident
occurring is that a malicious user altered the code of the product-photo-receive
Lambda function (see Figure 4.9) so that it stored the incorrect image in the photo bucket. The
root cause of our incident is (i), the over-privilege which allows an attacker to alter the code of
the Lambda function. We do not say in what manner an attacker exploits this over-privilege of
the service role. We can certainly extend our scenario to include this – for example, identify
the service that assumes this service role, and then give the attacker sufficient privilege over
that service in our application. We chose not to, to keep the incident and analysis somewhat
limited for purposes of exposition. At the minimum, identification of this over-privilege
immediately gives us a solution to address this security issue. Note, also, that over-privilege
is recognized as one of the top 10 security problems for serverless technology [101], and
was recently identified to be the root case of the Captial One Hack that exposed the personal
information of more than 100 million customers [102].
Analysis From the standpoint of analysis, there are a few possible reasons for the security
incident occurring. The true cause, which is a malicious user’s modification of the code of a
Lambda function, is one. As an example of another, the legitimate photographer may simply
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have sent in the wrong image. Referring back to Figure 4.9, an algorithm to investigate the
security incident would proceed as follows. It would first check if the photo that was received
by the photographer was of a Macbook. If it was, then the photographer is exonerated and the
logged behaviour of Lambda functions product-photo-receive and
product-photo-success have to be checked to see which of them was modified. If the
photo received from the photographer was of an iPhone, then before accusing the
photographer, we must verify that the correct photographer was assigned by
product-photo-assign and that the correct text message was sent to the photographer
by product-photo-message. AWS CloudTrail logging for management events does
not provide logs that are sufficient to run such a procedure. For instance, checking if the
correct text message was sent to the photographer requires that all messages sent out to
photographers by the product-photo-message function are logged; but this is not
logged. The approach we discuss in Section 4.2 has promise, however.
That is, we investigate the security incident by considering the access control system and its
state changes. We observe from Figure 4.9 that only product-photo-receive should
have access to the S3 photobucket. However it is possible that a malicious user may have
given another Lambda function access to S3 as well and then modified the function to change
the photo assignment. To investigate which Lambda function had access to S3 resources
in some past state, an investigator can issue a query for each of the Lambda functions. We
wrote a program for this – see Algorithm 4 for its pseudocode. A query would take the form,
〈γ, ψ, k, q = 〈F,AmazonS3Access〉 , π = Actual, L〉, where γ is the current state, ψ is the
state change rule, k is the known past state of the IAM access model, q is the forensic query, F
is the Lambda function, π is the access type and L is the CloudTrail logs. The program takes
as input a query that comprises of a role R (e.g. ProductPhotoReceiveRole) and an access A
(e.g. S3ReadWriteAccess), and the CloudTrail logs. The goal of the program is to determine
from the logs whether in any past state the access A was assigned to the role R. It parses each
log entry to determine what the event associated with it is. If the event is AttachRolePolicy,
then two parameters of the event, RoleName and PolicyArn are checked to verify if they are
identical to R and A respectively. If the condition is met, the program outputs the policy. If no
log entry is found that allows the given access to the given role, the program outputs an empty
set.
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Input: role R, access A, set of log entries L
Output: result ∈ {True, False}
1 S = ∅
2 result = ∅
3 foreach l ∈ L do
4 if l.eventName = AttachRolePolicy then
5 if l.RoleName = R ∧ l.PolicyArn.Access = A then
result = result ∪ l.PolicyArn
6 return result
Algorithm 4: Pseudocode to determine if a Lambda function’s role had access to S3.
On running our program for each Lambda function, we found that, as expected, only the
function product-photo-receive had access to S3. However, from the output of the
program we found that the one of the policies giving the service role access to S3 was a
PowerUserAccess policy. Such a policy grants read and write access to all S3 buckets, i.e.,
that service role is over-privileged. Hence we conclude that the
product-photo-receive Lambda function’s code may have been altered by a
malicious user. From our forensic analysis, we can conclude also that the logging capability
of AWS IAM allows for one to efficiently determine whether a principal actually possessed a
privilege in the past.
Goal-Directed Logging We observed that even though CloudTrail logged all management
events, only a small portion of the raw logs collected were actually related to our forensic
queries. As the number of users in the system grows, and the number of events that are logged
increases, the size of logs increases. This has two drawbacks. Firstly, the cost associated
with storing the logs in S3 increases. Secondly, and more importantly, it leads to the quantity
problem where the size of logs makes a meaningful analysis difficult [92, 93]. We therefore
wanted to see how much the size of logs could be reduced by using goal-directed logging.
As mentioned in Section 4.4, goal-directed logging is not only useful to decide in advance
what needs to be logged, but also, in a situation in which one cannot predict what logs will be
needed, it can be used to filter out logs before they are analyzed.
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Total # of Logs Reduced # of Logs % Reduction
Light Case 4491 47 98.95%
Heavier Case 23331 57 99.76%
Table 4.1. A summary of how the size of logs changes when goal-directed logging is used. As we
discuss in the prose, the Heavier Case has five times the personnel as the Light Case.
We analyzed the benefits of goal-directed logging under two scenarios. For each scenario,
we deployed the Hello, Retail! application to AWS, and added products and registered
photographers to the application’s databases. We then simulated the security incident discussed
above by changing Product-Photo-Receive’s code so that for the given item, a wrong
photo is stored in the S3 photo bucket. In the first scenario, we simulated a light use case
where there was only a single inventory manager and a single photographer registered in the
system. In the second scenario, we simulated a heavier use case where there were 5 inventory
managers and 5 photographers. We then compared the total number of logs generated by AWS,
and the number of logs that remained after filtering using goal-directed logging.
Table 4.1 summarizes our results. In the first scenario, the total number of logs generated was
4491, out of which only 47 were related to our forensic queries of interest. That is, with the
help of those 47 entries, we were able to generate the same forensic result as when using all
4491 entries. In the second scenario, the total number of logs generated was 23331 out of
which only 57 were related to our forensic queries of interest. In both cases, goal-directed
logging can reduce the number of logs by at least 98%. It is also interesting to observe that in
going from the light use-case to the heavy use-case, the total number of logs entries increases
by about a factor of 5 but the number of logs actually used by the forensic analysis increases
by a factor of 1.2 only. From these numbers we can conclude that goal-directed logging has




To our knowledge, forensics analysis has not been posed in access control, as such, in prior
work as we do in this work. However, there has been work on computer forensics in more
general contexts, and we summarize these below. We discuss also prior work on safety.
Computer forensics Early discussions about forensics in contexts to which our work
pertains are in the work of Noblett et al. [103]. That work suggests that computer forensics
dates back to around the mid-1990’s. Peisert et al. provide five, high-level principles of forensic
analysis [104]. That work proposes also a method to capture useful data rather than more data,
using ‘goal-oriented’ logging in which logging requirements are extracted by considering the
goals of an attacker [93, 105]. Several event reconstruction forensic tools have been proposed.
Amongst the earliest is ReVirt which improves the integrity of logs by encapsulating the target
system inside a virtual machine, and then placing the logging software beneath this virtual
machine [59]. ReVirt replays the complete, instruction-by-instruction execution of the virtual
machine to answer forensic queries. Zhu et al. proposed the Repairable File Service, which
uses logs to identify files that potentially have been contaminated by an intrusive process [62].
King et al. introduced Backtracker, which helps an administrator backtrack from a file with
suspicious contents to possible entry points of the intrusion using logged system calls [63].
Sitaraman et al. improved upon this backtracking method by logging additional parameters of
the file system and using data flow analysis to prune unwanted paths [60]. Goel et al. proposed
Forensix, which comprehensively logs kernal events, streams this information in real-time
onto append-only storage and then uses database technology to support high-level querying of
the archived log [61].
Peisert et al. proposed analyzing sequences of function calls for forensic analysis, focusing
on isolating cause and effects of the intrusion attack, and looking not only for unexpected
events but also for the absence of expected events [106]. Bishop et al. presented a technique
for deriving auditing criteria, and thereby logging requirements, from security policies [94].
Several other projects such as CERT’s Incident Detection, Analysis, and Response Project
(IDAR) [107] and SRI’s DERBI [108] assist administrators in understanding intrusions of file
systems. The book by Carrier discusses file system forensics in depth [58]. Olivier transferred
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concepts of file system forensics to database forensics [109].
Recent work has studied forensics in the context of the Internet of Things (see [110] for a
survey), and cloud computing (see [111] for a survey).
Safety Analysis To our knowledge, safety was first posed by Harrison et al. [65] in the
context of the access matrix model [112]. They introduced it as the question in which one asks
if a certain right can ‘leak’ in the future and showed that in general, the problem is undecidable
for the HRU scheme. However safety is decidable for the following restricted versions of
HRU: (1) no subjects or objects are allowed to be created, (2) each command has at most one
condition, and subjects and objects cannot be destroyed, and (3) each command comprises a
single primitive operation. Tripunitara and Li [72] revisited the work of Harrison et al. [65]
and introduced other notions of safety such as whether a particular right can leak into the cell
associated with a particular object, or into the cell associated with a particular subject and
object. In Section 4.3.1, we showed forensic analysis for HRU was undecidable by reducing
from their safety notion which asks if a right can leak into the cell associated with a particular
subject and object pair in which it did not exist in the current state.
Li et al. [67, 68] studied security analysis, a generalization of safety analysis, for trust
management [77] — an approach to access control in decentralized distributed systems with
access control decisions based on policy statements made by multiple principals. Security
analysis generalizes simple safety analysis in which one asks if there exists a reachable state in
which a specific principal has access to a specific resource. Li and Tripunitara [69] studied two
classes of security analysis problems for RBAC. Both classes use variants of a component of
the ARBAC97 administrative model for RBAC [79]. Jha et al. [81] studied the URA-RC-SAP
security analysis problem (SAP) in RBAC with the URA97 administrative scheme [79]. The
URA-RC-SAP problem allows assignments, revocations and trusted users. They study the
computational complexity of safety analysis for various sub-schemes and establish that while
the safety analysis is PSPACE-complete for the general scheme and some sub-schemes, for
some other sub-schemes, it is NP-complete, and even in P. Solworth and Sloan introduced
a new discretionary access control (DAC) scheme based on labels and relabelling that has
decidable safety properties [73]. Li and Tripunitara [70] argue that DAC should not be equated
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with the HRU access matrix scheme [65] in which safety is undecidable, and present an
efficient algorithm for deciding safety in the Graham-Denning DAC scheme [80].
4.7 Conclusions
Our conclusions are discussed in Chapter 6, Section 6.2.
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Chapter 5
Logic Locking: Observations from
Foundations and a Security Notion5
5.1 Introduction
We address logic locking, an approach that has been proposed to protect the Intellectual
Property (IP) of the designer of a digital Integrated Circuit (IC, or simply, circuit) from a
potentially untrustworthy semiconductor foundry [113]. Outsourcing of IC fabrication to such
a foundry has economic advantages to the designer. However, it comes with a potential for the
theft of their IP which is encoded as part of the design. If the design is provided to the foundry
in the clear, the foundry could, for example, fabricate unauthorized copies of the IC.
Logic locking works as follows; see Figure 5.1. The IP designer selects a locking algorithm.
The input to this algorithm is the circuit to be protected, C, and the designer’s choice for the
5This chapter is based on portions of work that is undergoing review [4]. I was involved in designing a circuit
that is resilient against the SAT attack when XOR-locked with a single key-bit (Section 5.2.1), explaining why
XOR-locked benchmark circuits are not resilient against the SAT attack (Section 5.2.2), making observations on
TTLock’s security (Section 5.3.1), and explaining the conditions under which the attack on TTLock in Section
5.3.2 succeeds. The security notion presented in Section 5.4 is one that I formulated, and is different from the
























Locking with key k*
Step B 
Obfuscation
C*(x,k*) = C(x) CL(x,k*) = C(x)
Figure 5.1. Overview of logic locking. In Step A, the circuit to be protected is locked with a chosen
key k∗ using a locking algorithm. The algorithm inserts some protection logic to ensure that when
the correct key is applied at the key inputs, the locked circuit is equivalent to the protected circuit. To
prevent identification and removal of the protection logic, Step B obfuscates the output of Step A.
length of a key, which is a sequence of bits. Alternately, a key may be chosen and provided
as input to the locking algorithm. The locking algorithm inserts some protection logic into
the circuit, obfuscates this logic and then outputs a circuit CL and a correct key k∗. The
circuit CL can be perceived as a two-input function, CL(·, ·), where the first input is an input
to the original circuit C , and the second input is a key. The circuit CL has the property that
CL(x, k) = C(x) for all inputs x if and only if k is a correct key. We use the article “a,” rather
than “the” for “correct key” because by intent of the logic locking algorithm or unintended by
it, more than one key may be correct. The IP designer sends CL to the foundry for fabrication.
When the foundry sends back the fabricated chips, the IP designer loads a correct key onto
tamper-proof memory on each chip.
We can contrast logic locking with other approaches that seek to achieve the same security
objective. For example, following is a mechanism based on a universal circuit — a circuit
that can simulate any circuit of a maximum size, given its description as input. Suppose
the universal circuit is realized as a Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA). The designer
encrypts the circuit to be protected using a semantically secure encryption scheme. The
designer then programs the FPGA with the decryption logic given this encrypted circuit and a
key. For a working IC, a correct key is provided. With such an approach, the only component
whose fabrication can be outsourced is the FPGA. We do not consider such an approach logic
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locking. To summarize, logic locking seeks to (1) outsource fabrication of the custom IC,
perhaps with some added security logic, and, (2) seeks the overhead of the security features to
be significantly lower than, for example, a universal circuit construction.
Attacks An attack on a logic locking mechanism has, broadly, one of two different, but
related, objectives: (i) key recovery, and, (ii) circuit recovery. If an attack targets key recovery,
then an attacker seeks to identify a correct key. If an attack targets circuit recovery, then an
attacker seeks to output a circuit C ′ with the property that for all inputs i, C ′(i) = C(i). A
manner in which the two objectives are related is that the recovery of an entire correct key
implies successful recovery of the circuit. However, the converse may not be true.
Either attack (i) or (ii) may be approximate [114]. For example, in the key-recovery attack,
if the key-length is 64 bits, we may deem an attacker to have succeeded if they are able to
correctly identify 60 bits of a correct key. Similarly, in the circuit-recovery attack, we may
deem an attacker to be successful if she is able to recover a circuit whose output differs from
that of the protected circuit for a small number of inputs only.
What the attacker is provided in attacks that have been considered in prior work and this work
are (i) the locked and obfuscated circuit CL, and, (ii) blackbox access to the original circuit
C. “Blackbox access” means that the attacker is allowed to exercise C with some input i and
get the output C(i) while incurring a cost of Θ(1). This can be considered realistic because
the attacker may be able to purchase a working (unlocked) IC to use while attacking a locked
copy of the IC. In some attacks, the attacker is weaker – they do not have (ii). This is typical
of removal attacks that work by removing components of CL (see, for example, our attack in
Section 5.3.2).
Contributions We make two sets of contributions. The first is new observations, rooted in
foundations and bolstered by implementations and empirical results, about two prior locking
techniques and attacks. For each of the first set of observations, we conclude with “lessons
learned.” These lessons, and lessons from prior work about locking techniques and security
properties that have been proposed in prior work, inform our second contribution which is a
new security property for logic locking.
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XOR-Locking: the good and the bad In Section 5.2, we revisit a particular locking
technique called XOR-Locking [113] with regards to its resistance to the SAT attack [115].
XOR-Locking is one of the earliest such schemes to have been proposed, to our knowledge,
and the SAT attack, which targets key recovery, has received considerable attention in prior
work. It is now customary, when one proposes a new logic locking scheme, to demonstrate, or
even prove, its resilience to the SAT attack. “SAT,” in this context, is an acronym for the
boolean satisfiability problem. The attack is based on the observation that a single
input/output pair from a working IC can potentially enable an attacker to eliminate numerous
incorrect keys.
The SAT attack has been demonstrated, in practice, to successfully recover entire keys of
XOR-Locked benchmark circuits [115]. Thus, it is appropriate to say that XOR-Locking
is susceptible to the SAT attack. We ask what this means in more depth. Specifically, is
it the case that given a circuit C, its XOR-Locked version CL is susceptible to the SAT
attack? We provide the answer: no, if one-way functions exist. A one-way function is a
function f that is polynomial-time computable, and for a uniform choice x, given only f(x),
it is computationally hard to find x′ such that f(x′) = f(x) [116]. In other words, there
exist circuits for which XOR-Locking is effective against the SAT attack, provided one-way
functions exist. Indeed, we establish that this is the case even with a one-bit key. We are able
to generate such circuits in practice under the assumption that one round of SHA-256 [117] is
a one-way function, and have run the SAT attack against them and verified their invulnerability.
We have made three such circuits available publicly [118]. Given the observation that such
circuits exist, we then ask: is there something about the benchmark circuits and the manner
in which they are XOR-Locked that makes them susceptible to the SAT attack? We answer
this question by first focusing on the first step of the SAT attack, which, given a locked circuit,
is the identification of whether every key is correct for it. We identify a property, which we
can call wire redundancy (see Definition 4 in Section 5.2.2), of the benchmark circuits that
if preserved by the locking and obfuscation mechanisms of XOR-Locking, is related to the
problem of determining whether every key is correct for the corresponding XOR-Locked
circuit. We do this using average-case computational complexity. Specifically, we identify
that if checking for this property, i.e. wire redundancy, in an XOR-Locked circuit is in distP,
then the problem of determining whether every key is correct for its XOR-Locked version is
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in distP, where distP is the average-case analogue of the complexity class P (see Definition 8
in Section 5.2.2). We present empirical evidence that the benchmark circuits are indeed from a
distribution for which checking for wire redundancy is computationally ‘easy’.
An attack on TTLock In Section 5.3, we address a state-of-the-art locking mechanism,
TTLock [119], that has been claimed to be provably secure against the SAT attack. We first
observe that the proof of security of TTLock relies on the assumption that a SAT solver
chooses its output uniformly from the set of all possible satisfying assignments. We then point
out, based on a plot from the work on TTLock [119], that this assumption is not supported
by empirical evidence. We then present a circuit recovery attack against TTLock and show
its effectiveness against benchmark circuits. Our attack is probabilistic, but not approximate:
when we succeed, we recover the circuit in its entirety. We discuss the conditions under which
our attack succeeds with significant probability. We have implemented the attack, and we
present empirical results from attacks on benchmark circuits. We are aware that there is prior
work that attacks TTLock [120, 121]; however, those are key-recovery attacks. Our attack
recovers the circuit without having to recover the key. At the minimum, our attack identifies
more vulnerabilities in TTLock than known previously.
A Security Notion The back and forth between defences and attacks in the logic locking
space has been rightfully attributed to a lack of appropriate security notions [122]. In the
absence of such notions, a newly proposed defence is customarily shown to be secure by
demonstrating its resilience against known attacks. Our attack against TTLock, which is a
scheme previously shown to be resilient against the SAT attack, serves as an example of why
such an approach at “proving” security is faulty. That is, resilience against current attacks
does not imply that a scheme is secure against future attacks. In Section 5.4 we propose a new
notion of “secure” for logic locking. Our notion seeks to protect against a malicious foundry
whose objective is to overproduce chips and sell them illegally in a black market. We compare
our notion to security notions suggested by prior work [123, 4, 122].
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Original Circuit Locked Circuit Locked & Obfuscated Circuit
Figure 5.2. An example of XOR-Locking [113]. We begin with the original circuit C (left figure).
To lock the circuit with a 2-bit key, we choose 2 wires, and insert XOR/XNOR key gates in to them
(middle figure). The correct key bits are K1 = 1 and K2 = 0. To prevent an attacker from knowing
the correct key by simply observing the key gates, the inverter is propagated forward using the Boolean
identity ¬x⊕̄y = x⊕ y (right figure).
5.2 XOR-Locking
In this section, we address XOR-Locking [113]. Figure 5.2 illustrates how XOR-Locking
works. We begin with an original, plaintext circuit C. We first identify wires in C into which
we intend to insert two-input gates called key gates. Then, we insert either an XNOR or an
XOR gate into each wire that was identified in Step (1). This yields a circuit which we denote
as CK . An XNOR gate corresponds to a key-bit of 1, and an XOR gate corresponds to a
key-bit of 0. Finally, as an obfuscation mechanism, we propagate inverters forwards and/or
backwards in CK to yield the locked circuit, CL.
It has been observed that XOR-Locking is ineffective against the SAT attack [115]. In the
remainder of this section, we investigate this observation in more depth. In Section 5.2.1, we
ask: do there exist circuits for which XOR-Locking is indeed effective against the SAT attack?
Our answer is yes, under customary assumptions, with even a 1-bit key. Then, in Section
5.2.2, we identify, using average-case complexity, a sufficient condition for a circuit whose
XOR-Locked version is susceptible to the first step of the SAT attack. We observe, empirically,
that benchmark circuits do indeed satisfy this sufficient condition, which helps explain, from
foundations, why XOR-Locking has been deemed to be susceptible to the SAT attack. In each
of those sections, we conclude with lessons learned. To our knowledge, our is the first work to
study the strength and weakness of XOR-Locking in such technical depth.
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Figure 5.3. A circuit (left) whose XOR-Locked version (right) with even a one-bit key is resilient to
the SAT attack. f is a one-way function, and “f(i) = c” is a circuit that outputs 1 if, on input i, the
output of f is a constant c that is in the range of f ; otherwise its output is 0.
5.2.1 The Effectiveness of XOR-Locking
In this section, we ask: notwithstanding the supposed susceptibility of XOR-Locking to the
SAT attack [115], do there exist circuits for which XOR-Locking is resilient to the SAT attack?
The following theorem states that under a particular customary assumption, the answer is
“yes,” with even a 1-bit key. The customary assumption is that one-way functions exist. This
observation about the strength of XOR-Locking suggests that XOR-Locking can be effective.
Theorem 5.2.1. If one-way functions exist, then there exists a family of circuits such that for
every member in the family, XOR-Locking is resilient to the SAT attack with even a 1-bit key.
Our proof is by construction, and it is shown in Figure 5.3. Suppose f is a one-way function,
and c is a constant that is in the range of f ; that is, there exists some x such that f(x) = c.
Suppose also that we know of no y such that f(y) = c. We first construct a circuit, shown
in the box “f(i) = c” in Figure 5.3, whose input wires encode an input i to the function f .
The circuit “f(i) = c” compares f(i) to c for equality. If f(i) = c, then the circuit “f(i) = c”
outputs 1; otherwise, it outputs 0. As the figure shows, our circuit C comprises the circuit
“f(i) = c,” whose output is the input of an AND gate. The AND gate’s second input is a
constant 1 bit. The output of the AND gate is the one-bit output of C. Thus, C has the property
that its output is 1 on input i if and only if f(i) = c, i.e., if and only if we have found an
inverse of c.
A locked version of such a C with a 1-bit key is shown to the right of Figure 5.3. We insert an
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XNOR or XOR gate in to the constant 1-wire in C. If we insert an XNOR gate as shown in the
figure, then the correct key is 1; if we insert an XOR gate, the correct key is 0. No propagation
of inverters, i.e., obfuscation, is necessary to thwart the SAT attack.
Why this is hard for the SAT attack The objective of the SAT attack is key recovery. Thus,
for the above C and CL in which the key gate is an XNOR, the SAT attack is successful if and
only if it is able to determine that the correct key bit is 1. We reprise the algorithm that is the
SAT attack as Algorithm 5.
Input: (i) Locked circuit CL, and, (ii) Blackbox access to the original circuit C
1 Let S = ∅
2 Let F be a boolean formula that is satisfiable if and only if there exists keys k1 and k2,
and input i, such that for all x ∈ S, CL(x, k1) = CL(x, k2) = C(x), and CL(i, k1) 6=
CL(i, k2)
3 while F is satisfiable do
4 S = S ∪ i
5 Find a key k∗ such that for all x ∈ S, CL(x, k∗) = C(x)
6 return k∗
Algorithm 5: The SAT Attack [115].
The input to Algorithm 5 comprises the assets the attacker possesses i.e. the locked circuit
CL and an oracle to the plaintext circuit C. The algorithm begins by creating a set S that is
initially empty (Line 1). Next it creates a boolean formula F that is satisfiable if and only if
there exists an input i and two keys k1 and k2 such that k1 and k2 when used to unlock CL
produce the correct output for all inputs in S but give different outputs from each other for the
input i (Lines 2-3). It then adds i as a member to S (Line 4). When it cannot find any more
inputs to add to S, it finds a key k∗ that is correct for all inputs in S (Line 5). It outputs k∗
which is guaranteed to be a correct key (Line 6).
In Algorithm 5, each check of the while condition in Line 3 is an invocation to a SAT solver, as
is the determination of a key k∗ in Line 5. The SAT attack works by progressively identifying
more and more members of a Distinguishing Set of inputs, S, to C.
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Definition 2 (Distinguishing Set). Given a logic-locked circuit CL of a plaintext circuit C, a
Distinguishing Set for it is a set of inputs S to C with the following property: for a particular
key k, if C(i) = CL(i, k) for all i ∈ S, then it is the case that k is a correct key.
Once the SAT attack finds a Distinguishing Set, the while loop of Lines (3) and (4) terminates.
Then, the SAT attack, in Line (5), finds a key that produces the correct output for all the
members of this set. Although the set of all inputs is a Distinguishing Set because a correct key
produces the correct output for all inputs, the SAT attack hopes to find a small Distinguishing
Set. The efficiency of the SAT attack is dictated by: (i) the number of iterations of the while
loop of Lines (3) and (4), i.e., the size of the distinguishing set S to which the attack converges,
and, (ii) the hardness of each instance in the check in Line (3), and Line (5).
Now consider what the SAT attack attempts to do for our circuit in Figure 5.3. In the
first step, it attempts to determine whether there exists an input i to the circuit such that
CL(i, 1) 6= CL(i, 0), i.e., an input i to C that distinguishes the one-bit key 1 from the key 0.
If it is able to find such an i, the set {i} is a distinguishing set, and the SAT attack can then
identify the correct one-bit key in Line (6). That is, for the locked circuit from Figure 5.3,
there exists a Distinguishing Set of size one, and any input that the SAT attack identifies in its
first step is exactly such an input. Determining whether such an i exists for our locked circuit
from Figure 5.3 is equivalent to determining whether the empty set, ∅, is a distinguishing set.
We call this problem out in the following definition. The empty set is distinguishing if and
only if every key is correct.
Definition 3 (NOTEMPTYSETDIST). NOTEMPTYSETDIST is the following problem: given
as input a logic-locked circuit CL of a circuit C, is every distinguishing set for CL of minimum
size non-empty?
For any locked circuit CL, a certificate for a “yes” instance of NOTEMPTYSETDIST is exactly
a triple 〈i, k1, k2〉 such that k1 6= k2 and CL(i, k1) 6= CL(i, k2). In the SAT attack, the
identification of such a certificate comes “for free” when NOTEMPTYDISTSET is solved as
the first step. The reason is that NOTEMPTYDISTSET is in NP, i.e., a “yes” answer to an
instance is associated with a certificate that is efficiently-sized and can be verified efficiently.
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And it is typical for a solver that corresponds to the class NP, e.g., a SAT solver, to return a
certificate along with a “yes” answer.
With regards to the locked circuit in Figure 5.3 then, if the SAT attack is able to “easily”
perform key recovery for some CL, then it is able to “easily” solve NOTEMPTYSETDIST for
that CL. This means that the SAT attack has “easily” identified an i such that f(i) = c. This
is because of the following. Suppose the key gate is, as the figure depicts, an XNOR, and
we apply as one-bit key the value 0. Now the output of the XNOR gate in Figure 5.3 is 0,
and therefore the output of CL(·, 0) = 0. To distinguish this key from the key 1, we require
an input i to the circuit that causes the output of the locked circuit to be 1, i.e., we require
CL(·, 1) = 1. We know that when the key-bit is 1, the output of the XNOR gate is 1. Thus,
when the key-bit is 1, the output of CL(i, 1) is 1 if and only if the output of the “f(i) = c”
circuit is 1. The SAT attack will have “easily” inverted the one-way function f for the value c
from its range, whose pre-image was chosen uniformly.
Comparison to prior approaches Broadly, the idea of using a one-way function to thwart
the SAT attack is not new. There is prior work that is similar to our construction in Figure 5.3,
specifically work by Yasin et al. [124] and Zhou[125]. Their objective is to take an existing
circuit C, and leverage constructs such as a one-way function to securely lock C. It is unclear
that these prior schemes indeed achieve what they set out to do — their approaches do not
provably guarantee that the SAT-attack will have to solve the one-way function in at least
one of its iterations. In contrast, we seek to show only that there exist circuits for which
XOR-Locking thwarts the SAT attack, and we are able to do this provably.
Realization in practice We have designed and implemented software that outputs instances
of the plaintext and locked circuits as depicted in Figure 5.3, and confirmed that the
implementation of the SAT attack of [115] indeed fails to solve NOTEMPTYSETDIST. “Fails,”
in this context, means does not determine that NOTEMPTYSETDIST is indeed true within 12
hours on a desktop computer with an 8-core AMD Ryzen 7 2700 processor and 32 GB RAM
that runs Ubuntu Linux 18.04. The function f we have adopted is one round of SHA-256
[117]. We generate the image of f , c, by first picking a random input that guarantees that only
one round of SHA-256 is exercised, and then computing its image c in software using the
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java.security package. We have made three instances of the original circuit, each of
which corresponds to a different c, and a corresponding locked version available publicly
[118]. Our circuit implementation of SHA-256 is based on [126].
Lessons learned The locked circuit from Figure 5.3 should be easy for an attack to break
and it may be somewhat surprising that the SAT attack, which has been the focus of so much
prior work on logic locking on account its effectiveness, fails for it. An effective attack on
that locked circuit could observe, for example, that a key bit of 0 results in the output of the
XNOR gate to be 0, which in turn causes the output of the AND gate, and therefore the circuit,
to always be 0. Therefore, one can confidently output the correct key bit as 1.
However, one cannot fault an attack, in this case the SAT attack, as being too weak, particularly
given that it has been demonstrated to be successful against benchmark circuits. Rather, we
argue that the property that underlies the SAT attack is too weak. That is, a meaningful
security property for logic locking would deem that the locking mechanism in Figure 5.3 is
not necessarily secure.
5.2.2 The Ineffectiveness of XOR-Locking
The observation in the previous section, that there indeed exist circuits for which XOR-Locking
mitigates the SAT attack, appears to go against the observation in prior work that XOR-Locked
circuits are susceptible to the SAT attack. In this section, we provide a reasoning, based in
computing foundations, about why this is the case for the benchmark circuits. That is, we
ask: is there a property of the benchmark circuits and/or the XOR-Locking procedure, that
renders XOR-Locked circuits from the benchmark easy for the SAT attack? The reason, in
this question, that we identify the original plaintext circuit as a possible culprit in the success
of the SAT attack is that our construction in the previous section exactly relies on a property
of the original plaintext circuit to render the SAT attack ineffective.
The answer to the above question is ‘yes.’ The computing foundations to which we appeal is
average-case complexity [6]. In classical computational complexity, we consider a decision
problem, L, and ask what upper- and lower-bounds are for its worst-case computational
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hardness. In average-case complexity, we consider a distribution problem which is a pair,
〈L,D〉. The component L is a decision problem as in classical complexity. The component D
is a family of distributions, D = {Dn}, where each Dn is a distribution for problem-size n.
For example, L may be 3-CNF-SAT – satisfiability of boolean formulas in propositional logic
that are in conjunctive normal form with exactly three literals per clause [127]. The distribution
Dn may be that we uniformly pick an instance of size n whose ratio of number of clauses to
number of variables is some constant. It is known that 3-CNF-SAT is computationally hard
for particular such families of distributions, and easy for some others [128].
Average-case complexity is sensitive to the choice of the input distribution. A reason that
considering average-case complexity is meaningful in this context is that we know, from the
previous section, that in the worst-case for the attacker, XOR-Locking can indeed withstand
the SAT attack. What we establish in this section, however, is that the distribution from which
the benchmark circuits are drawn render their XOR-Locked circuits susceptible to the SAT
attack. More specifically, what we do is the following. We identify a property of circuits which
we call wire redundancy. We observe that it is a sufficient condition to make an inference
about NOTDISTEMPTYSET (see Definition 3 in the previous section). We then establish a
correspondence between the computational ease of checking wire redundancy, and that of
NOTDISTEMPTYSET, using average-case complexity. We then observe empirically that the
benchmark instances are indeed drawn from such a distribution.
The notion of wire redundancy Our first step in identifying a property that renders
NOTDISTEMPTYSET easy for the benchmark instances is to define what we call a redundant
wire in a circuit. We do so in the following definition.
Definition 4 (Redundant wire). Given a circuit C and a wire w in C, we say that w is
redundant if for every single-input, single-output circuit X , C is equivalent to C(X), where
C(X) is exactly C, except with w replaced by X . By “equivalent,” we mean that C and C(X),
for every input, produce the same output.
Theorem 5.2.2. A wire w in a circuit C is redundant if and only if C is equivalent to C(w),
where C(w) is exactly C, but with an inverter inserted in to the wire w.
Proof. The “only if” direction is straightforward by contradiction. For the “if” direction,
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assume otherwise for the purpose of contradiction. That is, assume that for some 〈C,w〉, it is
the case that C is equivalent to C(w), and yet w is not redundant. As w is not redundant, there
exists some circuit X and some input i such that C(i) 6= C(X)(i). It must be the case that the
output of the sub-circuit X is ¬w on input i (i.e., the negation of whatever value w takes in C
for input i) and thus, C(i) 6= C(w)(i), a contradiction.
Below, we articulate what it means to unlock an XOR-Locked circuit.
Definition 5 (Unlocking an XOR-Locked circuit). Let CL be an XOR-Locked circuit of some
circuit C. To unlock CL with key k, we (1) hard code k as a key input for CL, and (2) replace
each key gate in CL with either an inverter or a wire, in the obvious way, so CL’s functionality
is maintained.
We now proceed to computational ease. We first address the XOR-Locked circuit. If it is easy
to check, for each wire in an XOR-Locked circuit, whether the wire is redundant, then it is
easy to solve NOTDISTEMPTYSET for the locked circuit. Towards this, we first define two
more computational problems.
Definition 6 (CHECKWIREREDUNDANCY). CHECKWIREREDUNDANCY is the following
problem: given as input a circuit, C, for every wire w in C, either find an input i such that
C(i) 6= C(w)(i), or decide that w is redundant. The output on input C is a pair 〈i, w〉 for each
wire w in C, where i is either an input to C such that C(i) 6= C(w)(i) or φ if w is redundant.
Definition 7 (F-NOTEMPTYDISTSET). F-NOTEMPTYDISTSET is the following problem:
given as input an XOR-Locked circuit CL of a circuit C, find an input i such that there exist
two keys k1, k2 for which CL(i, k1) 6= CL(i, k2), or decide that ∅ is a distinguishing set for CL.
The output on input CL is either i, or a special symbol, say, φ.
Our intent with the above two definitions is to relate computational ease of checking wire
redundancy with checking whether the empty set is distinguishing. A nuance with the above
two definitions is that algorithms for them must output a solution, rather than only “yes” or
“no.” This is the reason that we refer to them as computational problems, rather than decision
problems. We relate the computational ease of the above two problems in Theorem 5.2.3 below.
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But before we do so, in the following definition, we make precise what “computationally easy”
means for a computational problem such as one of the two above, whose only instances we
care about are drawn from a particular distribution. We associate the pair of problem and
distribution with a complexity class called distP that defines what it means for a deterministic
algorithm A to solve a distributional problem 〈L,D〉 in polynomial time on average.
Definition 8 (distP, adapted from Arora and Barak [6]). Let D be a distribution over {0, 1}∗;
we denote sampling from a distribution using a left arrow, ←. If A is an algorithm, let
timeA(x) denote the running-time of algorithm A on input x. Let E [·] denote expectation,
and |s| denote the size of the encoding of a string s.
Given a computational problem L and a distribution D, we say that 〈L,D〉 ∈ distP if there








Our definition above is exactly that of Arora and Barak [6], except that we specify it for
problems whose solutions need to be certificates if the answer is “yes,” rather than “yes” or
“no” only. The complexity class distP is the average-case analogue of the conventional class
P. The former captures the notion of ease for the ‘average’ instance of L drawn from some
distribution D, while the latter captures the notion of ease for the computational problem L for
the worst-case instance. We now relate the computational ease of checking wire redundancy
with the ease of checking whether the empty set is distinguishing.
Theorem 5.2.3. Let D be any distribution of XOR-Locked circuits. Then
〈CHECKWIREREDUNDANCY,D〉 ∈ distP implies 〈F-NOTDISTEMPTYSET,D〉 ∈ distP.
Proof. Let A be an algorithm that, in Definition 8, renders 〈CHECKWIREREDUNDANCY,D〉
to be in distP. We devise an algorithm A′ that renders 〈F-NOTDISTEMPTYSET,D〉 to be in
distP. The algorithm is as follows: on input locked circuit CL, invoke A on CL: if A has in
its output set, for any wire j of CL that corresponds to a key input, an input 〈i, k〉 such that
CL(i, k) 6= C(j)L (i, k), output i. Otherwise, decide that ∅ is a distinguishing set for CL.
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Algorithm A′ solves F-NOTDISTEMPTYSET. To see this, observe that if A produces as output
an input 〈i, k〉 for the wire j corresponding to the jth key bit, then it must be the case that
CL(i, k) 6= CL(i, k(j)), where k(j) is exactly k but with the j th bit flipped. In the same vein, if
A decides that no input 〈i, k〉 as above exists for any of CL’s key inputs, then it must be the case
that for any input i, and any keys k1 and k2 that differ only on one bit, CL(i, k1) = CL(i, k2).
But it then follows that CL(i, k1) = CL(i, k2) for all i, k1 and k2, because otherwise, not all
of the wires that correspond to input key bits on which k1 and k2 differ can be redundant; at
least one of those wires must be non-redundant. And if indeed CL(i, k1) = CL(i, k2) for all
i, k1, k2, then all keys are correct and ∅ is a distinguishing set for CL.
It remains to be shown that the expectation of the running-time of A′ is indeed bounded as

















To see this, observe first that A′ requires linear time to search A’s answer for an input-key pair
〈i, k〉 corresponding to one of CL’s key inputs. In other words, for every CL there is a constant
c1 such that
timeA′(CL) ≤ c1|CL|+ timeA(CL)




































≤ 2c1 + 2c
Relationship to the plaintext circuit, C The above discussion that culminates in Theorem
5.2.3 relates a property of the locked circuit, CL, with the first step of the SAT attack. We
now ask and answer: what, if anything, does this have to do with an original, plaintext
circuit, C, from the benchmarks on which the SAT attack has been demonstrated to be
successful? We show that there is a property of the original benchmark circuit C that renders
F-NOTDISTEMPTYSET easy provided the process of XOR-Locking causes the property to
be preserved in CL. The property is simply that checking wire redundancy is easy for the
benchmark circuit itself.
Theorem 5.2.4. If an XOR-Locking procedure does not propagate any inverters as in the right
part of Figure 5.2, then for any circuit C, if an input i exists such that C(i) 6= C(w)(i) for
some wire w in C, then for any XOR-Locked version CL of C, there exists an input i′ such that
that CL(i′) 6= C(w
′)
L (i
′), where w′ is the wire in CL corresponding to wire w in C.
Proof. Suppose there exists an input i such that C(i) 6= C(w)(i) for some wire w in C.





In other words, if we can easily find a proof that a wire w in C is not redundant, then we have
a proof that the corresponding wire in CL is not redundant. So checking wire redundancy in a
locked circuit is no harder than checking wire redundancy in the plaintext circuit.
We have established, empirically, that the set of circuits in the benchmark does indeed meet
the sufficient condition of Theorem 5.2.4. That is, CHECKWIREREDUNDANCY is indeed
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“easy” for every circuit C in the benchmark. To observe this, we did the following. For every
circuit in the benchmark, we check the redundancy of each wire in the circuit using ABC’s
combinational equivalence engine of the ABC package. Our results are shown in the Table 5.1
below.
Benchmark #In #Out #Gates Time(s) Benchmark #In #Out #Gates Time(s)
c432 36 37 160 6 c499 41 32 202 9
des 256 245 6473 465 c5315 178 123 2307 24
apex2 39 3 610 26 c7552 207 108 3512 211
apex4 10 19 5360 362 c880 60 26 383 16
c1355 41 32 546 24 dalu 75 16 2298 124
c1908 33 25 880 38 c2670 233 140 1193 58
c3540 50 22 1669 85 ex1010 10 10 5066 338
ex5 8 63 1055 48 i4 192 6 338 14
i7 199 67 1315 63 i8 133 81 2464 127
i9 88 63 1035 85 k2 46 45 1815 338
Table 5.1. Time it takes for our wire redundancy checking procedure to finish executing on the set of
benchmark circuits from prior work [115].
Lessons learned We can immediately infer, based on our observations in this section, that
the original circuit in Figure 5.3 whose 1-bit XOR-Locked version thwarts the SAT attack has
at least one wire for which it is computationally hard to determine whether it is redundant.
Also, this section and the previous one clearly point to properties of the original circuit as
sources of hardness for the SAT attack. This in itself is not a bad thing; for example, an
encryption scheme is not expected to mask the distribution from which a plaintext is chosen
to be encrypted. Thus, based on our observations in this section and the previous, we cannot
categorically say whether, for particular circuits of interest, XOR-Locking will be effective
or not. Rather, what is needed is a clearly expressed security property against which we can

















Figure 5.4. Example illustrating the TTLock (or SFLL-HD0) scheme [123]. F is the function
implemented by the circuit to be protected. First, protection logic is inserted to flip the output when the
input is equal to the correct key (corresponding to Step A of Figure 5.1), then synthesis is performed
(corresponding to Step B of Figure 5.1), and some more logic is inserted for the correct key to recover
the original circuit (corresponding to Step A of Figure 5.1).
5.3 TTLock
In this section, we consider a current state-of-art defense, TTLock [119] and its subsequent
generalization SFLL-HDm [123]. TTLock, pictured in Figure 5.4, works as follows. Let C be
the circuit to be protected and let F be the function implemented by C. First, TTLock selects
a secret key k∗ and creates a circuit that implements F f , where F f (x) = F (x) for all x 6= k∗,
and F f (k∗) = ¬F (k∗). F f is created by adding a comparator and an XOR gate to the original
circuit.
Then, the designer synthesizes the circuit implementing F f using a synthesis tool, which can
be thought of as an algorithm that restructures a Boolean circuit to reduce its area. From the
standpoint of TTLock, this synthesis is intended to obfuscate the circuit for F f , specifically,
mix the comparator, which has the secret key k∗ hard-coded as input, with F , so that an
adversary is not able to identify them in a locked circuit. However, the particular synthesis
procedure one should adopt is not specified as part of TTLock, and therefore, it is unclear that
this choice to adopt synthesis as obfuscation meets its intent.
Finally, a key input k is introduced, as well as another comparator and XOR gate. The
comparator checks if k = x, and if yes, the XOR gate flips the output of F f . This is the final
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Figure 5.5. Figure, reprised from [119], showing the number of DIPs required for the SAT attack
against TTLock for key-size n = 16, 17, 18, across 10 trials, for each of five benchmark circuits.
locked circuit CL. Setting k = k∗ recovers a circuit that is equivalent to the original circuit
C, but setting it to any other value results in a circuit whose output differs from that of C on
exactly two inputs: x = k∗ and x = k.
SFLL-HDm generalizes TTLock by flipping F if the hamming distance between input x and
k∗ is exactly m. As such, TTLock is simply SFLL-HD0. The claimed benefit of m > 0 is that
the functions corresponding to incorrect keys are more different than the designer’s function,
but in practice, setting m > 4 makes the scheme susceptible to the SAT attack [123].
5.3.1 Observations on TTLock’s Security
TTLock is claimed to be resilient against the SAT attack because each new distinguishing
input (DIP) found by the attack (assuming it is not equal to k∗) eliminates one key only. For
a key of size n, the expected number of DIPs needed for the SAT attack to break TTLock is
2n−1 [119]. This is based on the assumption that given a satisfiable Boolean formula, a SAT
solver will choose an assignment uniformly at random from the set of all possible satisfying
assignments [119].
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It is however unlikely that this assumption is true. Indeed, if it was, then the number of DIPs
required would depend only on n, the size of the key, and not on the original circuit F . This
is of course a desirable property but does not seem to be supported by empirical data. We
reproduce in Figure 5.5 a plot from the work of Yasin et al. [119] for the number of DIPs
required by the SAT attack for five ISCAS’85 benchmarks across 10 trials for each benchmark.
Our first observation from the plot is the divergent nature of the distribution of the numbers for
each of the benchmarks for n = 18. Our second observation are the points in the plot which
fall well below the expected value for the number of DIPs. If the SAT solver chooses uniformly
amongst satisfying assignments, then the probability that the number of DIPs required would
be below 256 for n = 16 across 10 trials is less than 4%. Yet we observe that for at least 4 out
of the 5 benchmarks, 2 out of the 10 trials (i.e. 20%) had DIPs below 256. These observations
suggest that the SAT solver is in fact biased towards the correct key. We therefore call the
purported security of TTLock against the SAT attack into question.
Yet another observation that casts further doubt on TTLock’s security is that assuming that
an attacker has access to the plaintext circuit, C, finding a key for its TTLocked version, CL,
is in NP. This is because given a key k∗ as a certificate, one could verify that it is a correct
key by checking that for x∗ = k∗, CL(x∗, k∗) = C(x∗), because only the correct key produces
an output that is correct for an input that is equal to it. A consequence is that the problem of
recovering a key for a TTLocked circuit can be reduced to SAT and be solved by a single call
to a SAT solver. The query to the SAT solver asks if there exists an assignment to k and x such
that (CL(k, x) = C(x)) ∧ (x = k). Consider a more general version of TTLock that has the
following properties: (1) there exists a special input for which all keys except the correct key
produce the wrong output, and (2) every input x that is not the special input eliminates one
incorrect key only, but this incorrect key may not be equal to x. Suppose the attacker has only
blackbox access to the plaintext circuit C and that SAT solvers were programmed to be able to
use plug-in oracles. In this case also, an attacker would be able to find the correct key with
a single call to the SAT solver. The oracle to the plaintext circuit, CO(x), is ‘plugged-into’
the SAT solver, and the solver is asked if there exists an assignment to k1, k2, k, and x that
satisfies the following formula:
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(CL(k1, x) 6= CO(x)) ∧ (CL(k2, x) 6= CO(x)) ∧ (CL(k, x) = CO(x)) ∧ (k1 6= k2)
5.3.2 A New Attack on TTLock
We demonstrate a simple yet effective circuit-recovery attack against TTLock. We begin by
noting that the security of TTLock is not premised on gates (comparator and XOR) that are
outside the grey box in Figure 5.4. These are in the clear and can be easily found and removed.
Next, we hypothesize that the matching node m(x), which is the output of the comparator
that checks if x = k∗ in the circuit that implements F f , still remains in the circuit even after
synthesis. That is, there exists a node in the synthesized circuit such that when the node is set
to logic 0, the function F of the original circuit is recovered.
We then observe that the node m(x) has a special property — it is logic 1 for one and only
one input. We define the signal probability of a logic gate in a circuit as the probability that
for a randomly picked input, it will output 1. We say the signal probability of a gate is low if it
is negligibly small. The signal probability of the gate whose output is m(x) is low – only 1
2n
for an n-input circuit. Our attack uses this property of m(x) to identify it in the locked circuit.
Starting from a locked circuit CL from which the external XOR and comparator have been
removed, we proceed in three steps:
1. We estimate the signal probability for each gate in CL. To do this, we apply N randomly
selected inputs to CL, and for each gate, we record the fraction of inputs for which it
outputs a 1.
2. If the signal probability estimate for a gate is 0, i.e., the gate never activates for any of
the N input patterns, we replace the gate with a constant 0.
3. We output the resulting circuit.
Results We tested our attack on circuits from standard benchmark suites, including the
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MCNC and the ISCAS-89 benchmarks. For each circuit, we created one hundred different
locked instances, selecting the key for each trial at random. We used the ABC package [129]
which implements a commonly used open-source synthesis tool to synthesize the locked
circuits. We applied N = 2000 input patterns to estimate the signal probabilities of gates.
Table 5.2 reports the percentage of trials for which we were able to recover an equivalent circuit
for each of the benchmarks6. For all benchmarks except one, we recovered the designer’s
function in at least 82% of the trials.
Benchmark # Inputs # Outputs # Gates % successes
scf 34 63 794 98
s420 34 17 151 82
s5378 214 228 2779 99
s13207 700 790 7951 67
s35932 1763 2048 16065 98
s38417 1664 1742 22179 94
s38584 1464 1730 19253 98
s15850 611 684 9772 88
Table 5.2. Number of trials out of 100 where our attack recovers the designer’s function for circuits
from the MCNC and ISCAS’89 benchmarks.
Why our attack works We now investigate the conditions under which our attack is
successful. First observe that if the original circuit C contains any gates whose output wires
are redundant (see Definition 4 in Section 5.2), whether or not these wires activate for any of
the N trials of the attack bears no consequence to the success of the attack. Therefore we can
safely assume that C contains only gates whose output wires are non-redundant.
Next we observe that if the original circuit C does not contain any gates that have low signal
probability, and if the synthesis tool does not modify the input circuit, then we can expect our
attack to succeed with probability almost 1. This is because the output wire of each gate in C
will activate for at least one of the N trials with probability almost 1.
6To check the equivalence of each reconstructed circuit with its corresponding benchmark, we used ABC’s
combinational equivalence engine.
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To check whether the benchmark circuits did not have any low signal probability gates, we
repeated our attack on them without passing the locked circuits through the synthesis tool.
We found that the attack succeeded for 6 out of the 8 benchmarks. That is, 6 out of the 8
benchmarks did not contain low signal probability gates. The 2 benchmarks that contained low
signal probability gates, and therefore for which the attack, when launched on unsynthesized
locked benchmarks, failed, were s13207 and s38584.
Our experiment, although limited, suggests that real-life circuits tend not to contain low signal
probability gates. This is not surprising considering that a designer typically tries to optimize
the utility of logic, and hence if the output of a gate is seldom active, the designer may avoid
using the gate altogether. This also suggests a natural trade-off between security and efficiency
in a circuit — if some redundancy is allowed in a circuit, it may be possible to obtain more
security, at least from our attack.
The theorem below gives a lower-bound on the probability that our attack would be successful
on a TTLocked circuit, if the synthesis algorithm does not modify the input circuit in any way.
Theorem 5.3.1. If the synthesis algorithm is the identity function i.e. it does nothing to the
input, then for a circuit C with n inputs and g gates, the probability that our attack succeeds








where s is the minimum signal probability of a gate in C.
Proof. If the synthesis algorithm is the identity function, then the attack succeeds if and only
if two conditions hold: (1) The output wire of each gate in C is logic 1 for at least one of
the N trials and, (2) The output wire m(x) is logic 0 for all the N trials. If s is the minimum
signal probability of a gate in C, then the maximum probability that an output wire of a gate
in C will not activate during a trial is 1− s. The probability that the output wire of a gate will
not activate for any of the N trials is (1− s)N . Using the union bound, the probability that at
least one of the g gates will not activate for any of the N trials is at most g(1− s)N . Hence
the probability that each gate will activate for at least one of the N trials has a lower-bound of
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1 − g(1 − s)N . Given that m(x) is logic 1 for one input only, the probability that it will be
logic 0 for all N trials is (1− 1
2n
)N .
The lower-bound in Theorem 5.3.1 depends on the following parameters: (1) g, the number of
gates in C, (2) s, the minimum signal probability of a gate in C, (3) N , the number of trials,
and (4) n, the number of input bits in C. If g increases, the probability that at least one of
the g gates will not activate for any of the N trials increases, and hence the probability of the
attack’s success decreases. If s increases, it is more likely that a gate will activate in a trial and
therefore the probability of the attack’s success increases. If N increases, the probability of
the attack’s success may increase or decrease. Finally, if n increases, the number of inputs for
which m(x) is low increases, and hence the probability of the attack’s success increases.
We next consider the general case in which the synthesis algorithm may not be the identity
function. The next theorem states sufficient conditions under which the success probability of
the attack is guaranteed to be high. The notation D′ denotes the circuit that is obtained when
output wires of low signal probability gates in the circuit D are grounded, i.e., set to 0.
Theorem 5.3.2. The success probability of our TTLock attack is guaranteed to be high if the
following conditions hold:
1. The original circuit C contains no low signal probability gates.
2. The synthesis tool is such that C ′in is functionally equivalent to C
′
out, where Cin and Cout
are the input and the output circuits of the synthesis tool respectively.
Proof. If the first condition holds, then the resulting circuit produced from the first step of
TTLock contains only one low signal probability gate, i.e., the one whose output is m(x) (see
Figure 5.4). We refer to this circuit as Cin as it is input to the synthesis tool. C ′in is equivalent
to the original circuit C because grounding m(x) in Cin recovers C. If the Condition (2) in
the statement of the theorem holds, then C ′out, which is the output of our TTLock attack, is
equivalent to C ′in, which in turn implies that C
′
out is equivalent to C.
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Condition (2) in the theorem implies that the synthesis tool does not introduce non-redundant
low signal probability wires in its resulting circuit. In this case the synthesis is unable to
destroy an unfortunate property of TTLock — identifying m(x) in the output of the first step
of TTLock allows one to recover the protected circuit.
Concurrent work Concurrently to our work on this attack, Sirone et al. [120] demonstrated
a different attack procedure, although based on the same intuition that node m(x) is not
removed by the synthesis tool. Instead of using signal probability, that work checks for certain
properties of the node; for example, positive unateness, i.e., the value of m(x) increases
monotonically in x. Sirone et al. [120] demonstrate their attacks work even on general
SFLL-HDm schemes for varying m. We demonstrate our attack on SFLL-HD0, which is
TTLock.
Yang et al. [121] present an attack against SFLL that exploits structural traces left behind
in the locked circuit. They propose two different techniques to carry out their attack, one is
based on Gaussian elimination and the other uses knowledge of one protected input pattern to
recover the key.
Both the attacks by Sirone et al. [120] and Yang et al. [121] are key-recovery attacks, whereas
our attack on TTLock is a circuit-recovery attack. Furthermore, both their attacks on TTLock
recover the correct key using structural traces left behind by the point function7 that is
implemented by the comparator that checks if the input is equal to the correct key. Hence,
in theory, both their attacks on TTLock can be protected against by using a point function
obfuscator8[130] to obfuscate the comparator. Our attack does not attempt to find the correct
key and hence cannot be protected against using point function obfuscation.
Lessons learned A SAT attack does not account for possible removal of circuit components,
which our attack in this section does. Any notion of security of logic locking must account
7A point function with target i ∈ {0, 1}∗ is a circuit that on input i′ ∈ {0, 1}|i| returns 1 if i′ = i and 0
otherwise.
8A point function obfuscator takes as input a circuit C that implements a point function for some target i and
returns a circuit Cob that is functionally equivalent to C i.e. Cob is a point function for the same target i. Security
requires that Cob hides i.
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for such classes of attacks as well. It must account also for probabilistic, yet exact (and not
approximate), attacks. Our attack is probabilistic; however, when it succeeds, the entirety of
the circuit is recovered.
5.4 A Security Notion
As we discuss in Section 5.5, research in the area of logic locking has mostly been a ‘cat
and mouse’ game — when a defence is proposed, it is not long before an attack against it is
discovered. The reason for this has been rightfully attributed to a lack of appropriate security
notions for logic locking [122]. In the absence of such notions, locking schemes have been
shown to be ‘secure’ by demonstrating their resilience against known attacks. However, as is
suggested by our results from the previous two sections, the resilience of a locking algorithm
against a specific attack or a class of attacks does not imply that it will not be vulnerable to
future attacks. In this section we attempt to formulate a suitable security notion for logic
locking. We do so by considering the threat model — the assets that the attacker possesses
and the goals they want to achieve.
Threat Model A realistic threat model is one in which the attacker (i.e. the foundry) has the
following assets: (1) the netlist of the locked circuit, (2) blackbox access to an unlocked circuit,
and (3) knowledge of the locking mechanism that was used. (1) is true because the designer
sends the foundry the netlist of the locked circuit for fabrication. (2) is true because assuming
that the IC has already gone through at least one round of production, the foundry can purchase
a working chip (an unlocked circuit) from the market. (3) is similar to Kerckhoff’s principle
for cryptographic systems which says that such a system should be secure even if everything
about the system, except the key, is public knowledge [131].
Possible goals of a malicious foundry are: (A) to sell the designer’s intellectual property (IP)
to a competitor, and (B) to over produce chips and sell them illegally in a black market. In this
work we differentiate between these two goals, and we attempt to devise a security notion for
when the attacker’s goal is (B) only. Observe that an adversary that achieves goal (A) does
not necessarily achieve goal (B). For example, consider when the adversary is only able to
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recover a fraction of the original circuit. Competitors may be interested in purchasing this
incomplete circuit but the circuit may not match the original circuit’s output for sufficiently
many (if any) inputs and hence it may not be possible to use it to produce illegal chips. On
the other hand, it is safe to assume that an adversary that achieves goal (B) can achieve goal
(A) too. This is because to achieve goal (B), the adversary must recover a circuit that matches
the original circuit for all except possibly a small number of inputs. Such a circuit would be
of interest to the IP designer’s competitors. A scenario in which an IP designer may want to
protect against (B) only is when they are a monopoly and have no competitors, or when an
association overlooks malicious activities by competitors and holds them accountable for their
actions thereby successfully deterring them from engaging in IP theft.
The circuit that is to be protected, C, can be thought of as an efficient circuit description of the
function that is implemented by the corresponding working chip. The attacker’s goal is to find
a polynomial-sized circuit, Crec, that is equivalent to C. Suppose the attacker finds a candidate
Crec and sells it illegally in a black market. The buyer may have access to a legal working
chip purchased from the IP designer. For the buyer to verify that Crec is indeed equivalent to
a circuit description for the authentic working chip, they would have to compare the output
of Crec with that of the working chip for all inputs, which is not feasible. Therefore, it is
reasonable to assume that an error margin can be tolerated. In other words, even if Crec differs
from C in its output for a set of inputs, if the cardinality of this set is sufficiently small, it may
still be possible for a malicious foundry to use Crec successfully. An observation is that the
illegal chips sold in the black market are used as a blackbox, i.e., the buyer does not obtain the
netlist of Crec, but rather just an oracle to it. To capture these ideas formally, we use the terms
negligible and distinguisher that are used in the field of cryptography.
Definition 9. A function f from the natural numbers to the non-negative real numbers is
negligible if for every positive polynomial p there is an N such that for all integers n > N it
holds that f(n) < 1
p(n)
[132].
A distinguisher is an algorithm, possibly a probabilistic one, that attempts to differentiate
between two kinds of things. For example, in the context of pseudorandom generators (PRGs),
the distinguisher attempts to differentiate between the result of applying a PRG to a random
string, and a bunch of random bits [132].
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Definition 10. A distinguisher, D, in the context of logic locking, is a (possibly probabilistic)
polynomial-time algorithm who is given access to an oracle. We use the notation DC1,C2 to
indicate that the oracle is formed from the two circuits C1 and C2, each having equal length
inputs, say n. When DC1,C2 gives an n-bit query x to the oracle it receives as output a string.
In Game 0, the string is C1(x)|C1(x) where ‘|’ is concatenation. In Game 1, the string is
C1(x)|C2(x). D’s goal is to ascertain whether it is playing Game 0 or Game 1. If D decides
it is playing Game 0, it outputs 0, else it outputs 1.
Let P (DGame0C1,C2 → 0) and P (D
Game1
C1,C2
→ 0) be the probabilities that DC1,C2 outputs a 0
when it is playing Game 0 and Game 1 respectively. Let WDC1,C2 be the difference in these
probabilities, i.e., WDC1,C2 = |P (D
Game0
C1,C2
→ 0)− P (DGame1C1,C2 → 0)|. WDC1,C2 can be thought
of as the distinguisher’s advantage in telling oracles to C1 and C2 apart.
We can define the malicious foundry’s goal (B) formally as follows:
Definition 11. Given a locked circuit, CL, whose input is of size n bits, and oracle access to the
corresponding protected circuit, C, the goal of the attacker, A, is to output a polynomial-sized
circuit, Crec, such that for some distinguisher D of interest to the attacker, WDC,Crec ≤ µ(n),
where µ is a negligible function.
Let A′ denote an ‘ideal’ adversary that has blackbox access to the protected circuit C and
knowledge of C’s size only, i.e., A′ does not have access to the locked circuit CL. The
following is a security notion for logic locking that is based on the attacker’s goal in Definition
11. In the notion, Crec and C ′rec are circuits output by A and A′ respectively.
Definition 12. Let Lock be a locking mechanism, that on input circuit C and key-length λ
outputs a locked circuit CL and a corresponding λ-bit key k. Let C = {Cn}n∈N be a class
of circuits where Cn is a set of circuits on inputs of size n. We say that Lock is secure for
C if the following is true: for every probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary A and
every distinguisher D, there exists an ideal adversary A′ such that if there exists a negligible
function µ(n) such that ∀n,∀C ∈ Cn, WDC,Crec ≤ µ(n), then there exists a negligible function
µ′(n) such that ∀n,∀C ∈ Cn, WDC,C′rec ≤ µ
′(n).
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Informally the above notion says the following. If Lock is a locking algorithm that is secure
from the possibility of the foundry achieving goal (B), then if an adversary A can output a
reconstructed circuit Crec such that a distinguisher that is given oracle access to Crec and C
cannot tell them apart, then it must be possible for A to obtain Crec without access to CL.
Comparison with Security Notions of Yasin et al. [123] Yasin et al. provide notions of
security that are based on existing attacks, namely the SAT attack [115], the sensitization
attack [133] and the removal attack [134]. For each of these attacks, they provide a security
notion that characterizes a locking algorithm’s degree of resilience against the attack. The
disadvantage with such an approach is that a single security notion cannot capture the overall
security of a locking algorithm. In contrast, our notion seeks to characterize whether or not an
algorithm is secure against all known and future attacks that can be used by a foundry.
The SAT attack and sensitization attack are key-recovery attacks. The removal attack is a
circuit-recovery attack. If a logic locking algorithm is susceptible to any key-recovery attack
such that a foundry can find a key that unlocks the locked circuit, the locking algorithm is not
secure by Definition 12. Similarly, if a logic locking algorithm is susceptible to a removal
attack such that an equivalent of the protected circuit can be found, the locking algorithm is
not secure by Definition 12. Therefore our security notion in Definition 12 is at least as strong
as the notions proposed by Yasin et al.
There exists a locking algorithm that is not susceptible to the SAT-attack or to the sensitization
attack, but is not secure under the notion given in Definition 12. An example is TTLock [119]
which was shown to be resilient against both the SAT attack and the sensitization attack [123].
TTLock is not secure under the notion in Definition 12 because it is susceptible to other attacks
that recover the protected circuit from the locked circuit, as shown in Section 5.3.2. Hence our
notion in Definition 12 is stronger than the notions of Yasin et al. that are based on the SAT
and sensitization attacks.
Comparison with Security Notions of El Massad et al. [4] Concurrently with this work,
El Massad et al. proposed a new locking mechanism and proved that it possesses a security
property that is akin to ciphertext indistinguishability in cryptography. Ciphertext
indistinguishability means that no adversary, given an encryption of a message randomly
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chosen from a two-element message space determined by the adversary, can identify the
message choice with probability significantly better than that of random guessing. In a similar
vein, the locking mechanism proposed by El Massad et al. which employs a sub-exponential
indistinguishability obfuscator [135] and a puncturable pseudorandom function [136],
guarantees that a computationally bounded adversary is unable to distinguish between any two
circuits of the same size, regardless of the functions they implement, once they are locked.
Their security property ensures that any information an adversary learns from a locked circuit
and blackbox access to the protected circuit, can also be learned by an adversary that has
knowledge of the size of the protected circuit and blackbox access to it only. Therefore their
security notion protects against both possible goals, (A) and (B), of the attacker, and is
stronger than the notion in Definition 12. Thus, their locking mechanism is an example of a
scheme that is secure under Definition 12.
One may argue that a locking algorithm that forbids an adversary from learning anything
from the locked circuit is superior than one that is secure under Definition 12 only. While
this is certainly true from a security standpoint, it may not be true from other standpoints of
interest such as the circuit area overhead. Therefore if an IP designer is interested in protecting
against goal (B) only, it may be advantageous for them to consider a locking algorithm that is
secure under our weaker notion in Definition 12. For example, consider a hypothetical locking
algorithm whose protection logic has a small circuit footprint, and for which we can guarantee
that any attack can recover at most a fraction of the protected circuit and this particular fraction
of the circuit cannot be used to determine the output of any input correctly. This algorithm
would be sufficient to protect against a malicious foundry whose goal is to sell illegal chips in
the black market. Such an algorithm is secure under the notion in Definition 12 but is insecure
under the notion of El Massad et al. [4]. A concrete example of a locking mechanism that is
secure under Definition 12 but not under the notion of El Massad et al. [4] is an open problem.
Comparison with Security Notions of Shamsi et al. [122] Concurrently with this work,
Shamsi et al. [122] proposed multiple security notions for logic locking. In their Exact
Functional Secrecy (EFS) notion, the attacker’s goal is to find an exact circuit — one that
is equivalent to the protected circuit for all inputs. In their Approximate Functional Secrecy
notion, the attacker’s goal is to find an approximate circuit — one that is equivalent to the
137
protected circuit for all except at most a fraction of inputs. Their mindset is that a locking
algorithm is secure under these notions if the success probability of an attacker who has access
to the locked circuit and can make a polynomial number of calls to an oracle for the plaintext
circuit is not significantly different from that of an attacker who does not have access to the
locked circuit, can make a polynomial number of queries to the oracle, and randomly guesses
the outputs that it does not obtain from the oracle.
They show via long-standing results in computational learning theory why it may be impossible
to satisfy the approximation-resiliency notion of security for low depth combinational circuits
under oracle-guided attacks. This is because many classes of Boolean functions are learnable
from random or chosen input-output pairs in polynomial time at a rate significantly better than
learning their truth-table. Hence, instead of bothering with attacking the locked circuit, the
attacker can directly try to learn the protected circuit from the oracle to it with significant
statistical advantage.
To avoid the negative results, they introduce the relaxed notion of Best-Possible Approximate
Functional Secrecy in which the best the attacker can do is to try to black-box-learn the
plaintext circuit C through input-output queries with the knowledge that C ′s size is bounded
to a known value. In other words, the locked circuit, beyond what the attacker can extract
from the oracle through querying, reveals nothing new except a bound on the size of C.
Unfortunately, the way in which their security notions are formalized makes a direct
comparison with our security notion difficult.
5.5 Related Work
There has been considerable work on logic locking over the past decade. To our knowledge,
logic locking was first proposed in 2008 by Roy et al. [113]. In their scheme, EPIC, a set
of XOR/XNOR key gates is randomly inserted into the original circuit, such that one input
of each key gate corresponds to a key-bit and the other input is driven by an existing wire
in the original circuit. Applying the correct key to the key-bits makes the locked circuit
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equivalent to the original circuit. Rajendran et al. [133] observed that an adversary with
access to a functional chip could attack the EPIC scheme by using automatic test pattern
generation (ATPG) algorithms to reveal the key bits. They proposed a scheme based on key
gates interference graph that is resilient against such attacks.
In 2015, El Massad et al. [137] and Subramanyan et al. [115] concurrently published attacks
against Rajendran et al.’s scheme [133]. Their attacks are referred to in the literature as the
SAT attack and it is based on the observation that a single input/output observation from a
working chip can potentially eliminate a large number of incorrect keys. The discovery of the
SAT attack was considered seminal because it defeated all locking schemes known at the time
[138, 139, 140].
Much of the subsequent work focused on devising SAT-resilient schemes. These can broadly be
categorized into three: (1) Those that attempt to formulate locking and obfuscation mechanisms
that are not translatable to SAT, (2) Those that make the underlying SAT problems hard, and,
(3) Those that attempt to make the number of SAT problems the SAT attack must solve in
order to be successful exponential.
Examples of defences in the first category are cyclic obfuscation [141] and behavioral locking
of the logic [142]. In cyclic obfuscation, the key idea is to introduce logical loops in the circuit
so that it can no longer be represented as a directed acyclic graph. This forces a SAT attack to
either be trapped in an infinite loop or to generate an incorrect key upon termination [143]. In
behavioral locking, the key into a locked circuit not only determines the circuit’s functionality,
but also its timing profile. A functionality-correct but timing-incorrect key will result in
timing violations. Shortly after the introduction of these schemes, stronger attacks such as
cycSAT [144] and the Satisfiability Module Theories (SMT) attack [145] were discovered
that were able to model cyclic or behavioral locking into a SAT or SAT+theory solvable logic
problems.
Defences in the second category include Cross-lock [146] and Full-lock [147]. In Cross-lock,
a onetime programmable interconnect mesh is used to obfuscate the routing of the circuit in
order to substantially increase the runtime of each iteration of the SAT attack. In Full-lock a
set of cascaded fully programmable logic and routing block (PLR) networks replace parts of
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the logic and routing in the desired netlist, resulting in harder SAT instances than Cross-lock.
Other defences in this category are those that incorporate one-way functions to make the
underlying SAT instances hard [124, 125]. See Section 5.2.1 for a discussion on the last two
schemes.
Defences in the third category include those that are based on point functions [148, 149, 150].
For example in SARLock [148], every incorrect key is wrong for the single input that is
identical to it. Similarly, the Anti-SAT block scheme [149] utilizes functions whose number
of input vectors that result in an output of 1 is either very high or very low. Although these
defences make the number of iterations involved in the SAT attack exponential, they are
vulnerable to other attacks such as the Signal Probability Skew (SPS) attack [134], removal
attacks [151], approximate attacks [114, 152], the bypass attack [153], and the Satisfiability
Module Theories (SMT) attack [145]. Also in the third category is the more recent and state-
of-the-art defence TTLock [119] and its subsequent generalization SFLL [123]. Key-recovery
attacks against TTLock and SFLL include the Functional Analysis Attack [120], and an attack
that exploits structural traces left behind in the circuit [121]. We address TTLock in Section
5.3 and present a circuit-recovery attack against it.
Although some of the above mentioned schemes claim “provable” security, they only provide
proofs against existing attacks, and do not formalize a precise notion of security as we do in
this work. Yasin et al. [123] attempt to formulate definitions of security but their definitions
are all predicated on existing attack strategies, specifically the SAT-attack [115], sensitization
attack [133] and SPS removal attack [134]. Šišejković et al. [154] propose a unifying metric
that attempts to capture the key security aspects of logic encryption. The goal of their work
is to propose quantification metrics that can be used to compare different locking schemes.
Other works that have proposed security notions are those by El Massad et al. [4] and Shamsi
et al. [122], we discuss these in Section 5.4.
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first work that: (1) Seeks to understand the strengths
and weaknesses of XOR-locking from a foundational perspective, (2) Presents a circuit-
recovery attack against TTLock that does not require the correct key to be found, and, (3)
Proposes a security notion that differentiates between the attacker’s goals of sale of illegal
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chips and sale of IP to a competitor, and seeks to protect against the former but not the latter.
5.6 Conclusions




In this chapter we summarize the insights that we have gained from appealing to computing
foundations for each of the three problems studied in this thesis. We also discuss open
problems that remain.
6.1 On VM-Scheduling to Combat Cloud Side-channels
In Chapter 3, we have addressed problems related to the use of scheduling as an approach to
mitigating cross-VM side-channel attacks in cloud systems. Such attacks can cause information
to leak. Specifically, we have sought to analyze the overhead incurred by an algorithm that
seeks to minimize information leakage, for models of information leakage that have been
proposed in prior work [5]. We have posed and answered a fundamental question: is the
problem of determining a VM placement that minimizes information leakage tractable? We
have established that it is intractable (NP-hard) by showing that even seemingly simpler
sub-cases such as placing VMs across only two equal-capacity servers, and migrating VMs
across only two equal-capacity servers, is NP-hard. Given the customary assumption, P 6= NP,
this tells us that no efficient algorithm exists for the problem. We have identified, however,
that a decision version to which the optimization problem relates to polynomially is in NP.
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We have then analyzed prior work, which proposes an efficient, greedy approach called Nomad,
motivated by an observation there that an approach based on reduction to ILP does not scale to
even modestly-sized inputs that can arise in practice. We have identified that the reduction to
ILP there can be inefficient, i.e., exponential-time. Also, we have identified deficiencies with
Nomad: its initial design is unnecessarily inefficient, and the final design yields no decrease in
information leakage for infinitely many inputs, unless P = NP, even though for these instances
a reduction in leakage is possible.
We have then designed and implemented efficient reductions to ILP and CNF-SAT, with the
intent of adopting corresponding solvers as oracles. We have conducted a limited empirical
assessment with a focus on the main points of our work. Our empirical results suggest that the
overhead imposed by an approach that indeed decreases information leakage is more than prior
work suggests, but that the news is not all bad. For inputs that prior work suggests take longer
than a day with an ILP approach, our implementation that is based on an efficient reduction
takes a few minutes only. This suggests that further research-investment in well-founded
approaches can decrease the overhead further, for instances that are likely to arise in practice.
Apart from such a research-investment as future work, we have pointed to several open
problems. Is the closed migration problem tractable under models other than 〈R,C〉? Is the
general problem only weakly NP-hard? Is the optimization version of the problem efficiently
approximable?
6.2 On Forensic Analysis for Access Control
In Chapter 4, we have motivated, posed and studied forensic analysis in the context of access
control systems, and observed its similarities to and differences from the more traditional
safety analysis, of which forensic analysis seems a natural complement. We have instantiated
forensic analysis for three access control schemes from the literature and identified that the
worst-case computational complexity of forensic analysis for each of those schemes is the
same as safety analysis. We have investigated also sufficient and minimal logs to render
analysis for those schemes efficient (polynomial-time) and in that context, motivated and
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discussed goal-directed logging. We have discussed a case-study of an open source serverless
cloud computing application in which we have instantiated our analytical ideas as validation
in practice.
There is tremendous scope for future work, both at the foundations and in practice. At the
foundations, there is the issue of generalizing forensic analysis similar to the manner that
safety analysis has been generalized to so-called security analysis to consider more general
properties. In each case, we need to carefully consider meaningful ways to model these in the
context of forensic analysis. In every such context, we need to keep in mind the additional,
important issue of logging that arises with forensic analysis. From the standpoint of practice,
we need to address the several different settings in which it is meaningful to pose forensic
analysis in the manner we do, and further investigate the utility of goal-directed logging.
We also need to consider realistic attacks that are anticipated in the future, and ask whether
forensic analysis in the manner we pose and address is useful to mitigate those.
6.3 On Logic Locking to Protect Digital ICs
In Chapter 5, we have made two sets of contributions on logic locking. The first is deeper
observations on existing schemes and attacks on them. We have considered
XOR-Locking [113], a scheme that has been shown to be vulnerable to the SAT attack [115].
We have asked whether there exists circuits for which XOR-Locking can be effective against
the SAT attack, and have shown the answer to be ‘yes’ provided one-way functions exist. We
have given examples of such circuits that are built from SHA256 and have empirically
demonstrated that they are resilient against the SAT attack even when XOR-Locked with a
single bit. We then asked if there exists a property of plaintext circuits that makes their
XOR-Locked versions vulnerable to the SAT attack. We have found that the ease of checking
wire redundancy in plaintext circuits is related to the ease of the problem that is solved by the
first iteration of the SAT attack. The second scheme we have considered is TTLock [119]. We
have made important observations on TTLock’s security and outlined a new removal attack
that we have found is effective against TTLocked benchmark circuits. We have analyzed the
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conditions under which our attack is successful. Our second contribution is a new security
notion that seeks to protect against a foundry whose goal is over-production only. We have
compared our notion to those proposed by prior work.
The promise of logic locking is certainly enticing as a technically sound scheme can
revolutionize security of digital ICs. However, much work remains to be done. An open
question pertains to a recent challenge that was published, and that is: should we consider an
attack model in which the attacker has access to not only the locked circuit, CL, but also the
original circuit C? In such an attack model, the goal of the attacker is key-recovery. We
observe that with benchmark circuits as well, an attacker has complete knowledge of those
circuits.
In this work we distinguished between two possible goals a malicious foundry may have: (A)
to sell the designer’s intellectual property (IP) to a competitor, and, (B) to over produce chips
and sell them illegally in a black market. We provided a security notion that protects against
(B) but not (A). An open question is whether it is possible to obtain security against goal (B)
but not goal (A). The answer to this question would be ‘yes’ if there exists a construction of a
locking scheme that is secure under our security notion but not under the stronger notions of
prior work [4]. Whether such a scheme exists and, what, if any, benefit such a scheme offers
over those that are secure under stronger notions, are open problems.
145
Bibliography
[1] Nahid Juma, Jonathan Shahen, Khalid Bijon, and Mahesh Tripunitara. “The Overhead from
Combating Side-Channels in Cloud Systems using VM-Scheduling”. In: IEEE Transactions on
Dependable and Secure Computing (2018). ©2020 IEEE.
[2] Avoid Infringement upon IEEE Copyright.
https : / / journals . ieeeauthorcenter . ieee . org / choose - a -
publishing-agreement/avoid-infringement-upon-ieee-copyright/.
Accessed: 2020-05-18.
[3] Nahid Juma, Huang Xiaowei, and Mahesh Tripunitara. “Forensic Analyis for Access Control”.
In: Undergoing review. (2020).
[4] Mohamed El Massad, Nahid Juma, Jonathan Shahen, Mariana Raykova, Siddharth Garg, and
Mahesh Tripunitara. “Logic Locking to Protect Digital Integrated Circuits (ICs): Observations
from Foundations, and a Security Property and Mechanism”. In: Undergoing review. (2020).
[5] Soo-Jin Moon, Vyas Sekar, and Michael K. Reiter. “Nomad: Mitigating Arbitrary Cloud Side
Channels via Provider-Assisted Migration”. In: Proceedings of the 2015 ACM Conference on
Computer and Communications Security. 2015, pp. 1595–1606.
[6] Sanjeev Arora and Boaz Barak. Computational Complexity: A Modern Approach. 2009. ISBN:
0521424267.
[7] Walter J. Savitch. “Relationships between nondeterministic and deterministic tape
complexities”. In: Journal of Computer and System Sciences 4.2 (1970), pp. 177–192.
[8] Jonathan Shahen. “Using Polynomial Timed Reductions to Solve Computer Security Problems
in Access Control, Ethereum Smart Contract, Cloud VM Scheduling, and Logic Locking.”
PhD thesis. University of Waterloo, 2020.
146
[9] Gorka Irazoqui, Thomas Eisenbarth, and Berk Sunar. “A Shared Cache Attack That Works
across Cores and Defies VM Sandboxing–and Its Application to AES”. In: Proceedings of the
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. 2015, pp. 591–604.
[10] Gorka Irazoqui, Mehmet Sinan Inci, Thomas Eisenbarth, and Berk Sunar. “Wait a minute! A
fast, Cross-VM attack on AES”. In: International Workshop on Recent Advances in Intrusion
Detection. 2014, pp. 299–319.
[11] Fangfei Liu, Yuval Yarom, Qian Ge, Gernot Heiser, and Ruby B. Lee. “Last-Level Cache
Side-Channel Attacks are Practical”. In: Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy. 2015, pp. 605–622.
[12] Rodney Owens and Weichao Wang. “Non-interactive OS fingerprinting through memory
de-duplication technique in virtual machines”. In: 30th IEEE International Performance
Computing and Communications Conference. 2011, pp. 1–8.
[13] Thomas Ristenpart, Eran Tromer, Hovav Shacham, and Stefan Savage. “Hey, You, Get off of
My Cloud: Exploring Information Leakage in Third-party Compute Clouds”. In: Proceedings
of the 2009 ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security. 2009, pp. 199–212.
[14] Kuniyasu Suzaki, Kengo Iijima, Toshiki Yagi, and Cyrille Artho. “Memory Deduplication As a
Threat to the Guest OS”. In: Proceedings of the Fourth European Workshop on System Security.
2011, 1:1–1:6.
[15] Yuval Yarom and Katrina Falkner. “FLUSH+RELOAD: A High Resolution, Low Noise, L3
Cache Side-Channel Attack”. In: 23rd USENIX Security Symposium. 2014, pp. 719–732.
[16] Yinqian Zhang, Ari Juels, Michael K. Reiter, and Thomas Ristenpart. “Cross-VM Side Channels
and Their Use to Extract Private Keys”. In: Proceedings of the 2012 ACM Conference on
Computer and Communications Security. 2012, pp. 305–316.
[17] Yinqian Zhang, Ari Juels, Michael K. Reiter, and Thomas Ristenpart. “Cross-Tenant Side-
Channel Attacks in PaaS Clouds”. In: Proceedings of the 2014 ACM Conference on Computer
and Communications Security. 2014, pp. 990–1003.
[18] Bhanu C. Vattikonda, Sambit Das, and Hovav Shacham. “Eliminating Fine Grained Timers
in Xen”. In: Proceedings of the 2011 ACM Workshop on Cloud Computing Security. 2011,
pp. 41–46.
[19] Himanshu Raj, Ripal Nathuji, Abhishek Singh, and Paul England. “Resource Management for
Isolation Enhanced Cloud Services”. In: Proceedings of the 2009 ACM Workshop on Cloud
Computing Security. 2009, pp. 77–84.
147
[20] Erman Pattuk, Murat Kantarcioglu, Zhiqiang Lin, and Huseyin Ulusoy. “Preventing
Cryptographic Key Leakage in Cloud Virtual Machines”. In: 23rd USENIX Security
Symposium. Aug. 2014, pp. 703–718.
[21] David Evans, Anh Nguyen-Tuong, and John Knight. “Effectiveness of Moving Target
Defenses”. In: Moving Target Defenses. 2011, pp. 29–48.
[22] Andrew Baumann, Marcus Peinado, and Galen Hunt. “Shielding applications from an untrusted
cloud with haven”. In: ACM Transactions on Computer Systems 33.3 (2015), pp. 1–26.
[23] Michael Sindelar, Ramesh K. Sitaraman, and Prashant Shenoy. “Sharing-aware algorithms for
virtual machine colocation”. In: Proceedings of the Twenty-third Annual ACM Symposium on
Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures. 2011, pp. 367–378.
[24] Michael R. Garey and David S. Johnson. Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory
of NP-Completeness. 1979. ISBN: 0716710447.
[25] Richard M. Karp. “Reducibility among Combinatorial Problems”. In: Complexity of Computer
Computations, pp. 85–103.
[26] Narendra Karmarkar and Richard M. Karp. “An Efficient Approximation Scheme for the
One-dimensional Bin-packing Problem”. In: Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Symposium on
Foundations of Computer Science. SFCS ’82. Washington, DC, USA, 1982, pp. 312–320.
[27] Oded Goldreich. Computational Complexity: A Conceptual Perspective. 1st ed. New York, NY,
USA, 2008. ISBN: 052188473X.
[28] S. A. Vavasis. “Quadratic Programming is in NP”. In: Information Processing Letters, 36.2
(Oct. 1990), pp. 73–77.
[29] Thomas H. Cormen, Clifford Stein, Ronald L. Rivest, and Charles E. Leiserson. Introduction
to Algorithms. 2nd. 2001. ISBN: 0070131511.
[30] Carsten Sinz. “Towards an Optimal CNF Encoding of Boolean Cardinality Constraints”.
In: International Conference on Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming. 2005,
pp. 827–831.






[34] Mehmet Sinan Inci, Berk Gülmezoglu, Gorka Irazoqui Apecechea, Thomas Eisenbarth, and
Berk Sunar. “Seriously, get off my cloud! Cross-VM RSA Key Recovery in a Public Cloud.”
In: IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive (2015), p. 898.
[35] Mengjia Yan, Read Sprabery, Bhargava Gopireddy, Christopher Fletcher, Roy Campbell, and
Josep Torrellas. “Attack directories, not caches: Side channel attacks in a non-inclusive world”.
In: Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. 2019, pp. 888–904.
[36] Daniel Gruss, Raphael Spreitzer, and Stefan Mangard. “Cache template attacks: Automating
attacks on inclusive last-level caches”. In: 24th USENIX Security Symposium. 2015,
pp. 897–912.
[37] Yuanzhong Xu, Weidong Cui, and Marcus Peinado. “Controlled-channel attacks: Deterministic
side channels for untrusted operating systems”. In: Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on
Security and Privacy. 2015, pp. 640–656.
[38] Shweta Shinde, Zheng Leong Chua, Viswesh Narayanan, and Prateek Saxena. “Preventing your
faults from telling your secrets”. In: Proceedings of the 11th ACM Symposium on Information,
Computer and Communications Security (ASIACCS), Xian, China. 2016.
[39] Taesoo Kim, Marcus Peinado, and Gloria Mainar-Ruiz. “STEALTHMEM: System-level
Protection Against Cache-based Side Channel Attacks in the Cloud”. In: 21st USENIX
Security Symposium. 2012, pp. 11–11.
[40] Jicheng Shi, Xiang Song, Haibo Chen, and Binyu Zang. “Limiting Cache-based Side-channel
in Multi-tenant Cloud Using Dynamic Page Coloring”. In: Proceedings of the 2011 IEEE/IFIP
41st International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks Workshops. 2011,
pp. 194–199.
[41] Venkatanathan Varadarajan, Thomas Ristenpart, and Michael Swift. “Scheduler-based defenses
against cross-vm side-channels”. In: 23rd USENIX Security Symposium. 2014, pp. 687–702.
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A Forensic Analysis for Access Control
A An Upper-bound on Hardness for General ARBAC
In Section 4.3.2 we presented a restricted version of the ARBAC scheme that sufficed for our
lower-bound result in Theorem 4.3.3. Here, we describe a general version of the ARBAC
scheme and show that the upper-bound result in Theorem 4.3.5 for the restricted version
applies for this general version also.
The Scheme We adopt the ARBAC97 scheme [79] and give an exposition similar to prior
work on safety analysis [81]. A system is associated with finite sets of users (U ), roles (R) and
permissions (P ). A state γ is a tuple 〈UAγ, PA,RH〉, where UAγ ⊆ U ×R is the user-role
assignment relation, PA ⊆ P ×R is the permission-role assignment relation and RH is the
role-hierarchy. The latter is specified by relations of the form r1  r2 which denotes that the
role r1 inherits all the permissions associated with the role r2, and thus, members of r1 are
implicitly also members of r2.
Given a state, γ, each user has a set of roles for which the user is authorized. We formalize this
by defining a function authorizedRoles(u)→ 2R, that when applied to state γ evaluates as:
authorizedRoles(u) = {r ∈ R | ∃r1 ∈ R such that [(u, r1) ∈ UAγ ∧ (r1  r)]}
We also define down(r) to be the set of all roles dominated by r and up(r) to be the set of all
roles that dominate r as follows:
down(r) = {r′ ∈ R|r  r′}
up(r) = {r′ ∈ R|r′  r}
ARBAC defines administrative roles and specifies how members of these roles can change
an RBAC policy. A policy can be changed by making modifications to the: (1) user-role
assignment, (2) permission-role assignment, and (3) role hierarchy. As in prior work [81]
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we focus on changes made to the user-role assignment, because it is the most volatile [155].
Changes allowed to the user-role assignment are described by three components CA, CR and
CO.
CA ⊆ R × C × 2R determines who can assign users to roles and the preconditions these
users must satisfy. C is the set of conditions, which are expressions formed using roles, the
binary operators ∧ and ∨, the unary operator ¬, and parentheses. A tuple 〈ra, c, rset〉 in
CA means that members of the administrative role ra ∈ R can assign any user whose role
memberships satisfy the condition c, to any role r ∈ rset, where rset ⊆ R. For example,
〈r0, r1 ∧ r2 ∧ ¬r3, {r4}〉 ∈ CA means that a user that is a member of the role r0 is allowed to
assign a user that is a member of both r1 and r2, but is not a member of r3, to be a member of
r4.
CR ⊆ R× 2R determines who can remove users from roles. A tuple 〈ra, rset〉 ∈ CR means
that the members of the administrative role ra ∈ R can remove a user from a role r ∈ rset,
where rset ⊆ R. Unlike the relation CA, there are no preconditions in the relation CR. We
assume that CA and CR satisfy the property that the administrative roles are not affected by
CA and CR. The administrative roles appear in the first component of each tuple in CA or
CR. These roles do not appear in the last component of any CA or CR tuple. This condition
is satisfied in ARBAC97, which assumes the existence of a set of administrative roles that is
disjoint from the set of normal roles.
CO is a set of mutually exclusive role constraints. Each constraint has the form 〈{r1, ..., rm}, t〉
where each ri is a role in R, and m and t are integers such that 1 < t ≤ m. This constraint
forbids a user from being a member of t or more roles in {r1, . . . , rm}. A set of roles Ri ⊆ R
satisfies a constraint 〈{r1, . . . , rm}, t〉 if and only if |Ri ∩ {r1, . . . , rm}| < t. For example,
〈{r1, r2}, 2〉 means that no user is allowed to be a member of both r1 and r2. For example, if
in state γ, r1 ∈ authorizedRoles(u) for user u, then an assignment action that assigns u to
any role in up(r2) would fail because of the constraint.
Ψ consists of a single state-change rule, ψ, which is a set of actions:
ψ = {assign(ua, ut, rt) | ua, ut ∈ U ∧ rt ∈ R} ∪ {revoke(ua, ut, rt) | ua, ut ∈ U ∧ rt ∈ R}
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An assignment action assign(ua, ut, rt) means that the user ua assigns the user ut to the role
rt. When this action is applied to an RBAC state, γ, it succeeds if and only if the following
three conditions hold:
1. (ut, rt) 6∈ UAγ , i.e., user ut is not already assigned to role rt.
2. There exists a tuple 〈ra, c, rset〉 ∈ CA such that ra ∈ authorizedRoles(ua),
authorizedRoles(ut) satisfies c, and rt ∈ rset.
3. authorizedRoles(ut) ∪ down(rt) satisfies every constraint in CO, i.e., the new role
memberships of ut do not violate any constraint.
When the assignment action is successfully applied to an RBAC state, γ, the resulting state,
γ′, differs from γ only in the user-role relation. The result of a successful application is
UAγ′ = UAγ ∪ {(ut, rt)}. When the application is not successful, the state does not change.
A revocation action revoke(ua, ut, rt) means that the user ua revokes the user ut from the role
rt. When this action is applied to an RBAC state, γ, it succeeds if and only if the following
two conditions hold:
1. (ut, rt) ∈ UAγ , i.e., user ut is assigned to role rt.
2. There exists a tuple 〈ra, rset〉 ∈ CA such that ra ∈ authorizedRoles(ua) and rt ∈
rset.
When the revocation action is successfully applied to an RBAC state, γ, the resulting state,
γ′, differs from γ only in the user-role relation. The result of a successful application is
UAγ′ = UAγ \ {(ut, rt)}. When the application is not successful, the state does not change.
Upper-bound
Theorem A.1. Forensic analysis for the general ARBAC scheme described above with π =
possible and L = ∅ is in PSPACE.
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Proof. Our proof is by construction. We propose a non-deterministic algorithm that is correct
and is guaranteed to halt, and that consumes space at worst polynomial in the size of the input,
thereby proving that the problem is in NPSPACE, the class of decision problems for which
there exists a non-determinisic algorithm that consumes space only polynomial in the size of
the input. We then appeal to Savitch’s theorem, NPSPACE = PSPACE [7]. Given a forensics
instance, 〈γ, ψ, k, q, π, L〉, where q = (u, r), our algorithm “inverts” state-changes, and goes
“backwards” starting at the current state, γ.
We observe that to decide whether a query (u, r), may have been true in some state between k
and γ, we do not need to consider changes to role-memberships of users other than u. This
is because membership to administrative roles are not changed by ψ, and membership to
non-administrative roles of users other than u do not effect u’s role-memberships.
We maintain a “present state,” call it p. Consider p = 〈UAp, PA,RH〉. The PA and RH
components of p are the same as those of γ and k of the input. As for the UAp component,
because we need to consider changes to u’s role-membership only, it suffices to record u’s
present role-memberships. There are 2|R| possible role-membership configurations for u, thus
the size of p is |R| bits.
We then enumerate all possible state-changes that could have resulted from an immediately
prior state, p′, to p. This is our “inversion” of state-changes. There can be at most linearly,
and therefore, polynomially, many such state-changes because the number is upper-bounded
by the cardinality of ψ. To enumerate the possible state-changes, we do the following. For
each assign action (ua, u, rt) ∈ ψ, we ask whether (u, rt) ∈ UAp, i.e., u is a member of rt
in the state p. If yes, we go through the set CA to check if there is a tuple (ra, c, rset) such
that ra ∈ authorizedRolesp(ua), authorizedRolesp(u) satisfies c, and rt ∈ rset. If yes,
then that assign action was a possible state-change, with the prior state p′ being identical to
p except for UA′p = UAp \ (u, rt). Otherwise, it is not a possible state-change. Similarly,
for each revoke action 〈ua, ut, rt〉, we ask whether rt 6∈ UAp. If yes, we check whether
authorizedRolesp(u) ∩ down(rt) satisfies every constraint in CO. If yes, we go through
the set CR to check if there is a tuple (ra, rset) such that ra ∈ authorizedRolesp(ua), and
rt ∈ rset. If yes, then that revoke action was a possible state-change, with the prior state p′
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being identical to p except that UA′p = UAp ∪ (u, rt).
Then from amongst the possible state-changes, we non-deterministically pick one, and set p
to the corresponding prior state, p′. Apart from space for p and the enumeration of possible
state-changes, we allocate space also for: (i) the number of “backwards” state-changes we
have effected, and, (ii) a boolean for whether we have encountered a state p such that p ` q.
The size of (i) is |R| bits. This is because the number of different states is upper-bounded by
2|R|, and therefore a counter of |R| bits suffices. The size of (ii) is one bit.
Every time we effect a (non-deterministic) state-change backwards with a new present state
p, we do the following. We increment our counter (i) above. Then we check whether the bit
(ii) above is already set. If yes, we check if authorizedRolesp(u) = authorizedRolesk(u).
If yes, we halt and output ‘true.’ If the bit (ii) is not set, we check whether the new state
p ` q, i.e., whether r ∈ authorizedRolesp(u). If yes, we set the bit (ii) and we clear the
state counter to 0. If we do not return ‘true’ after this state-change, then we check whether
our counter has reached 2|R|. If yes, we immediately halt and output ‘false.’ Otherwise, we
continue, i.e., enumerate possible state-changes with the new present state p.
The algorithm above is correct because there exists a sequence of non-deterministic choices
that causes us to output ‘true’ if and only if the input instance is indeed true. Also, the
algorithm is guaranteed to halt because of the counter we maintain. The total space we need is
at worst linear, and therefore polynomial, in the size of the input.
B Graham-Denning with Trusted Users
We present in Algorithm 6 a polynomial-time procedure to solve forensic analysis for Graham-
Denning based systems when π = possible, L = ∅, and trusted users are considered.
Algorithm 6 makes the following assumptions: (1) The universal subject u is trusted, (2) the
past known state k contains at least one untrusted subject, (3) the subject s and object o in the
input query (s, o, x) exist in the current state γ. Observe that if (2) does not hold, then the
instance cannot be true.
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Input: Forensic instance, 〈i, γ, ψ, q = (s, o, x),possible, T 〉
Output: true or false
1 if x = control then output false
2 if x = own ∧ o ∈ Sγ then
3 if o 6∈ Sk then output true
4 if o ∈ Sk ∧ SubjectOwnerChain(o, k, γ, T ) = true ∧BreakCyle(s, o, k, T ) = true
then output true
5 if x = own ∧ o ∈ Oγ \ Sγ then output false
6 if x ∈ R ∪R∗ then
7 y = x
8 if x ∈ R then y = x∗
9 if ∃su ∈ Sγ \ T s.t. y ∈Mγ [su, o] ∨ own ∈Mγ [su, o] then output true
10 if o ∈ Ok ∧ ∃su ∈ Sk \ T s.t. y ∈Mk[su, o] ∨ own ∈Mk[su, o] then output true
11 if o ∈ Sγ then
12 if o 6∈ Sk then output true
13 if o ∈ Sk ∧ SubjectOwnerChain(o, k, γ, T ) = true then output true
14 if o ∈ Oγ \ Sγ then
15 if o 6∈ Sk ∧ ∃su ∈ Sk \ T s.t.
UntrustedSubjectOwnerChain(su, k
′, γ, T ) = true then output true
16 if o ∈ Sk ∧ObjectOwnerChain(o, k, γ, T ) = true then output true
17 output false
Algorithm 6: Algorithm to solve forensic analysis for Graham-Denning, when π =
possible, L = ∅, q = (s, o, x), o ∈ Oγ , s ∈ Sγ , k 6` q and γ 6` q. In line 15, k′ is
identical to k except it has a column for o and own ∈M ′k[su, o]
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Below are terms and functions used in Algorithm 6:
• A non-subject object is an object that is not a subject.
• An exclusive ownership chain of an object o in state γ is an ordered set {o1, o2, . . . , u}γ
where o1 owns o, o2 owns o1 etc., in γ. Note that o is not included in o’s exclusive
ownership chain.
• An inclusive ownership chain of an object o in state γ is an ordered set {o, o1, o2, . . . , u}γ
where o1 owns o, o2 owns o1 etc., in γ. Note that the inclusive ownership chain of o
includes o and it is the first object in the set.
• OwnObjects(s, k, γ, C) takes as input a subject s, two states k and γ, and an ownership
chain C. It returns true if and only if s ∈ C, s ∈ Sγ , and in γ, s has ownership over all
objects in the set O′ which is defined as follows. O′ comprises of non-subject objects
that exist in both states k and γ, and in the state k, each of these objects is owned by at
least one subject from the subjects preceding s in the ownership chain C.
• SubjectOwnerChain(s, k, γ, T ) takes as input a subject s, states k and γ, and a set of
trusted subjects T . It returns true if and only if s ∈ Sk and the exclusive ownership chain
C of s in k is such that: (1) it contains an untrusted subject s∗, and (2) there exists a
subject s′ which is either s∗ or one of the subjects that come after it inC such that s′ ∈ Sγ ,
the subjects preceding s′ in C do not exist in Sγ , and, OwnObjects(s′, k, γ, C) is true.
SubjectOwnerChain(s, k, γ, T ) returning true on some input implies the possibility
of s∗ having destroyed the subjects preceding it in C, obtaining direct ownership over s,
and then (later) s∗ being destroyed by s′ if s∗ 6= s′.
• UntrustedSubjectOwnerChain(s, k, γ, T ) takes as input a subject s, states k and γ,
and a set of trusted users T . It returns true if and only if s 6∈ T , s ∈ Sk and the inclusive
ownership chain C of s in k contains a subject s∗ such that: (1) s∗ exists in γ, (2) all
subjects preceding s∗ in C do not exist in state γ, and (3) OwnObjects(s∗, k, γ, C) is
true. This function returning true on some input implies the possibility of either s being
s∗ or s∗ having destroyed s.
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• ObjectOwnerChain(o, k, γ, T ) takes as input an object o, states k and γ, and a set of
trusted subjects T . It returns true if and only if o ∈ Ok and from among all the exclusive
ownership chains of o in k, at least one chain C is such that (1) it contains an untrusted
subject s∗, and (2) there exists a subject s′ which is either s∗ or one of the subjects that
come after it in C such that s′ exists in Sγ and the subjects preceding s′ in C do not exist
in Sγ , and, OwnObjects(s′, k, γ, C) is true. This function returning true on some input
implies the possibility of s∗ having destroyed the subjects preceding it in C, obtaining
direct ownership over o and then (later), s∗ being destroyed by s′ if s∗ 6= s′.
• BreakCycle(s1, s2, k, T ) takes as input two subjects s1 and s2, a state k and a set of
trusted subjects T . It returns true if and only if one of two conditions hold: (1) s2 is not
in s1’s exclusive ownership chain in k or (2) s2 is in s1’s exclusive ownership chain but
one of the subjects preceding s2 in the chain is untrusted. This function returning true on
some input implies that s1 can own s2 without violating property 7 of Graham-Denning
states (see Section 4.3.3). To see why this is so when condition (2) holds, assume the
untrusted subject in the ownership chain is su and the subject immediately preceding it
in the chain is sw. su can create a new subject sv and (temporarily) transfer ownership
over sw to sv to break the chain.
Below is a line-by-line explanation of Algorithm 6:
[Line 1] If x = control, the query is false because s ∈ Sγ , o ∈ Oγ , γ 0 q, and the control
access cannot be transferred or deleted (see Figure 4.5).
[Lines 2-4] If x = own and o is a subject, then there are 2 cases to consider: (A) o 6∈ Sk, (B)
o ∈ Sk. In case (A) the query is true, because an untrusted user in Sk can create o and thereby
own it, and then can transfer ownership to s (possibly creating s first if it doesn’t already exist).
s can then transfer ownership away. In case (B) the query is true if and only if 2 conditions
hold in state k. The first is that SubjectOwnerChain(o, k, γ, T ) is true and the second is that
BreakCycle(s, o, k, T ) is true. Because the untrusted subject in the ownership chain of o in k
can gain direct ownership over o and then transfer it to s.
[Line 5] If x = own and o is a non-subject object the query is false because when a subject
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owns a non-subject object, the ownership is retained until either the subject or the object is
destroyed.
[Lines 6-10] If x ∈ R ∪ R∗, then if x ∈ R, let y = x∗, else let y = x. That is, y ∈ R∗. An
important observation is that if s obtains the right x over o, then because every subject controls
itself, s can issue the command deletex(s, s, o). The query is true if any of the following two
conditions hold because the untrusted subject su can grant or transfer x over o to s. (1) There
exists an untrusted subject su in Sγ such that y ∈ Mγ[su, o] or own ∈ Mγ[su, o]. (2) o ∈ Ok
and there exists an untrusted subject su in Sk such that y ∈Mk[su, o] or own ∈Mk[su, o].
[Lines 11-13] If x ∈ R ∪ R∗, and neither of the above 2 conditions hold, the algorithm
evaluates based on whether o is a subject or not. If o is a subject, then there are two cases to
consider: (A) o 6∈ Sk, (B) o ∈ Sk. In case (A) the query is true because an untrusted subject
su in Sk can create the subject o and thereby own it. su can then grant y to s (possibly creating
s first if it doesn’t exist in k). Finally, su can transfer ownership to o’s owner in γ. In case (B),
the query is true if and only if SubjectOwnerChain(o, k, γ, T ) is true because this implies
there exists an untrusted subject in the ownership chain of o in k who can gain direct ownership
over o and then grant x to s (possibly creating s first if it doesn’t exist in k). The untrusted
subject can then transfer ownership away to the owner of o in γ.
[Lines 14-16] If o is a non-subject object, there are two cases to consider: (A) o 6∈ Sk,
and (B) o ∈ Sk. In case (A), the query is true if and only if there exists an untrusted
subject su ∈ Sk such that UntrustedSubjectOwnerChain(su, k′, γ, T ) is true, where k′
is identical to k except there exists a column for object o and own ∈ M ′k[su, o]. This is
because su can create o, and grant x over o to s. In case (B), the query is true if and only if
ObjectOwnerChain(o, k, γ, T ) is true.
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